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Abstract 
 
Although human-caused climate change is one of the greatest societal challenges of the 21st 
century, insights from social and environmental psychology remain underrepresented in the 
mitigation debate. This is surprising given that the collective potential for reducing national 
carbon emissions through changes in individual lifestyles and behaviours has clearly been 
demonstrated. Accordingly, this PhD thesis aims to provide a more systematic and detailed 
understanding of individual mitigation behaviour. It does so specifically by examining the 
social-psychological determinants of climate change risk perceptions, intentions and 
behaviours using a longitudinal UK national survey (N = 808, wave 1) and (N = 501, wave 2).  
 
In total, three separate analyses were conducted using the national survey data. In the first 
analysis (chapter 4), a social-psychological model of climate change risk perceptions is 
advanced. The model proposes that public risk perceptions of climate change are influenced 
by three key psychological dimensions, namely; (i) cognitive, (ii) experiential and (iii) socio-
cultural factors. Results confirm the model’s validity and show that nearly 70% of the 
variance in risk perception can be explained by the model’s components. Main findings also 
provide empirical support for a distinction between personal and societal risk judgements and 
highlight important differences in their psychological antecedents. The second analysis 
(chapter 5) specifically investigates the interrelation between personal experience with 
extreme weather, affect and risk perception and situates their conceptual relationship within 
the cognition-emotion debate. Results provide strong support for a dual-process model, where 
risk perception and affect mutually influence each other in a stable feedback system.  
 
In the third analysis (chapter 6), a domain-context-behaviour (DCB) model is advanced. The 
purpose of the model is to causally conceptualize and systematically organize the social-
psychological determinants of climate change mitigation behaviours. A key aspect of the 
DCB model is the notion that environmental values (i.e. the “domain”) and climate change 
cognitions, norms and emotions (i.e. the “context”) do not influence specific mitigation 
intentions and behaviours (e.g. energy conservation) directly. Rather, they influence a broad 
and general orienting intention to help reduce climate change. This general intention in turn 
activates and predicts specific mitigation intentions directly as well as indirectly via 
behaviour-specific determinants. Important differences emerge between high-impact and low-
impact behavioural changes. Overall, results from this thesis have important implications for 
public policy, risk communication and behavioural change interventions. 
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1.1 Chapter Outline and Structure of Thesis 
 
 
 
During my first year as a doctoral student I came across a Wasthington Post article 
written by David Fahrenthold. In the article, Fahrenthold (2009, p.1) summarizes;  
“To a psychologist, climate change looks as if it was designed to be ignored. It is a global 
problem, with no obvious villains and no one-step solutions, whose worst effects seem as 
if they'll befall somebody else at some other time. In short, if someone set out to draw up 
a problem that people would not care about, it would look exactly like climate change.”  
Fahrenthold’s ironic portrayal of the issue captures an important reality: while 
global climate change is now widely considered to be the greatest environmental threat of 
the 21st century, it is also an unprecedented psychological challenge, requiring perhaps 
one of the greatest exercises in understanding and achieving large-scale behavioural 
change. Unfortunately, the human dimension of the climate change problem is also is the 
least understood dimension (Gifford, 2014). This becomes apparent from the fact that 
while large majorities of the public, both in the UK and elsewhere, are currently aware of 
and broadly concerned about climate change, behavioural engagement is lacking 
(Whitmarsh, Seyfang, & O’Neill, 2011). Accordingly, the central aim and contribution of 
this thesis is to advance a detailed and systematic social-psychological understanding of 
how people feel, think about and perceive the risk of climate change on one hand, and 
subsequently act on their values, perceptions, attitudes and intentions on the other.  
More specifically, this thesis consists of a collection of five independent but 
related papers which (including the introduction and general discussion) are presented in 
seven consecutive chapters. The first two chapters provide a detailed overview of the risk 
perception, communication and behavioural change literature and advance a new 
conceptual framework for communicating climate change. The empirical part of this 
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thesis (which comprises three out of the five papers) is based on results from a large 
national survey of the UK population. Very broadly, this thesis can conceptually be 
divided into two parts. In the first part, a detailed and integrated understanding is 
advanced of how people form risk judgements about climate change. To this extent, a 
comprehensive model of climate change risk perceptions is presented and subsequently 
tested and validated empirically. After the dimensional foundations for understanding 
public risk perceptions of climate change are laid out, the complex interrelationship 
between personal experiences with extreme weather, affective reactions and risk 
perception are explored in more detail through the lens of a dual-processing perspective.  
A major thematic link throughout this thesis is the notion that in order to build a 
more comprehensive and practically relevant social-psychological understanding of the 
problem, the way that people perceive, feel and think about climate change needs to be 
linked to not only people’s willingness to help reduce climate change but also to a set of 
impactful and specific mitigation behaviours – which is the subject of the second part of 
this thesis. More specifically, a domain-context-behaviour (DCB) model for explaining 
and predicting a wide range of mitigation behaviours is introduced and tested empirically.  
The rest of this introduction is structured as follows; first a brief contextual 
introduction to the climate change problem is provided. This section is followed by an 
explanation of the viewpoint and contribution that psychology as a discipline has to offer 
to the climate change problem. After explaining the rationale for a social-psychological 
approach to the issue, the scope and contribution of this thesis is discussed in more detail, 
particularly as to how it situates itself within the current literature. A detailed overview of 
the general philosophy and overarching methodological approach adopted in this thesis is 
given as well, including a description of the national survey design. The introduction 
section ends with an outline of the structure for the remainder of this thesis. 
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1.1  Problem Context: Climate Change  
 
 
“Climate change is probably the greatest long-term challenge facing the human race”                  
 
                                                                                                   Tony Blair (2006, p.4). 
 
1.1.1 Global Warming 
 
The temperature on earth is determined by a careful balance between solar energy 
received from the sun (input) and the reflection of some of this energy back into space 
(output). Much of the solar radiation that is not reflected back into space is absorbed by 
the earth’s land and oceans, warming the planet’s surface. As a result of this warming, so-
called “long-wave” (infrared) radiation is emitted by the earth. Greenhouse gases such as 
carbon dioxide (CO2) and methane (CH4) essentially function as a thermal blanket by 
“trapping” the radiation (heat) – causing the atmosphere to warm (Maslin, 2009).  
While the “greenhouse” effect is a natural process and an essential feature of life 
on earth, since the industrial revolution, human activities have substantially increased the 
amount of greenhouse gases (“GHGs”) such as CO2 in the atmosphere, causing it to trap 
more heat than it would otherwise. In fact, current levels of atmospheric greenhouse gas 
concentrations are the highest in 800,000 years and the global average temperature on 
earth has increased by about 0.85% over the last 130 years (Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change, 2013). Moreover, the projected rate of temperature change for this 
century steadily outpaces any extended global warming period that has occurred over the 
last 65 million years (American Association for the Advancement of Science, 2013).   
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1.1.2 Human Causation: The Scientific Consensus  
 
 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report is widely regarded as the most 
authoritative international scientific investigation into global warming and their latest 
findings suggest, with 95% certainty, that anthropogenic (i.e. human-caused) climate 
change is a reality (IPCC, 2013). The IPCC is certainly not alone in its conclusion: a 
recent study that surveyed over 12,500 peer-reviewed abstracts on the subject of global 
climate change found that 97% of the papers support the consensus position that humans 
are causing global warming (Cook et al., 2013). Indeed, as Maibach, Myers and 
Leiserowitz (2014) note, evidence of a near-unanimous scientific consensus on the human 
causes of climate change has consistently been demonstrated by a wide variety of studies  
(e.g. see Anderegg et al., 2010; Doran & Zimmerman, 2009: Oreskes, 2004). 
 
1.1.3 A Changing Climate 
 
Climate change is a statistical property that refers to the average long-term variability in 
the earth’s climate (IPCC, 2013). As previously mentioned, the earth’s climate is 
changing, primarily as a result of human activities. For example, the atmosphere and 
oceans have warmed, the amount of snow and ice has decreased and the average sea level 
has risen (IPCC, 2013). In particular, the rate of (global) warming has steadily increased 
over the last 50 years and the last three decades have likely been the warmest 30-year 
period of the last 1400 years. As ice glaciers continue to shrink worldwide, the average 
rate of sea level rise (since the mid-19th century) has steadily surpassed the average rate 
observed during the previous two thousand years (IPCC, 2013). Moreover, further 
increases in the average global temperature are likely to significantly disrupt the earth’s 
climate system (National Resource Council, 2013).  
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Because the climate system is comprised of very complex feedback mechanisms, 
there is a reasonable amount of uncertainty associated with specific impact-predictions on 
the global, national and regional levels. Yet, some likely consequences of global climate 
change include; more frequent extreme weather events (e.g. heavy precipitation, flooding, 
freak storms, heat waves etc.), droughts, increased wildfires, resource scarcity, impacts on 
human health (e.g. spreading of infectious disease), social unrest, species extinctions, loss 
of biodiversity and flooding of low-lying coastal countries, small island nations and wed-
land ecosystems (IPCC, 2013).  
Downscaled effects for the UK in particular are likely to include increased 
flooding as a result of both heavier downpours and sea-level rise along with greater 
extremes of heat and drought, stresses on water resources, loss of flora and fauna as well 
as at least some loss of low-lying coastal land (Met Office, 2011). In fact, some of the 
impacts of climate change are already visible around the world (e.g. Coumou & 
Rahmstorf, 2012; Ki-Min et al., 2011; Parmesan, 2006; Parmesan & Yohe, 2003). Over 
the last seven years alone, increased heat waves, (summer) floods and prolonged cold 
periods (heavy snow) have significantly damaged and interrupted UK infrastructure, 
costing the economy billions of pounds (Defra, 2012).  
As highlighted by the UK Treasury’s “Stern Review”, the benefits of early 
mitigation and adaptation strategies strongly outweigh the associated costs. In fact, 
without substantial action, the societal and economic costs of unhalted climate change are 
going to be grave (Stern, 2007). Indeed, if catastrophic consequences are to be avoided, 
the scientific consensus suggests that warming should be kept below 2°C by the end of 
the century (IPCC, 2013). Yet, in order to do so, widespread public support and action 
will be required (Milfont, 2012). 
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1.2 Addressing Climate Change: A Social-Psychological Approach 
 
“Psychologists provide a theoretically and empirically based understanding of human 
behaviour at the individual level. This level of analysis is relevant for understanding the 
human causes of climate change because it is the collective impact of human behaviours 
that is contributing to climate change” – (APA, 2009, p. 15) 
 
Whether or not disastrous climate change can be avoided by keeping future warming of 
the planet to a minimum will ultimately be the result of (collective) human behaviour and 
decision making. Indeed, it is said that we have entered the age of the “anthropocene”, 
where human activities increasingly control the ultimate direction and functioning of the 
Earth’s systems (Steffen, 2010). The human activities that drive climate change mainly 
refer to behaviours that involve the release of three primary greenhouse gases (GHGs), 
including; carbon dioxide emissions through the burning of fossil fuels such as oil, coal 
and gas (e.g. automobiles, household heating, air travel), agricultural activities that are 
responsible for the release of methane (e.g. raising cattle, livestock, meat consumption) as 
well as the emission of nitrous oxide (e.g. through industrial processes).  
As highlighted by a special task-force report of the American Psychological 
Association, because climate change is driven by human behaviour, the value of a 
psychological perspective is indispensable (APA, 2009). Indeed, as Stern (2011) 
comments; “psychology can make a significant contribution to limiting the magnitude of 
climate change” (p.1). Particularly, because the very nature of (applied) psychology 
revolves around understanding, explaining and changing behaviour in response to a 
problem (Kaiser, Schultz, & Scheuthle, 2007; Klӧckner & Blobaum, 2010). Overall, there 
is little question that psychology (and environmental psychology in particular) is uniquely 
suited to contribute to a better understanding of the human dimensions of climate change 
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(Ernst & Wenzel, 2014; Gifford, 2008, 2014; Schmuck & Vlek, 2003; Spence, Pidgeon, 
& Uzzell, 2009; Stern, 2011).  
 
1.2.1 Psychology: An Undervalued Perspective?  
 
 
The value of a psychological perspective is evident in that the most important dimension 
of the climate change system (i.e. the human-dimension) is also the least understood 
(Gifford et al., 2011). In fact, not only is it the least understood dimension, it is also the 
most overlooked. For example, Spence and Pidgeon (2009) argue that despite the clear 
human, cultural and social dimensions of climate change, solutions are mostly framed in 
terms of new technologies, industry incentives and other economic and market-based 
instruments. Indeed, insights from social and environmental psychology remain severely 
underrepresented in the mitigation debate (Klӧckner, 2011; Ernst & Wenzel, 2014).   
To this extent, Klӧckner (2011) highlights the technocratic bias that becomes 
apparent when reading past IPCC reports (i.e. there is virtually no mentioning of insights 
from psychology). On the whole it is not unfair to conclude that; “discourse on climate 
change in the media and among policy-makers is virtually silent on the role of 
psychology” (Gifford, 2008, p. 273). This is not a new development per se, as during the 
1970 energy crisis so-called “technological fixes” and “price mechanisms” were (despite 
limited success) equally given priority, while in fact, social psychology had much to say 
about energy conservation (e.g. Ester, 1985; Gaskell & Ellis, 1982; Gaskell & Pike, 
1983). While technological advances and economic strategies such as incentives and price 
mechanisms are undoubtedly important in their own right, they tend to focus solely on 
creating “extrinsinc motivation” – a strategy which has consistently shown to crowd out 
people’s “intrinsic motivation” to help the environment (e.g. Ariely, Bracha, & Meier, 
2009; Evans et al., 2013; Frey, 1994; Frey & Oberholtzer-Gee, 1997). In fact, external 
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incentives only tend to work as long as the incentive is maintained (e.g. if someone 
decides to reduce their energy consumption in order to save or earn money, changes in 
that person’s economic circumstances might quickly negate such conservation efforts). In 
short, external incentives are not stable, long-term motivators of pro-environmental 
behaviour (Steg, Bolderdijk, Keizer, & Perlaviciute, 2014). Yet, the determinants of 
stable pro-environmental conduct is a central area of research for both social and 
environmental psychologists (Gifford, 2008, 2014).  
The continued lack of consideration of a psychological perspective is therefore 
astonishing, especially given the fact that figures from both the US and the UK indicate 
that changes in individual lifestyles and behaviours could reduce national carbon dioxide 
emissions by as much as 20% to 30% (Dietz et al., 2009; Dietz, Stern, & Weber, 2013; 
Gardner & Stern, 2008; UKERC, 2009).  Such “mitigation”1 behaviours include personal 
transport choices, home energy and water usage as well as various food and consumption 
behaviours (Defra, 2008). In fact, the adoption of voluntary mitigation behaviours by the 
public will play a central role in transitioning to a low-carbon society (Whitmarsh, 
Seyfang, & O’Neill, 2011), especially in light of the ambitious targets set by the EU and 
the UK Climate Change Act, which aim for an 80% to 95% GHG emissions reduction by 
2050 relative to the 1990 baseline (HM Government, 2008).  
Thus, understanding behavioural change in the context of climate change is 
therefore critical (Brody, Grover, & Vedlitz, 2012). Yet, while the potential for change is 
clear, so far, public engagement with climate change in the UK (and elsewhere) remains 
                                               
 
1 The terms “mitigation”, “low-carbon”, “conservation”, “pro-environmental” and “sustainable” are often 
used interchangeably. The term “mitigation behaviour” is generally preferred here in the context of climate 
change because it specifically and unambiguously refers to behavioural changes that can help reduce the 
human impact on the climate system. The terms pro-environmental / sustainable may refer to a broader 
class of behaviours (such as keeping a public park clean) and the term “low-carbon” tends to downplay the 
impact of other important behaviours and greenhouse gases (e.g. agricultural activities, methane).  
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limited, which is problematic as many individual behaviours need to be changed in a 
relatively short amount of time (De Young, 1993, 2011). In fact, despite international 
awareness and general concern for the issue (Bord, Fisher, & O’Connor, 1998; 
Eurobarometer, 2014; Kim & Nahmias, 2014; Lorenzoni & Pidgeon, 2006; Pidgeon, 
2012), climate change is; (a) generally viewed as a psychologically distant risk, both 
temporally as well as spatially (Leiserowitz, 2005, 2006; O’Neill & Hulme, 2009; 
Spence, Poortinga, & Pidgeon, 2012) and (b) of low personal importance to people 
(Lorenzoni et al., 2006; Weber, 2010), especially in comparison to other urgent economic 
and societal problems (Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2003; Pew, 2012). As a result, behavioural 
engagement has remained low (Lorenzoni, Nicholson-Cole, & Whitmarsh, 2007; 
Whitmarsh, Seyfang, & O’Neill, 2011). The apparent gap between general awareness and 
concern for the risk of climate change on one hand, and the clear lack of personal action 
on the other, is often dubbed the “value-action” (Kollmuss & Agyeman, 2002) or 
“attitude-behaviour” (Newhouse, 1990) gap – which is of fundamental interest to both 
social and environmental psychologists. 
 
1.2.2 Adaptation vs. Mitigation 
 
 
The lack of appropriate action refers to both adaptation and mitigation (the two broad 
response options to human-induced climate change). While mitigation is primarily 
focused on reducing the human emission of greenhouse gases (GHGs) to avoid further 
and potentially more dangerous climate change, adaptation is more concerned with 
managing both current and future impacts of climate change (e.g. through building dikes 
and more resilient infrastructures). It is evident that both approaches are essential as 
regardless of future mitigation efforts, some level of climate change is going to be 
inevitable - making adaptation a necessity (Parry et al., 1998). 
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 Yet, while the importance of adaptation strategies is duly acknowledged, the 
focus of this thesis is mostly on mitigation behaviour. Primarily because there are 
important differences between the two approaches that make mitigation a particularly 
interesting problem for psychology, namely; (a) the spatial and temporal scales on which 
they are effective and (b) the relative distribution of the associated costs and benefits 
(Klein, Schipper, & Dessai, 2005). For example, adaptation is relatively obvious in that it 
requires individuals to respond to a visible or imaginable local risk (e.g. flooding) for 
which the physical and psychological benefits of immediate action are relatively clear.  
Mitigation on the other hand, calls for a (significant) personal cost at present for a 
potentially large but uncertain and globally distributed benefit in the future (Klein, 
Schipper, & Dessai, 2005). In fact, the mitigation issue can be described as a social 
dilemma, common resource or collective action problem (Dawes, 1980; Hardin, 1968; 
Olson, 1965). As Otto, Kaiser and Arnold (2014) highlight, there is a constant conflict 
between prioritizing short-term selfish interests (e.g. driving out of convience) over 
behavioural changes that pose a cost today but ultimately benefit a long-term collective 
good (i.e. limiting global climate change).  
Lastly, while adaptation to the impacts of climate change will largely be in the 
public’s interest, the benefits of voluntary mitigation actions are predicated on a shared 
belief that humans are causing global warming – which, despite the scientific evidence, is 
certainly not a universal belief (e.g. Leiserowitz et al., 2013; Leviston & Walker, 2013; 
Poortinga et al., 2011). In short, the level (local vs. global) on which benefits and costs 
are construed mentally differ for adaptation and mitigation. Particularly, the concerns and 
benefits that motivate adaptation tend to be psychologically closer and less “challenging” 
than those which influence mitigation responses (Haden et al., 2012; Whitmarsh, 2008).  
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1.2.3  Scope and Contribution of Thesis 
 
 
A central characteristic of the climate change problem revolves around the notion of 
“risk”. The way in which people come to perceive climate change as a risk on one hand, 
and the extent to which people then subsequently act on their perceptions, values and 
intentions on the other, is the central topic of this thesis. In fact, the current thesis broadly 
situates itself between two separate but closely related contributions that psychology can 
make to the climate change debate. First, psychology can help advance understanding of 
how people think and feel about climate change risks, which is important because these 
factors in turn affect people’s motivations and behavioural responses (Swim et al., 2011).  
More specifically, it has been noted that the environmental psychology literature 
lacks theoretical integration (e.g. Castro, 2006; Klӧckner & Blobaum, 2010), this is 
reflected in both the variety of models and approaches used to explain and describe public 
risk perceptions as well as in terms of systematically mapping the psychosocial 
determinants of mitigation behaviours. For example, Wåhlberg (2001) notes that while it 
is now well-known that people experience risk in different dimensions, no coherent 
attempt has been made to piece them together to arrive at a more integrated and 
comprehensive understanding. To this extent, the current thesis advances a novel and 
integrated framework for understanding and measuring risk perception in the context of 
climate change. In particular, this thesis suggests that public risk perceptions of climate 
change are influenced by three core psychological dimensions, namely; cognitive, 
experiential and socio-cultural factors (controlling for key socio-demographic 
characteristics). These conceptual foundations are validated empirically using a national 
quota sample of the UK population and at the time of this writing, the model proposed in 
this thesis offers the most comprehensive explanatory account of climate change risk 
perceptions (at least, in terms of variance explained).  
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Secondly, Finucane (2012) comments that; “clarifying the mechanisms by which 
feelings and cognitions are related and integrated in human judgement and decision 
making is a critical next step in understanding perceived risk” (p. 61). Indeed, most prior 
investigations have assumed a unidirectional and linear relationship between key 
perceptual and psychological risk constructs. While this may, to some exent, reflect a 
limitation in the methodology that is available to (most) psychologists and risk 
researchers, the current thesis ventures beyond traditional modes of thinking by being the 
first to explore the interdependent relationship between personal experiences with 
extreme weather events, the formation of (negative) affective evaluations and risk 
perceptions of climate change. In particular, this thesis uses a non-recursive (i.e. 
feedback) structural equation modelling approach to examine how cognitive and affective 
factors reciprocally influence each other to shape perceptions of climate change.  
As mentioned, closely related, a second contribution that psychology can make to 
the climate change debate is “to improve our understanding of the behaviours that drive 
climate change by building more effective behavioural models based on empirical 
analyses that contribute to a deeper and more detailed understanding of individual 
behaviour” (APA, 2009, p.8). With regard to the psychological determinants of mitigation 
behaviours, a specific focus on climate change has been lacking (Brody et al., 2012; 
Roser-Renouf & Nisbet, 2008) and as Whitmarsh (2009) points out, existing research has 
so far mostly been exploratory in nature. In particular, it has remained unclear how broad 
value structures and general concern for the environment are related to specific norms, 
beliefs and perceptions about climate change and in turn, how beliefs and perceptions 
about climate change influence specific mitigation intentions and behaviours. This thesis 
offers a novel explanation to this problem by introducing and validating a domain-
context-behaviour (DCB) model. The DCB model structurally organises key social-
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psychological determinants in a theoretically coherent manner to explain and predict a 
wide range of mitigation intentions and behaviours. The DCB model further improves 
current understanding by identifying key common psychological antecedents (as well as 
differences) between important low and high impact behavioural changes. 
Overall, this thesis advances a more integrated, systematic and comprehensive 
social-psychological understanding of climate change risk perceptions, intentions and 
behaviours and as such, is likely to help increase the saliency of psychological research in 
the mitigation debate (Klӧckner, 2011), especially in light of a growing demand for more 
“evidence-based” public policy (Gifford, 2008). For example, a systematic understanding 
of the key psychological determinants that shape and influence climate change risk 
perceptions, intentions and behaviours is likely to assist organisations and policy-makers 
in communicating the risk of climate change more effectively and allow interventionists 
to design better targeted and more informed behavioural change campaigns.  
 
1.3  General Philosophy and Approach 
 
“There is nothing so practical as a good theory” (Kurt Lewin, 1951 p. 169) 
 
1.3.1 The Individual Level: Some Critical Reflections 
 
 
Some of social psychology’s predominant focus on the role of individual-level 
perceptions, values, attitudes and behaviours has not gone without criticism (e.g. Farr, 
1991, 1996; Gaskell, 2001; Howarth, 2006), particularly for neglecting the notion that 
individual behaviours tend to be “deeply embedded in social situations, institutional 
contexts and cultural norms” (Shove, 2010, p. 1276). Indeed, the progressive 
“individualisation” and “decontextualisation” of social psychology is often said to have 
taken the “social” out of social psychology (Howarth, 2006; Graumann, 1986).  
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Some of these philosophical differences in psychological research can be traced 
back to different cultural traditions. In Europe, psychology was essentially born out of the 
philosophy of mind (Farr, 1991), given it a strong theoretical focus, whereas mainstream 
American social-psychological research is often characterised as being “individualistic” 
and mostly “empirically-driven” (Greenwood, 2004; Voelklein & Howarth, 2005). While, 
stereotypically, American social psychology may de-emphasise theory and overly 
concern itself with the importance of individual information processing, European social-
psychological theories that deal with more complex collective social concepts are often 
difficult to test empirically and may lack controlled experimental rigour (Eysenck, 2001).  
Despite these stereotypes, it is important to note that both approaches bring an 
equally valuable perspective to the table. Yet, Shove (2010) continues to criticise 
psychology’s attempt to model social-contextual factors by “importing” them as causal 
factors of and external drivers to behaviour rather than emphasizing the endogenous, 
dynamic and emergent nature of social practice. Shove is also dismissive of any potential 
for integration between the two disciplines, which is surprising given the fact that other 
scholars have long fostered a joint venture between psychology and sociology, a field 
perhaps better known as “societal psychology” (Himmelweit & Gaskell, 1990). Similarly, 
in the context of risk perception, Jackson, Allum & Gaskell (2006) highlight the benefits 
of integrating psychological and sociological approaches. Yet, the persistent argument 
that social psychology has become “asocial” is somewhat misleading. It is misleading 
“because it tends to suggest that social psychology ought to concern itself with the 
emergent properties of supraindividual social groups as opposed to the psychological 
properties of individuals who constitute social groups” (Greenwood, 2004, p.11).  
Furthermore, as Whitmarsh, O’Neill, & Lorenzoni (2011) note in their reply to 
Shove (2010), the overly simplistic portrayal of psychological models of behaviour and 
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the general dismissal of non-sociological approaches to behavioural change is entirely 
unwarranted. Ultimately, a social-psychological “approach” is not a unidimensional one 
and as I hope to have illustrated, there is no shortage of different philosophies on the 
historical conception and representation of the “individual” vs. the “social”. 
 
1.3.2 Situating the Current Work 
 
 
The above debate is meaningful in situating the current work, which is born out of and 
influenced by both traditions. While Shove (2010) seems to be entirely dismissive of 
social psychology’s attempt to “incorporate” social-contextual factors (e.g. by exploring 
how social norms affect behaviour), it is generally uncontested in psychology that social 
norms are one way of representing the “social” – even although more radical approaches 
may exist (Howarth, 2006). In fact, in line with the more practical and constructive views 
of Whitmarsh et al. (2011), the current thesis aims to better incorporate “contextual” 
factors in applied social-psychological theories, which is much needed in the 
environmental domain (Gifford, 2008; Steg & Vlek, 2009).  
Overall, the current thesis aligns itself with the philosophy that the “social” can be 
represented as part of the perspective of the “individual”. Primarily because ultimately, 
social-psychological states and behavioural dispositions neither belong to metaphysically 
(dubious) emergent entities nor to “trans-or-supra individual processes and structures”, 
rather, they belong to the individual and to the individual mind alone (Greenwald, 2004, 
p. 12). While Uzzell (2010) agrees with the basic notion that attitudes and values reside 
within the individual mind, he emphasises the connection to contextual factors by 
stressing that; “we must remember that they have gotten there somehow” (p. 882).  
Thus, in comparison to other recent important social-psychological work that has, 
for example, explored social representations theory (Smith & Joffe, 2012) or the larger 
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socio-cultural meaning of the climate change debate (Capstick, 2012; Tanner, 2011), the 
overarching epistemological approach adopted in thesis may be type-casted as an 
“individualistic environmental psychology” (Vlek, 2000) - where the fundamental unit of 
analysis is the individual. As Gifford (2008, p. 279) notes; “we can, and should, do the 
fundamental research on individuals and climate change“. After all, “one of psychology’s 
unique contributions is to the understanding of behaviour at the individual level” (APA, 
2009, p.8). In fact, the driving motivation behind this thesis is strongly aligned with 
Gifford’s (2008) view that while the importance of “contextual” factors should be 
acknowledged, the ultimate solution to climate change lies with (changing) the 
psychology of the individual. As I have noted elsewhere, while incremental behavioural 
change approaches may be criticised for not fundamentally questioning wider socio-
cultural practices, this criticism is distracting as it devalues the important contribution that 
psychology can make in terms of offering a practical and empirically-informed 
understanding of human behaviour at the individual level (van der Linden, 2012).  
Yet, at the same time, climate change is an inherently interdisciplinary problem 
and doing so requires an integrated effort (Pidgeon & Fischhoff, 2011; Swim et al., 2011). 
While its theories and methods are very much influenced by social and cognitive 
psychology (Steg, van den Berg, & De Groot, 2013), environmental psychology by its 
very nature has a long history of crossing disciplinary boundaries (Gifford, 2008), closely 
collaborating with geographers and environmental scientists. The current thesis follows in 
this tradition: while the overarching approach is social-psychological in nature, insights 
are gathered and applied from across the social, environmental and behavioural sciences. 
In addition, every study reported in this thesis starts with a strong theoretical 
outlook and is based on a (primarily) deductive and theory-driven approach. Particularly 
because a deductive strategy in this context allows for; (1) precise operationalisation of 
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theoretical constructs, (2) the ability to explain the causal processes through which they 
affect behaviour and (3) a systematic and comparative investigation of competing models 
and hypotheses (Bamberg & Schmidt, 2003). For example, a major theme throughout this 
thesis is a distinction between models of behaviour and theories of change. While 
“models of behaviour” aid in understanding specific behaviours by identifying the 
underlying factors that influence them, theories of change show how behaviours can be 
changed and / or change over time (Darnton, 2008; van der Linden, 2013a).  
While having distinct purposes, the two approaches are also highly 
complementary. In fact, the general philosophy adopted in this thesis is that as opposed to 
finding out “what works” experimentally on a “hit and miss” basis, in order to 
successfully change any behaviour, a grounded theoretical and empirical understanding of 
the factors that influence and determine relevant perceptions and behaviours must be 
established first (Government Communication Network, 2009; Gifford et al., 2011; van 
der Linden, 2013a). Indeed, trying to engage the public with mass communication 
campaigns is going to be of little success if such efforts are not founded on sound 
behavioural research (Pidgeon & Fischhoff, 2011). Thus, in line with this philosophy, 
throughout this thesis a symbiotic relationship between “models of behaviour” and 
“theories of change” is maintained.  
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1.4  Methodology 
  
 
1.4.1 Qualitative vs. Quantitative Considerations  
 
 
The value of any scientific approach must be evaluated in light of the research question 
that it is trying to answer. While the behavioural and social sciences are certainly 
interrelated, they are not quite one and the same, as they differ in their level of scientific 
analysis. While the social sciences tend to apply conceptual frameworks to the study of 
human society and the role of individuals within society (e.g. by studying structural 
systems, cultures and the impacts of social organisation), the behavioural sciences mainly 
focus on systematically abstracting empirical data to understand, explain and predict 
behavioural processes within a social system, including human decision-making and 
communication strategies (Klemke, Hollinger, & Kline, 1980). Of course, these 
distinctions are never hard and fast, as some areas of psychology lean more towards a 
social science perspective, whereas others take a more behavioural scientific approach.  
While qualitative (e.g. case studies, discourse analysis, field work) and 
quantitative approaches (e.g. experiments, close-ended surveys) are not mutually 
exclusive and often complement each other (Bauer & Gaskell, 2000), not all methods are 
equally well-equipped to answer a particular research question. For example, while 
qualitative research is often concerned with understanding the perspective of participants, 
developing theory from field work or to define phenomena in terms of experienced 
(interpretive) meanings, quantitative methods are particularly well-suited for testing 
hypothesised (causal) relationships, generalisability of findings and for evaluating the 
validity, reliability and underlying factor structure of psychological measures (Elliot, 
Fischer, & Rennie, 1999). 
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The major focus of this thesis is on testing hypothesised theoretical/causal 
relationships between psychological constructs in order to explain key perceptual and 
behavioural processes that are relevant to understanding human responses to climate 
change. In addition, this thesis explores the underlying factor structure of important 
psychological constructs (e.g. risk perception) and aims to identify systematic and robust 
data patterns that can be generalised across a representative sample. Thus, while drawing 
on some qualitative work (e.g. a focus group), the overarching scientific approach taken 
in this thesis is positivist and grounded in a quantitative survey methodology that draws 
heavily on the psychometric paradigm (i.e. the theory of psychological measurement).  
 
1.4.2 The Psychometric vs. Experimental Paradigm 
 
 
The question may be raised why, in this context, a survey methodology is thought to be 
better suited than an experimental approach. In short, the reason for this is that a national 
survey has high external validity, is generally a good method for reaching larger 
populations as well as for studying the relationships among psychological variables (Steg, 
van den Berg, & De Groot, 2013). In fact, while experiments tend to maximize internal 
validity at the expense of external validity (Argyris, 1975), this thesis is more concerned 
with identifying meaningful theoretical relationships between psychological properties 
that are generalisable to a larger population. To this extent, online survey research is 
welcomed in psychology (Gosling et al., 2004), as Gifford (2008) notes, in order to tackle 
climate change, research should, preferably, be generalisable beyond (a) the “laboratory” 
and (b) “introduction to psychology” students - two ever present conditions which have 
not served social psychology well (Sears, 1986; Peterson, 2001).  
Furthermore, the difference between psychometric and experimental variables is 
often poorly understood (Bindra & Scheier, 1954). Experimental investigations tend to 
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produce variation by altering the subject's external environment, internal state, or both. In 
other words, the experimentalist obtains variation by subjecting groups or individuals to 
different treatment conditions. In contrast, in psychometric research, no attempt is made 
to produce any change in the individual under investigation (in fact, the individual is to 
stay put). Instead, variation is obtained by surveying individuals that differ with respect to 
the psychological construct(s) of interest (Bindra & Scheier, 1954).  
This thesis is concerned with keeping the psychological properties under 
investigation (e.g. risk perceptions of climate change) constant in order to learn more 
about how individuals differ with respect to those properties while advancing and testing 
a theoretically novel explanation for the observed level of variation. Of course, both 
approaches could be combined and a variable (e.g. risk) can be expressed both 
psychometrically (e.g. risk perception) as well as experimentally (e.g. under varying 
levels of induced threat). Yet, given the research objective of this thesis, the psychometric 
paradigm is able to obtain an amount of variation that cannot be achieved through 
experimentation, no matter how rigorously conditions are manipulated. For example, a 
survey instrument allows for the measurement of a large number of self-reported 
behaviours at the same time - enabling a more systematic investigation of determinants.  
It may be argued that people tend to somewhat overestimate their self-reported 
concern and pro-environmental behaviour (e.g. Bord et al., 1998; Chao & Lam, 2009; 
Gifford et al., 2011). In addition, the possibility of course exists that the mere act of 
asking people for their willingness to perform a socially desirable behaviour could 
inadvertently increase the probability that someone will actually do so, a phenomenon 
known as the “mere measurement” effect (Morwitz & Fitzsimons, 2004). Yet, the impact 
of social desirability bias has actually proven to be quite negligible in the environmental 
domain (Milfont, 2009). Moreover, the alternative, observing, tracking and manipulating 
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a large number of widely different public (e.g. riding the bus) and private (e.g. shower 
time) behaviours simultaneously seems neither practical nor feasible (Tobler et al., 2012). 
Additionally, complex multivariate relationships between different latent (i.e. 
unobserved) psychological constructs (e.g. knowledge, affect, risk perception) can be well 
represented within a behavioural system using statistical and psychometric techniques 
such as structural equation modelling (Bullock, Harlow, & Mulaik, 1994). 
 Furthermore, using a large-scale national survey also constructively builds on 
existing survey literature, as much research in this area has been limited to intention-only 
research (e.g. Heath & Gifford, 2006; Poortinga et al., 2012; Spence et al., 2011; Tobler 
et al., 2012), non-representative student samples (e.g. Hidalgo & Pisano, 2010; Klӧckner 
& Blobaum, 2010; Truelove, 2009) or studies that measure psychological dispositions 
and (past) behaviour(s) at the same point in time (e.g. Semenza et al., 2008; Whitmarsh, 
2009). Indeed, separation between the collection of the independent (e.g. risk perception, 
attitudes, intention) and dependent (e.g. behaviour) measures reduces common method 
bias and increases the potential for causal inference (Biddle, Slavings, & Anderson, 1985; 
Podsakoff et al., 2003).  
 
1.4.3 Sample and Participants 
 
 
Accordingly, this thesis uses a longitudinal UK national quota sample to survey a wide 
range of psychological properties, including; risk perceptions, experiences with exteme 
weather events, values, attitudes, norms, emotions, intentions, habits, barriers and 
behaviours related to climate change. Given the relatively large degree of internet 
penetration in the UK (approx. 77% of the population), the survey was administered 
online via a survey sampling company (Survey Sampling International). Using multi-
stage randomisation, participants were selected from a large mixed panel of people who 
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were willing to participate in web-based research for a small (symbolic) reward that they 
could choose to either keep or donate. The total cost of the sample was approx. £5,000. 
The national quotas were based on gender, age and region and reflect the 2001 
Census data for the United Kingdom. The age of the participants ranged between 18 and 
65 (see appendix C for full sample characteristics). The questionnaire took about 15 to 20 
minutes to complete and was carried out in two waves. During the first wave in October 
of 2012, respondents (N = 808) were surveyed on all constructs except for self-reported 
behaviour. Four weeks later, the same panel members were asked to report on their 
behaviour and (N = 501) participants responded. The panel attrition rate was 38%. Panel 
attrition often only marginally affects the composition of the sample (Chang & Krosnick, 
2009). Yet, the pattern of missingness in the current study is not fully random but can 
reasonably be controlled for and is further detailed in other sections of this thesis. 
The rationale behind the online survey method is that online (web-based) surveys 
offer many measurement advantages over more traditional telephone or face-to-face 
techniques, including less random error, less surveys satisficing, less social desirability 
bias and more valid self-reports (Chang & Krosnick, 2009; Yeager et al., 2011). 
However, these benefits do not negate the fact that online panels suffer from what is 
generally referred to as an “opt-in selection bias” (Yeager et al., 2011). It should be 
mentioned however that participants did not pre or self-select what surveys they wanted 
to participate in. In addition, while online panels or so-called “non-probability” samples 
are generally deemed to be less representative (even after weighting adjustments have 
been made) by some (e.g. Chang & Krosnick, 2009; Malhotra & Krosnick, 2007; Yeager 
et al., 2011), this remains an active area of debate (Couper, 2000), particularly now that 
internet access among the UK general population has increased to over 77% (Office of 
National Statistics, 2011).  
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For example, probability samples with very low response rates are not necessarily 
less “biased” (Brick, 2011; Couper, 2000). Moreover, another study that compared the 
validity of traditional random digit dialing (RDD) techniques to that of web-surveys (both 
quota and probability-based) specifically in the context of climate change found that      
(a) when it comes to statistical inferences about relational differences between variables 
of interest, modest differences between the three methods exist but parameter estimates 
tend to be similar and (b) national quota samples obtained from large online panels are 
often sufficiently “representative” in comparison (Berrens et al., 2003).  
 
1.4.4 Design and Structure of National Survey 
 
 
The survey (appendix D) was designed partly at the London School of Economics and 
Political Science and partly at the Yale Project on Climate Change Communication. In 
designing the survey, the time-lapsed between measurement points (i.e. four weeks) was 
based on a careful trade-off between temporal contiguity and temporal erosion 
(Rindfleisch et al., 2008). This is a complicated matter in the sense that capturing the right 
temporal sequence is very much dependent on theory and context (Marini & Singer, 
1988; Mitchell & James, 2001). Yet, while any time period is unlikely to perfectly 
accommodate the idiosyncratic circumstances of each respondent and every behaviour, on 
average, four weeks was chosen to (a) reduce the cognitive accessibility of previous 
responses and (b) to allow enough time for psychological dispositions (e.g. intentions) to 
materialise into behaviour but not to the extent that it “erodes” the cause-effect 
relationship (Bradburn, Rips, & Shevell, 1987; Ajzen, 2011) or that the action becomes 
too difficult for people to accurately recall (Gaskell, Wright, & O’Muircheartaigh, 2000). 
In addition, while crafting the survey debates about terminology (climate change 
vs. global warming) were taken into account. Although the two terms are often used 
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interchangeably in the literature, some studies report that people tend to have different 
cognitive and affective associations with each term while other studies have found that 
levels of awareness and concern do not differ much between the two terms (cf. Schuldt, 
Konrath, & Schwarz, 2011; Villar & Krosnick, 2011; Whitmarsh, 2009b). Because the 
scientific term is “climate change” and because climate change has become the 
predominant frame in the UK media (Doyle, 2011; Capstick, 2012), the term “climate 
change” (rather than global warming) was used throughout the survey.  
Yet, as suggested by Leiserowitz (personal communication), to avoid confusion 
between the two terms (and to differentiate historical from recent climate change), at the 
start of the survey, respondents were a given a brief but objective explanation of what is 
meant by the term “climate change”: “You may have heard of the term 'climate change' 
(also referred to as 'global warming' in the media). Climate change refers to the idea that 
the world's average temperature has been increasing in the last 150 years, may be 
increasing in the future and that the world's climate may change as a result”. 
Furthermore, in designing the survey, common method biases and other design 
challenges (e.g. priming, order and context effects) were duly taken into account (e.g. see  
Krosnick, 1999; O’Muircheartaigh, Gaskell, & Wright, 1993; Podsakoff et al., 2003; 
Wright, Gaskell, & O’Muircheartaigh, 1997) and addressed when possible (e.g. through 
question / item randomisation). In addition, “don’t know” and “not applicable” options 
were provided where relevant - which is generally considered good practice in survey 
research (Leiserowitz, personal communication; Spence et al., 2012). Moreover, in order 
to tailor the survey to the UK context and to make sure that the language, questions and 
response options were clearly formulated and perceived as unambiguous by the target 
audience, the survey was pilot tested first using a focus group of (N = 15) members of the 
general public. The focus group was conducted at the behavioural research lab of the LSE 
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(appendix E). One issue that cropped up during the session was the length of the survey, 
which was eventually reduced to 20 minutes (maximum). Other issues included the initial 
list of potential “barriers”, which did not encompass some of the challenges to 
behavioural change frequently mentioned by the participants (e.g. autonomy of the 
decision). Results from the pilot study were used to refine and finalise the questionnaire.  
 
1.5  Outline of Thesis 
 
 
The remainder of this thesis is organised around five chapters that jointly build a 
comprehensive and systematic understanding of the social-psychological determinants of 
climate change risk perceptions, intentions and behaviours (Table 1.1). First, in chapter 2, 
a detailed survey of the literature is offered, with a particular emphasis on exploring the 
gap between communicating (the risk of) climate change and changing individual 
behaviour. Chapter 3 provides a more specific review of how people form risk 
perceptions of climate change psychologically and lays the conceptual foundations for a 
new integrated model. The empirical part of this thesis (chapters 4, 5 and 6) is based on 
data from a national survey and reported as three separate analyses. Building on chapter 
3, a new social-psychological model of climate change risk perceptions is advanced and 
validated empirically in chapter 4. The fifth chapter extends this research by specifically 
exploring the complex interrelationship between affective and cognitive aspects of 
climate change risk judgements. In chapter 6, a domain-context-behaviour (DCB) model 
is advanced. The DCB is a new behaviour prediction model that conceptually links the 
way people feel, think about and perceive the risk of climate change to the performance 
of specific mitigation behaviours by structurally organising the social-psychological 
antecedents of these behaviours in a novel theoretical framework. Last but not least, 
chapter 7 summarises the main findings of this thesis and ends with a general discussion. 
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Table 1.1:  Outline of Chapters and PhD thesis  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Outline of PhD Chapters Key Research Aims     Method 
1. Introduction. 
 
 
2. Towards a new model for communicating climate 
 
 
 
 
Broad review of the communication and 
 
 
 
 
Qualitative  
Review change. behaviour change literature; advance new   
 communication model  
 
3. The role of knowledge, learning and mental models 
 
Specific review of risk perception literature; 
 
Qualitative  
in public perceptions of climate change related risks. propose and explore key conceptual   Review 
 dimensions.  
 
4. The social-psychological determinants of climate 
 
Advance and test a new integrated risk 
 
National Survey 
change risk perceptions: Towards a comprehensive perception model. Explore differences in  
model. determinants between personal and societal  
 risk judgements.  
 
5. On the relationship between personal experience, 
 
Explore the complex interrelationship 
 
National Survey 
affect and risk perception: the case of climate change. between personal experience with extreme 
 
weather, negative affect and risk perceptions 
 
 of climate change.  
 
6. The Psychological Determinants of Climate Change 
 
Mitigation Intentions and Behaviours: A Domain- 
 
Advance and validate a new model for 
understanding the role of values and 
climate change 
 
National Survey 
Context-Behaviour (DCB) Model. beliefs, perceptions and norms  
 in explaining and predicting specific  
 
 
7. General Discussion and Conclusion. 
low and high-cost mitigation behaviours.  
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Abstract 
 
 
While nearly 20 years of public communication about climate change has undoubtedly raised 
international awareness and concern, large-scale behavioural change has not followed. The aim of 
this paper is therefore twofold, namely; (a) to provide an extensive review of the theoretical and 
empirical evidence on which past and current climate change campaigns are based and (b) to 
advance a new communication model. With regard to the former, it is argued that the evolution of 
public climate change campaigns can be delineated according to the following typology; (1) “the 
cognitive-analytical type”, (2) the “affective-experiential type” and (3) “the social-normative 
type”. In addition, three major explanations are offered for the relative ineffectiveness of past 
campaigns: (a) while human behaviour is often the result of complexly integrated behavioural 
processes, most public climate change campaigns ought to be, but are unfortunately not, designed 
in an integrative manner, (b) public campaigns do not pay sufficient attention to the psychological 
determinants of the behaviours that they are trying to change and (c) often fail to make the climate 
change context explicit. Based on these shortcomings, an integrated conceptual framework is 
advanced to guide the design of future public interventions and to help narrow the gap between 
communicating climate change and changing individual behaviour. 
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1.0 Introduction   
 
 
 It has been well documented that for most people, the media is a prominent and integral 
source for acquiring information about climate change (e.g. Boykoff & Rajan, 2007; 
Ungar, 2000). Moreover, the way that information about climate change is framed and 
communicated can significantly influence the public’s knowledge, attitude and perception 
toward the issue (e.g. Sampei & Aoyagi-Usui, 2009; Sharples, 2010; Stamm et al., 2002; 
Weingart, Engels, & Pansegrau, 2000). As a result, a popular strategy for inducing 
behavioural change has been the deployment of persuasion techniques embedded in 
communication strategies. To this extent, a major area of concern is the apparent disparity 
between public communication and the lack of actualized behavioural change observed in 
the general public (Whitmarsh, O'Neill, & Lorenzoni, 2011). While public polls often 
indicate that people express general awareness and concern (e.g. Eurobarometer, 2011; 
Globescan, 2006), individuals remain reluctant to take personal action. This phenomenon 
has also been dubbed the “value-action” (e.g. Kollmus & Agyeman, 2002), “attitude-
behaviour” or “intention-behaviour” gap (e.g. Sheeran, 2002). 
Traditionally, most communication campaigns have tried to address this gap by 
providing people with more information, a strategy that has become better known as the 
“information-deficit” model of human behaviour. In fact, a content analysis by Devine-
Wright (2004) suggests that a deficit model of human behaviour has played a dominant 
role in past public behavioural change campaigns and is likely to continue to do so.  On 
the whole, public interventional campaigns only seem to produce modest behavioural 
changes (Steg, 2008).  For example, a 1999 mass public media campaign in the UK; “Are 
you doing your bit” only elicited small consequent changes in attitudes and behaviours 
(O'Neill & Hulme, 2009). Similar disappointing findings have been observed in The 
Netherlands (e.g. Staats et al., 1996). While new communication strategies have been 
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undertaken in recent years, more substantial analyses of such campaigns often remain 
elusive (i.e. those that go beyond media hits and broad-opinion brushes), making it hard 
to identify benefits and limitations (Moser, 2010; Steg & Vlek, 2009). Recent research is 
increasingly pointing out that communication interventions need to be made more locally 
relevant and designed in such a way that they meaningfully involve and engage the public 
with climate change (Moser 2006; O'Neill & Nicholson-Cole, 2009). Moser (2006, p.3) 
defines “effective communication” as; “any form of public engagement that actually 
facilitates an intended behavioural, organisational, political or other social change 
consistent with identified mitigation and adaptation goals”.   
While there certainly has been no shortage in the number of publications that offer 
“practical” short-lists for effective climate change communication (e.g. Centre for 
Research on Environmental Decisions, 2009; Climate Change Communication Advisory 
Group, 2010; Futerra, 2005; Moser, 2010), there is currently no systematic overview of 
the theoretical and empirical pathways that explain how to get from merely 
communicating information to actually changing people's behaviour. Moreover, while 
behavioural change is of course, to a certain extent, a practical matter, a more theory-
driven perspective is generally welcomed by behavioural researchers (Steg & Vlek, 
2009.) Attaining a more holistic understanding of the link between designing persuasive 
messages, the communication and processing of that information on one hand and 
eliciting behavioural change on the other inevitably calls for the integration of insights 
from all relevant disciplines that deal with the subject matter. Indeed, integrative 
theoretical research can help synthesise, connect and combine dispersed research findings 
from various disciplines to advance new insights and improve current knowledge and 
understanding. Yet, in order to validate the value of a new integrative communication 
model, it is pivotal to first discuss the theoretical and empirical evidence of past models 
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as well as their limitations. In an attempt to provide a more systematic overview, the 
current paper delineates the “evolution” of public climate change campaigns according to 
the following typology:    
 
(1) The “cognitive-analytical” type (consistent with the traditional knowledge-
attitude-behaviour model);   
(2)  The “affective-experiential” type (congruent with the “risk-as-feelings” model 
and the use of negative emotional appeals such as “fear” messages); and  
(3) The “social-normative” type (consistent with the “normative” paradigm - which 
seeks to leverage the persuasive potential of social and moral norms on pro-
environmental behaviour).  
 
In addition, three major short-comings of past and current public communication 
interventions are identified: 
 
(1) Most public interventions ought to be, but are not designed in an integrative 
manner; 
(2) Current campaigns do not sufficiently target specific behaviours nor do they pay 
attention to the psychological determinants of the behaviours that they are trying 
to change; and 
(3) Public campaigns often fail to make the climate change context explicit. 
In the first section of this paper, the theoretical and empirical evidence for each of 
these public communication strategies is critically discussed. In the following section, a 
more integrated understanding of human behaviour and decision-making is advanced by 
looking at the combined influence of cognitive, experiential and normative factors on 
behaviour. In addition, the importance of understanding the psychological determinants of 
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environmental behaviour is outlined for both, the communication process as well as its 
integral role in eliciting behavioural change. Finally, a new integrative conceptual 
framework is proposed in an attempt to advance current understanding of how to 
transition from merely communicating information about climate change to actually 
changing individual behaviour.   
2.0   The Cognitive-Analytical Approach 
 
 
2.1 The Homo Logicus?   
 
 
“I know that you believe you understand what you think I said, but I’m not sure you 
realise that what you heard is not what I meant.”     
                  (Robert McCloskey) 
 
Until recently, the tradition has been to communicate information about climate change in 
a relatively scientific and analytical format (CRED, 2009), operating under the 
assumption that people process (uncertain) information predominantly in an analytical 
matter (Marx et al., 2007). As a result, technical terms such as “stratospheric ozone 
depletion”, “anthropogenic climate change” and “significant probability” have often been 
used in communicating information about the long-term developments in the earth’s 
climate. Yet, whether or not cognitive reasoning abilities in humans are really that well 
developed is questioned by both comparative neuroanatomical work as well as cognitive 
psychology. In particular, it has been argued that the “neocortex” (the rational, higher 
functioning) part of the brain was developed last in the chain of human evolution and is in 
fact the least developed part of the brain (Maclean, 1990). Similarly, in their heuristics 
and biases approach, Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky (1982) have highlighted that, when 
forming judgements under uncertainty, people employ relatively simple heuristics and 
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cognitive short cuts that may lead to erroneous and biased decision making strategies. In 
short, recent research has questioned how proficient individuals are in processing abstract 
and analytical information about climate change (Marx et al., 2007).  
Because climate change is such a complex and elusive global hazard, the concept 
is difficult to communicate to various publics (Moser & Dilling, 2004). This process is 
even further complicated by the fact that people tend to process information so that it is 
congruent with their pre-existing beliefs.  Selectively attending to evidence that confirms 
pre-existing beliefs and the negligence, re-interpretation as well as distortion of 
information to the contrary is generally referred to as “confirmation bias” (Lewicka, 
1998). In fact, most information that is eventually retained in an individual's memory 
tends to be information that supports pre-existing thoughts and beliefs. For example, in 
one US study increased levels of knowledge seemed to increase concern for some people 
(e.g. Democrats) but not for those (e.g. Republicans) who were already sceptical about 
climate change from the outset (Malka et al., 2009). 
 Similarly, in a study where US farmers were asked to recall weather statistics, 
those who believed that their region was undergoing climate change recalled weather 
statistics consistent with those beliefs while farmers that believed that their region had a 
constant climate recalled weather statistics congruent with those beliefs (Weber & Sonka, 
2004).  In sum, the way in which people process information and structurally organise 
their knowledge can have significant impacts on their behaviour. Yet, how do people 
cognitively understand climate change? And to what extent does more knowledge of the 
climate change problem affect people’s behaviour? 
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 2.2 Information Processing and the Structural Organisation of Knowledge 
 
 
Cognitive psychologists have often described the way in which individuals process and 
organise incoming information as an elaborate network of mental structures that 
represents an individual’s understanding of the external world, a notion perhaps better 
known as “schema theory” (Anderson, 1977). More recently, the study of “mental 
models” has gained increased attention. Essentially, a mental model is a person’s internal, 
personalised, intuitive and contextual understanding of how something works (Kearney & 
Kaplan, 1997). What is important to take away from this is that mental models carry three 
important functions; (1) they serve as a framework into which people fit new information 
(2) they define how individuals approach and solve problems and perhaps most important 
(3) they help formulate actions and behaviour (Carey, 1986; Morgan et al., 2002). The 
majority of research on mental models has identified several fundamental gaps in the 
public's understanding of climate change.  
For example, the American Psychological Association concluded in a recent 
report that “the understanding of climate change, both in its causes and in its likely effects 
by the average citizen around the world is limited” (American Psychological Association, 
2009, p. 21). Nationally representative surveys in the US point out that climate literacy 
seems to be low in general (e.g. Leiserowitz, Smith, & Marlon, 2010). In particular, 
people do not seem to understand the human causes that contribute to climate change nor 
the scientific consensus on this matter (Leiserowitz, 2007). In some cases, people even 
perceive a few degrees increase in global mean temperature as something rather pleasant, 
not understanding the potentially large harmful geophysical consequences of such an 
increase (Meijnders, 1998). Indeed, despite widespread media coverage of climate 
change, typical mental models tend to suffer from several fundamental misconceptions 
(Bostrom et al., 1994).  
                                                                     67 
 
 
For example, most explanations given of the physical mechanisms underlying 
climate change are inconsistent and incomplete. Kempton et al. (1995) found that 
Americans assimilated information about climate change into pre-existing mental models 
of ozone depletion. In particular, people mistakenly believe that ozone depletion is a 
cause of climate change (Meijnders, 1998). This is not just the case in the US: a survey 
performed by GlobeScan in 1999 (covering 25 countries) found that people worldwide 
(mistakenly) identified “depletion of the earth’s ozone layer” as a main cause. This 
development has led to much confusion between the two issues. A likely explanation is 
that the hole in ozone layer has been scientifically well documented over the years and is 
much easier to imagine and remember (Ungar, 2000).  It is interesting to observe that this 
was pointed out by Bostrom et al. (1994) and by Kempton et al. (1995) and yet again 
some 11 years later by Lorenzoni et al. (2006), suggesting that despite past 
communication efforts, this popular misconception still persists.  
People also tend to have difficulty understanding the difference between climate 
change and other environmental problems (Heskes, 1998; Read et al., 1994).  In 
particular, it is hard for people to differentiate between good environmental conduct more 
generally and specific actions that help reduce climate change. Often measures such as 
not buying aerosol spray cans, recycling and reducing waste are mentioned as effective 
strategies for mitigating climate change, possibly because such apposite behaviours are 
generally known to be harmful to the environment (Bostrom et al., 1994; Leiserowitz, 
Smith, & Marlon, 2010; Read et al., 1994).  In addition, misconceptions about the relative 
importance of the various causes of climate change are also widespread. Particularly, 
people tend to overweigh the effects of deforestation and non-recycling and 
underestimate the effects of fossil fuel consumption (Bostrom et al., 1994; Whitmarsh, 
2009). This also becomes evident from the fact that the general public remains mostly 
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unaware of the link between air travel and climate change (e.g. Becken, 2007; Cohen & 
Higham, 2011; Gössling et al., 2006; Gössling & Peeters, 2007) and meat consumption 
and climate change (e.g. de Boer, Schösler, & Boersema, 2012). Furthermore, it would be 
erroneous to suggest that a flawed understanding of climate change solely exists among 
the “lay” or general public. In fact, Sterman and Booth Sweeney (2002; 2007) and 
Sterman (2008) conducted a series of experiments that identified widespread incorrect 
beliefs about climate change among highly educated MIT science and engineering 
majors. In particular, the students were unable to correctly describe the process 
mechanisms that underlie climate change. Sterman and Booth Sweeney (2007) 
hypothesised that these deep-seated misperceptions arise as a limitation of people’s 
mental model with regard to concepts of stock and flow in phenomena of accumulation 
(Sterman & Booth Sweeney, 2007).  
In conclusion, while general awareness of climate change is high and 
occasionally, some local studies find that people are relatively well informed about basic 
concepts (e.g. Lorenzoni & Langford, 2001; Truelove, 2009), improvement is slow, 
confusion persists and a more sophisticated public understanding of climate change still 
appears to be random and inconsistent (Anable, Lane, & Kelay, 2006; APA, 2009). 
Understanding the way that individuals’ process, classify and organise new information is 
important because incorrect mental representations of climate change are likely to 
contribute to a “wait and see” attitude (Xiang, 2011). 
 
2.3 Does Knowing Make a Difference? The Relationship Between Knowledge 
and Behaviour 
 
Based on a review of the evidence, it would not be unreasonable to conclude that there is 
still widespread misunderstanding about (1) the process mechanisms of climate change, 
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(2) its underlying causes and (3) effective response behaviours. In the face of addressing 
these issues, there are varying theoretical assumptions concerning the role of knowledge 
in behaviour. Knowledge is often believed to be a background factor that influences a 
person’s attitude toward a certain behaviour (Ajzen, 1991). Given the known association 
between attitude and behaviour (Armitage & Connor, 2001), knowledge is thus assumed 
to influence behaviour indirectly.  
The idea behind the attitude-behaviour relationship is that the more people know 
about and understand the connections between their own behaviour and a range of 
environmental threats, the more likely it is that a person will adjust their behaviour 
accordingly. Such models essentially assume a linear progression from increased 
environmental knowledge to a favourable change in one’s attitude which in turn is 
thought to produce a change in behaviour - a framework that has become better known as 
the “Knowledge-Attitude-Behaviour” (KAB) model (Kollmus & Agyeman, 2002).  
While a historically popular theory in social-psychology, the “KAB” model has 
(recently) received fierce criticism. For example, Bulkeley (2000, p. 314) states: “recent 
research challenges the assumption that public confusion and an apparent gap between 
stated beliefs and action, arises from a deficit in public knowledge and understanding of 
environment issues”. Similarly, Moser (2006) and Kollmus and Agyeman (2002) criticise 
information-based campaigns for being too “rationalist” and “outdated”.  
While it is certainly true that knowledge is a necessary but not sufficient condition 
for behavioural change, it would be erroneous to suggest that the role of knowledge is 
outdated or not important. In fact, the role of knowledge in environmental behaviour is 
important but often underestimated (Kaiser & Fuhrer, 2003), particularly because 
researchers fail to make a distinction between three converging types of environmental 
knowledge, namely; declarative knowledge (i.e. factual knowledge), procedural 
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knowledge (i.e. knowledge of appropriate courses of action) and effectiveness knowledge 
(i.e. knowledge of how effective each course of action is). To illustrate, information about 
the causes of climate change (e.g. CO2 emissions) can help create a better understanding 
of appropriate response behaviours (e.g. reducing energy consumption) and vice versa. 
While Kollmus and Agyeman (2002) state that only a small fraction of environmental 
behaviour can directly be explained by environmental knowledge, this argument neglects 
to consider that the effect of knowledge is often overlooked because it is mediated by 
other important psychological processes (Kaiser et al., 1999). 
 For example, one of the first studies that systematically reviewed the 
psychological determinants of environmental behaviour (Hines, Hungerford, & Tomera, 
1986) reported positive and significant correlations between environmental knowledge 
and environmental behaviour (r = 0.30-0.37, p < 0.001). Building on their work, a more 
recent and extensive meta-review conducted by Bamberg and Moser (2007) found these 
findings (largely) to be still accurate. Others studies have also corroborated these 
findings. For example, a study by Meinhold and Malkus (2005) supports the theory that 
there exists a linear relationship between environmental knowledge, attitudes and 
behaviour. In particular, environmental knowledge was found to moderate the attitude-
behaviour relationship, where both strong pro-environmental attitudes and high 
environmental knowledge predicted significantly more pro-environmental behaviour. 
Other critics have argued that if individual knowledge about climate change is generally 
limited then knowledge should not be able to explain much of the variance in response 
behaviours (e.g. Maibach, Roser-Renouf, & Leiserowitz, 2008).  
It is worth noting here that predicting specific climate change mitigation 
behaviours (e.g. air travel) based on general environmental knowledge and attitudes may 
sometimes (unsurprisingly) cause distortion in measurements (Bamberg, 2003; Kaiser et 
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al., 1999; Whitmarsh, 2009) - as someone can hold general pro-environmental knowledge 
and beliefs but still maintain different attitudes toward specific behaviours. For these 
reasons, it is perhaps more appropriate to review to what extent knowledge about climate 
change is able to predict specific climate change mitigation behaviours. To this extent, 
some evaluative studies have found that general knowledge about climate change is only 
weakly related to actual self-reported behaviours (e.g. Staats et al., 1996) 
 Yet, research by Bord, O’Connor and Fisher (2000) and O' Connor et al. (1999) 
provides evidence that knowledge is in fact an important predictor. In both studies, 
knowledge about climate change was an independent predictor of behavioural intentions 
(even after controlling for general environmental attitudes). In fact, knowledge was the 
strongest relative predictor of intentions, explaining 11 per cent of the variance to take 
voluntary action and 20 per cent of the variance to support new government policies 
(Bord, O’Connor, & Fisher, 2000). Similarly, Ngo, West and Calkins (2009) also found 
that knowledge successfully predicted a range of climate change mitigation behaviours. 
While knowledge of climate change impacts has also been implicated in eliciting 
behavioural change (e.g. Nillson & Kuller, 2000), Truelove (2009) found that knowledge 
of appropriate response behaviours was the strongest predictor of mitigation intentions. 
Similarly, research by Semenza et al. (2008) and Hounsam (2006) found that the most 
popular self-reported barrier to behavioural change was the fact that people did not know 
how to change their behaviour to reduce their own contribution to climate change.  
In conclusion, knowledge can be considered a necessary (but not sufficient) 
condition for behavioural change, given that knowledge about the causes, impacts and 
solutions to climate change have all been implicated as significant predictors of 
behavioural outcomes. However, differences in measurement (e.g. self-reported vs. actual 
knowledge, intention vs. behaviour) make a clear assessment more difficult. Moreover, in 
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order to fully leverage the effect of knowledge on behaviour, different forms of 
knowledge must converge (Kaiser & Fuhrer, 2003). Thus, popular recommendations that 
public campaigns should prioritize one type of knowledge (e.g. response strategies) over 
another (e.g. causes) should be exercised with caution as, in some cases, such a strategy is 
likely to neglect the interdependent relationship between different knowledge structures. 
3.0 The Affective-Experiential Approach 
 
 
3.1 The Homo Expertus?  
 
“A man who carries a cat by the tail learns something he can learn in no other way.”   
                (Mark Twain) 
 
What Mark Twain jokingly points out is an important fact of life: knowledge and 
cognition can only do so much for human learning and understanding.  Humans have 
inherited a well-equipped sensory system, and, through interaction with our natural and 
social environments we are able to learn and understand things in a way that abstract 
knowledge is unable to provide. While traditional knowledge based approaches assume 
that the public is not changing their behaviour because they fail to understand the issue 
(Lorenzoni, Nicholson-Cole, & Whitmarsh, 2007), scholars are increasingly pointing out 
that scientific narratives are unlikely to elicit more engagement (Hargreaves et al., 2003), 
particularly because of the “yawn factor” that science tends to have on non-experts 
(Abbasi, 2006). In addition, recent studies have shown that climate change is a temporally 
and spatially distant concept for most people (Maibach, Roser-Renouf, & Leiserowitz, 
2008; O’Neill & Nicholson-Cole, 2009; Spence, Poortinga, & Pidgeon, 2012).  
One reason for this is that individuals have difficulty visualizing future periods 
(Tonn, Hemrick, & Conrad, 2006).  For example, a study by O’Neill and Nicholson-Cole 
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(2009) indicated that respondents could not really articulate what climate change might 
mean for the United Kingdom. Individuals also tend to display an unrealistic sense of 
optimism (Weinstein, 1980), particularly to the extent that climate change is likely to 
affect others (e.g. the third world) but not the individual in question (O’Neill & 
Nicholson-Cole, 2009). Because climate change cannot be experienced directly, it is 
likely that individuals will continue to distance themselves psychologically from the issue 
(Lorenzoni & Pidgeon, 2005). Yet, a study covering 34 countries found that the majority 
of people in each country believed that climate change was a somewhat to very serious 
problem (GlobeScan, 2000). In 2006, GlobeScan repeated the study and found that the 
percentage of respondents that believed that climate change was a “very serious threat” 
increased significantly in most countries (GlobesScan, 2006). Similarly, studies 
conducted in the EU and UK also indicate that over 80 per cent of respondents reported to 
be “concerned” about climate change (e.g. Poortinga et al., 2006; Eurobarometer, 2011).  
Yet some researchers have argued that there is an issue with the way this apparent 
“concern” is conceptualised. Because there is no one coherent method of how an 
individual’s risk perception is assessed, measures vary greatly and the terms “concern”, 
“worry” and “perceived seriousness” are often used interchangeably. Yet, the literature 
often fails to note that these terms mean slightly different things. To illustrate, it is 
possible to have general concern for an issue without actively worrying about it. Worry is 
then considered to be a much more active emotional state and a stronger predictor of 
behaviour than either “concern” or perceived “seriousness” (Leiserowitz, 2007). For 
example, a survey by the Pew Global Attitudes Project (2006) found that, while varying 
among countries, personal levels of worry about climate change are generally lower than 
perceived seriousness or general stated concern.  
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Thus, while general concern about climate change seems to be well established 
among the general public, the same cannot be said for personal worry. Furthermore, it is 
also questionable whether this concern is related to the perception that climate change is 
an urgent or high-priority problem. For example, while many people are concerned about 
climate change, they rank it as less important than many other societal issues such as 
terrorism, health care and the economy (Krosnick et al., 2006). Similar evidence is 
provided by Poortinga and Pidgeon (2003), based on 1,547 face-to-face interviews the 
researchers found that while there was some moderate concern for all environmental risks 
mentioned in the study, climate change was ranked among the least important issues. This 
evidence leads to the conclusion that although general concern is expressed, there is also 
a dominant belief that climate change is a distant, non-urgent and non-personal threat 
(Darnton, 2005), possibly hindering proactive behavioural responses (Lorenzoni & 
Langford, 2001). These findings have lent support for the hypothesis that if general 
concern can be transformed into personal worry then perhaps people are more likely to 
change their behaviour accordingly.  
 
3.2 Risk as Feelings 
 
 
It has become increasingly apparent that individuals have a hard time relating to 
technical, descriptive and abstract risk messages. In fact, the public may not act upon 
simple information about probabilities unless this information is given emotional meaning 
(Slovic et al., 2004). Accordingly, converging evidence from cognitive, social and clinical 
psychology has strongly indicated that human perceptions of risk (across domains) are 
very much influenced by affective and emotion-driven processes (e.g. Chaiken & Trope, 
1999; Esptein, 1994; Loewenstein et al., 2001; Sloman, 1996; Slovic et al., 2006; Weber, 
2006). At this point it is perhaps warranted to make a conceptual distinction between 
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“emotion” and “affect”. While specific definitions may vary, an emotion can generally be 
understood as; “a complex state of feeling that results in psychophysiological changes 
that influence thought and behaviour” (Myers, 2004, p. 500). Emotions are relatively 
transient and often manifest in a specific feeling-state, such as fear or happiness. Affect is 
a more subtle form of emotion that specifically refers to an evaluative and associative 
response (positive/negative) towards an external stimulus (Slovic, 1999). For example, 
affective images can be regarded as a broad construct to which positive and negative 
feeling states have become attached through learning and experience (Slovic et al., 1998, 
p.3). To illustrate, most people have an immediate (negative) associative reaction to the 
word “nazi”. In short, while emotions are complex feelings that cause psycho-
physiological changes, affect is often conceptualised as a rather fast, specific and 
automatic evaluation of a stimulus object.  
In the context of climate change, Leiserowitz (2006) and Smith & Leiserowitz 
(2012) found that negative affect and imagery toward climate change were the strongest 
predictors of risk perception. More specifically, the research indicated that people tend to 
have strong negative affective associations with the term “global warming”. Similar 
findings were reported in a study by O’Neill and Nicholson-Cole (2009): while 
respondents seemed to have a wide range of imaginations and mental visions related to 
global warming, most of them were negative and bleak.   
Yet, to what extent do (negative) affect and emotions influence willingness to help 
reduce climate change? According to Böhm (2003), environmental behaviours are guided 
by so-called “prospective” and “retrospective” consequence based emotions, such as fear 
and worry, which also happen to be the most intense emotions associated with 
environmental risks. In fact, Böhm and Pfister (2001) theorised that fear and worry over 
negative consequences should lead people to prevent or reduce environmental damage. In 
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line with this train of thought, a large amount of research has been geared towards 
eliciting a sense of “risk” - with the underlying hope that fear will serve as a motivator for 
behavioural change. 
 
 3.3 The Link Between Personal Experience, Risk Perception and Behavioural 
Change 
 
While it is well known that emotions are an important and significant predictor of 
environmental behaviour in general (Grob, 1995; Maloney, Ward, & Braucht, 1975), less 
is known about the specific relationship between experience, emotion, risk perception and 
behaviour in the context of climate change. Direct experience is thought to influence risk 
perception and behaviour (Whitmarsh, 2008), in particular, because experiences can 
invoke strong memorable feelings, possibly making them more dominant in processing 
(Loewenstein et al., 2001). Consider an individual that encounters an approaching 
tornado. Such a direct threat can elicit strong instinctive emotions such as fear and 
anxiety that subsequently guide immediate behaviour (i.e. the so-called fight-flight 
response). These instinctive emotions primarily arise in the brain’s limbic system, an 
evolutionary older part of the brain that guides behaviour through fast and automatic 
responses, especially in reaction to threats (Maclean, 1990). 
Yet, it is unclear to what extent this model applies to the context of climate 
change. For example, a sensible response to living in a hurricane prone region would be 
moving away from the danger zone or perhaps buying flooding insurance (i.e. adaptation 
measures). In fact, the goal of the response behaviour is to deal with / mitigate immediate 
threats (not climate change as a broader concept in itself). It is not at all obvious that 
whenever a person's town or house floods, that person is actively going to diminish his or 
her carbon footprint in response, unless that person explicitly links the flooding event to 
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climate change (Helgeson et al., 2012) - which is not always the case. For example, a 
study by Whitmarsh (2008) reported no difference in risk perceptions of climate change 
between respondents that had experienced flooding before and those who had not.  
Yet, people who live in low-lying coastal areas do tend to have a heightened sense 
of personal risk (Brody et al., 2008) and a recent study by Spence et al. (2011) did find 
that past flooding experiences were significantly related to increased preparedness to 
reduce energy use. In particular, past flooding experiences mediated onto level of concern 
and perceived local vulnerability, which in turn, increased individual preparedness. 
Moreover, a significant amount of studies indicate that risk perception is an important 
predictor of individual willingness to help reduce climate change (e.g. Heath & Gifford, 
2006; Hidalgo & Pisano, 2010; Leiserowitz, 2006; Ngo, West, & Calkins, 2009;            
O’ Connor et al., 1999; Semenza et al., 2008). Yet, a second issue revolves around the 
idea that even if direct experience does matter, there is a disassociation between the 
cognitive information that informs individuals that there is in fact a risk to be worried 
about and the inability for many people to observe or experience this risk in their direct 
environment (Weber, 2006). This lack of personal experience with the potentially 
negative consequences of climate change is causing a lower level of individual concern 
than advisable (APA, 2009; Weber, 2006). Thus, although “experience” may indeed raise 
a person’s sense of concern to what is considered a more appropriate level of “worry”, 
direct experience with the impacts of climate change is generally lacking.  
 A potential solution to this problem has been to try and inflate personal worry 
among the general public through measures that do not require actual personal 
experience. One such measure is the use of negative emotional messages, particularly 
“fear-appeals” (Stiff & Mongeau, 2003). The use of fear appeals has gained popularity in 
climate change communication (Moser & Dilling 2004; O’Neill & Nicholson-Cole, 
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2009), as the advertisement of extreme events is thought to do better than the idea of slow 
on going change (Brönnimann, 2002). To understand why fear appeals are often believed 
to work (at least in theory) it is helpful to briefly consider the development of various 
theories in the field of persuasive communication.   
To start with, the experience of “fear” is a negatively valenced emotion 
accompanied by a high level of arousal, elicited by a threat that is perceived to be 
significant and personally relevant (Witte, 2000).  In particular, fear appeals are a method 
of communication that attempts to influence attitudes and behaviours through the threat of 
some danger (Tanner, Day, & Crask, 1989). A large amount of research has been 
performed over the years concerning the role of negative threat-related emotion in 
communication, largely inconclusive about its general effectiveness. One of the earliest 
theories on fear appraisal was put forth by Janis (1967), who proposed that the relation 
between fear and attitude change is curvilinear (U shaped). In effect, the theory suggests 
that moderate levels of fear are more persuasive than lower or higher levels. More 
specifically, Janis’s drive theory argues that fear arousal is needed to elicit a motivational 
drive state (i.e. tension) that individuals will then seek to resolve.  
From this point of view, for fear-appealing communication to be persuasive two 
requirements have to be met; (1) the level of fear induced by communication must be 
sufficiently high to function as a drive state and (2) recommendations have to be included 
in the communication as to how to reduce this drive state. Unpleasant emotional tension 
can be resolved by individuals through either “adaptive responses” (i.e. useful 
behavioural changes) or through “maladaptive responses”. For example, Leventhal (1970) 
made a distinction between an internal “fear control” process and an external “danger 
control” process. Maladaptive behaviours are targeted at controlling the fear response 
(e.g. through denial) but they often leave the actual threat (e.g. climate change) intact.  
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Rogers' (1975, 1983) protection motivation model (PMM) has arguably been one 
of the most applied theories to understanding fear appeals (Witte, 1992). The PMM states 
that a threat related message will only be effective if (1) it convinces the reader that he or 
she is seriously threatened (threat appraisal) and (2) actually capable of averting the threat 
(coping response). In particular, Rogers (1983) postulated that people continue to engage 
in maladaptive behaviours (e.g. “energy consumption”) if the rewards (convenience) of 
that behaviour exceed both the perceived severity of the threat (e.g. climate change) and 
the individual’s perceived susceptibility to that particular threat (low).  The intention to 
protect one’s self then depends on four factors: (1) a threat’s malignancy (2) its 
probability of occurrence, (3) the effectiveness of a coping response (i.e. response 
efficacy) and (4) an individual’s ability to perform the response (i.e. self-efficacy).  
 
3.4 Scaring People, Does It Work?  
  
 
Empirical evidence supporting either Janis (1967) or McGuire’s (1969) model has been 
lacking (Higbee, 1969; Sutton, 1982). Furthermore Leventhal’s (1970) and Roger’s 
(1975) models have been criticized for being imprecise (e.g. Witte, 1992). In general, the 
empirical evidence for the “fear” approach is mixed. While some meta-reviews point out 
a positive linear relationship between level of fear and a change in behavioural outcomes 
(Boster & Mongeau, 1984; Sutton, 1982), this does not mean that a curvilinear 
relationship should be rejected (Meijnders, 1998). More generally, Boster and Mongeau 
(1984) found that fear appeals are modestly correlated with attitudes and to a lesser extent 
with intention and behaviour. Overall, it is generally agreed upon that without efficacy 
messaging (i.e. an individual’s perceived capability to avert the threat), fear appeals tend 
to be backfire (O’Neill and Nicholson-Cole, 2009). Indeed, if anything can be learned 
from 50 years of research, it is that strong fear appeals with high efficacy messaging 
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produce the highest level of behavioural change whereas strong fear appeals with low 
efficacy messaging produce the most maladaptive responses (Witte, 2000).  
However, much of the research on fear appeals has focused on health risks, which 
are both personal and direct (de Hoog et al., 2005) - two important conditions that are 
(perceived to be) absent in the context of climate change. Yet, there is some evidence 
available on the use of fear appeals in the context of climate change. For example, 
Meijnders et al. (2001a, 2001b) found that moderate fear messages related to global 
warming induced more systematic processing of the perceived risks as well as more 
favourable attitudes toward energy conservation (when compared to the low-fear 
condition). Lowe et al. (2006) carried out a pre/post-test study after individuals had 
watched the climate change disaster movie “The Day After Tomorrow” (Emmerich, 
2004). Although a majority of the respondents (67 per cent) were in agreement that 
everyone needs to do something about climate change, this sense of urgency quickly 
faded in a focus group meeting a month after the screening.  
Yet, very different results were presented by Leiserowitz (2004). In a similar 
study concerning the same movie, the author found that movie-watchers versus non-
watchers showed higher levels of both concern and worry, estimated various impacts on 
the US more likely and significantly increased their intentions (in all stated categories) to 
engage in personal action to address climate change (Leiserowitz, 2004). Similarly, 
Jacobson (2011) used a spatial-econometric analysis to measure increases in the purchase 
of voluntary carbon offsets within a 10 mile radius of US movie theatres after the release 
of Al Gore’s “An Inconvenient Truth” (Guggenheim, 2006). Shortly after its release, 
purchases of carbon offsets went up by 50 per cent, yet no renewals were recorded in 
subsequent years.  
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O’Neill and Nicholson-Cole (2009) conclude that dramatic, sensational, fearful 
and shocking representations of climate change (both visual and iconic) can successfully 
capture people’s attention and drive a general sense of urgency to the issue (O’Neill & 
Nicholson-Cole, 2009). Yet, the same researchers also found that while capturing 
attention and raising concern, fear messaging disengages people from climate change and 
renders them feeling hopeless and overwhelmed. The authors further mention that 
catastrophic and fearful representations of climate change are unlikely to motivate a sense 
of personal engagement and can possibly trigger psychological barriers such as anxiety, 
apathy, paralysis and denial (Lorenzoni et al., 2007; Moser & Drilling, 2007).  
Consistent with these claims, other research has found that fear messaging can 
have different impacts on different audiences. For example, individuals with strong “just-
world” beliefs tend to resort to maladaptive responses (e.g. denial) when faced with fear-
messages about global warming, which negatively affects their intention to help reduce 
climate change (Feinberg & Miller, 2011). The authors recommend that messages should 
include sufficient information on potential solutions, which is consistent with the idea that 
a message is more persuasive when negative emotions about one's vulnerability are 
coupled with positive thoughts about potential solutions (Das, de Wit, & Stroebe, 2003).   
All in all, these findings point to one (of several) potential problem(s) that 
characterize the “fear” approach. To start with, it is likely that fear appeals have a rather 
short-term effect. In fact, Weber (1997) coined the term “single action bias” to explain the 
tendency for individuals to only take a single action to reduce a perceived threat and 
subsequently neglect further steps that would provide incremental protection. For 
instance, a 2008 poll in the United States indicated that while 28 per cent of Americans 
thought the environment was getting better, after having elected President Barack Obama 
in 2009, this number rose to 49 per cent (Silver, 2009). A possible explanation for the 
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single action bias is that the first measure people take often sufficiently reduces the active 
level of worry / vulnerability. An additional shortcoming is that fear appeals offer 
diminishing returns (Hastings et al., 2004). That is, communicators run the risk of 
desensitising or “emotionally numbing” people to the risks involved, as familiarity with a 
risk reduces its salience (Fischoff et al., 1978). Furthermore, the “finite pool of worry” 
hypothesis states that people can only worry about a limited number of problems at any 
given time. As a result, increased concern for one risk (e.g. economic crisis) might 
decrease concern for other risks such as climate change (Hansen, Marx, & Weber, 2004).  
In conclusion, “fear as a motivator” should be used with caution (Futurra, 2005). 
While fear messaging can definitely serve a particular function (e.g. capturing attention 
and breeding concern), it is often difficult to retain such level of interest and arousal as 
people need a reason to stay engaged and often quickly shift their attention. Furthermore, 
when using narratives of an impending “catastrophic” and “looming disaster” without 
promoting actions that can help reduce the threat, fear messages are likely to trigger 
maladaptive responses and leave people feeling disempowered and disengaged. In the 
words of O’Neill and Nicholson-Cole (2009): “depicting a state of crisis does not sit 
comfortably with the suggestion of individual action” (p. 376).  
4.0 The Social-Normative Approach 
 
 
4.1 The Homo Sociologicus?  
 
 
“No man is an island, entire of itself; every man is a piece of the continent, a part 
of the main.”                                (John Donne) 
 
In addition to cognitive and experiential processing, human behaviour is also shaped by a 
wide range of normative factors. In fact, social-psychological research that explores the 
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effect of social influences on behaviour is pervasive - as it is through social comparison 
with referent others that people validate the correctness of their opinions and decisions 
(Festinger, 1954). People derive descriptive and prescriptive social norms from observing 
others, apply a logic of appropriateness in unfamiliar situations (March, 1994) and 
unsurprisingly, tend to behave as their friends and peers (Cialdini et al., 1999).  
There are many examples of how social factors influence environmental 
behaviour. For example, people's energy use tends to decrease when they are told that 
their neighbours are conserving energy as well. People tend to alter their use of energy 
more generally to conform to the group-norm (e.g. Schultz et al., 2007). Usually a 
distinction is made between descriptive and prescriptive social norms. While prescriptive 
norms contain information about how others think someone ought to behave, descriptive 
norms merely describe how others are behaving (Cialdini et al., 1991). When 
communicating social information it is important to understand the relationship between 
these two concepts. For example, merely describing that CO2 emissions are increasing 
because a lot of people are choosing to fly short distances instead of using alternative 
modes of transportation (a descriptive norm) may have unintended effects if it is not 
clearly mentioned that this behaviour is in fact undesirable (prescriptive norm). In other 
words, it should be made clear that people ought to avoid flying short distances, otherwise 
the message is easily misread as; “it’s okay because everyone's doing it”.    
Another important question is how moral norms are theoretically distinct from 
social norms. Moral norms refer to the idea that some behaviours are just inherently right 
or wrong regardless of their personal or social consequences (Manstead, 2000). While 
there certainly is a strong link between social and moral norms, it is nevertheless possible 
that a person’s moral convictions do not coincide with the expectations that exist in that 
person’s social environment. One way to think of the relationship between these two 
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concepts is that both cultural and social learning play an important role in acquiring moral 
beliefs (Krebs & Janicki 2002), as social reference groups deliver standards for what is 
viewed as right or wrong. It is over time, when people have internalized a social norm 
that it becomes a (personal) moral norm (Manstead, 2000).  
Moral norms are then considered to be the link between internalized (general) 
values and more specific opinions and expectations about how to behave in a tangible 
situation (Schwartz, 1977). Thus, even although moral norms may originate from social 
group norms, once they have become internalised, they exercise influence over an 
individual’s behaviour independently from any immediate social context (Manstead, 
2000; van der Linden, 2011). Similarly, Bicchieri (2006) highlights that while social 
norms are followed conditionally upon the satisfaction of expectations of others, moral 
norms are followed unconditionally based on internal (emotional) processes.  
Moral norms are often assumed to play a central role in explaining pro-
environmental behaviour. A particularly influential framework is Stern et al.’s (1999) 
Value-Belief-Norm (VBN) theory. According to the VBN, people's motivation for caring 
about the environment can be traced back to a specific set of personal values. For 
example, someone could be aware of the potentially negative consequences of climate 
change because they wonder how it might affect them personally (i.e. egoistic values), 
how it will affect other humans (altruistic values) or how it will affect the earth more 
generally (biospheric values). These values are then thought to influence more specific 
belief structures about human-environment interactions (a person’s ecological worldview) 
which in turn determines the extent to which people are aware of (adverse) consequences 
(AC) and ascribe responsibility to their own actions (AR) – eventually leading to the 
activation of an individual's moral norm, which, according to the VBN, is thought to be 
the main driver of pro-environmental behaviour. 
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4.2      Evidence for the Role of Normative Influences on Environmental Behaviour 
 
 
Empirical evidence for the persuasive power of normative influences on environmental 
behaviour is growing. A frequently quoted study is that of a conservation experiment on 
hotel towel reuse. In the experiment, a simple “normative” prompt (i.e. “75 per cent of 
guests in this room reuse their towel when asked”) significantly increased the reuse of 
towels (Goldstein, Cialdini, & Griskevicius, 2008) - illustrating how the communication 
of simple social information can induce behavioural change. In fact, a range of other 
studies that have used social norm manipulations in the context of energy conservation 
have showed similar positive results (e.g. Dolan & Metcalfe, 2012; Schultz et al., 2007).  
In addition to social pressure, moral norms are an equally (if not more) powerful 
tool for encouraging pro-environmental behaviour (Markowitz & Shariff, 2012). To this 
extent, a recent field experiment by Bolderdijk et al. (2013) set out to explore what 
message frame is most successful when asking drivers to pull over to get their tire 
pressure checked. Results strongly indicated that a moral message frame was most 
effective (i.e. compared to financial incentives). Similarly, other recent research has 
found that both moral and social norms are significant predictors of consumer decisions 
to purchase carbon offsets (Blasch & Farsi, 2012). Yet, there are a number of problems 
inherent to the “normative” approach. First, observed effect sizes are typically small and 
short-lived (John et al., 2011). The latter is particularly true for social norms, since they 
are conditional upon the existence of exogenous social pressure (extrinsic motivation) 
while moral norms elicit motivation through internal processes (i.e. intrinsic motivation).  
A second problem concerns the use of “guilt appeals”. Guilt usually arises as a 
result of violating some moral or social norm (Baumeister, 1998). In theory, guilt is 
thought to be a motivator of pro-environmental behaviour because it often leads to a 
moral obligation to compensate for any caused damages (Bamberg & Mӧser, 2007). 
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Studies show that under certain conditions guilt can be effective in changing behaviour 
(O'Keefe, 2002) and some support is found in the context of climate change. For example, 
Ferguson and Branscombe (2010) illustrate that feelings of guilt mediated beliefs about 
global warming and willingness to engage in mitigation behaviours. Truelove (2009) 
comments however, that similar to “fear appeals”, the associated drawbacks are plentiful. 
One concern is the risk of eliciting negative emotions (such as anger toward the guilt-
inducer), which could potentially undermine the technique's overall effectiveness.  
It is also interesting to note that in survey studies, social norms are often identified 
as one of the weakest predictors of behaviour (e.g. Armitage & Connor, 2001). A 
potential explanation for this is that it may very well be the case that the effect of social 
norms on behaviour is systematically underdetected – mainly, because people display a 
strong tendency to underestimate the extent to which they are subject to social influences 
(Griskevicius, Cialdini, & Goldstein, 2008). Yet, in a similar manner it can be argued that 
the effects found in many experimental studies are simply the result of artificially induced 
social pressure. In fact, it is crucial to understand that in order for social norms to affect 
behaviour, they must first be activated and made salient (Cialdini et al., 1999).   
Unfortunately, strong social norms are generally absent for most pro-social 
behaviours (van der Linden, 2011). In fact, negative social identities associated with 
performing “unsustainable” behaviours are currently not very well articulated. Thus, 
throwing a “few numbers” at people for social comparison purposes is not going to have 
much effect when there is no negative social identity to leverage in the first place (Corner, 
2011). As a result, while social and moral norms may affect behaviour, in order to 
leverage their full potential, a strong pro-environmental norm must be established first. 
Several governmental advisory bodies have recently advised the UK government to use 
more “deep-frames” in their communication. This entails a community-based approach 
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where the discourse is shifted from “you” to “we” and from “I” to “us”, encouraging the 
elicitation of moral values, collectivism and social identity (CCCA, 2010).  For example, 
the UK government is currently actively trying to harness the persuasive potential of 
social norms in their design of large-scale behavioural change campaigns (Cabinet Office, 
2011). Yet, at the time of this writing, rigorous empirical evaluations remain elusive. 
 
5.0 Towards a new framework for communicating climate change 
 
 
5.1 An Integrated Understanding: Theories of Dual-Processing in the Brain 
 
 
“Information’s pretty thin stuff unless mixed with experience”  
(Clarence Day) 
 
So far, all three major approaches to public climate change campaigns have been 
considered in isolation. Yet, cognitive, experiential and normative influences do not affect 
human behaviour independently of each other - on the contrary, most behaviour is the 
result of carefully integrated neurological processes. The ancient Greek philosophers 
Plato and Aristotle long debated the intricacies of the fine line between passion and 
reason and ever since, a substantial amount of research in social, cognitive and 
neuropsychology has lend its support for a theory of “dual-processing” in the brain 
(Pessoa, 2008). Either a distinction is made between cognitive and affective processing 
(e.g. Damasio, 1994; Epstein, 1994; LeDoux, 1996; Zajonc, 1998) or between controlled 
and automated processes (e.g. Kahneman, 2003; Schneider & Shiffrin; Sloman, 1996).  
It is important to realise that these processing systems do not function independently of 
each other. Instead, they operate in parallel and continuously interact with each other, 
where higher analytical reasoning may evoke strong (primal) emotions and simple 
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reflexes can be triggered by higher functioning neocortical processes (Marx et al., 2007; 
Weber, 2006;). In fact, rational decision making cannot be effective unless it is guided by 
emotion and affect (Damasio, 1994, 1999), moreover, without emotions, humans are not 
able to learn effectively at all (Baumeister & Bushman, 2008). While dual-process 
theories aid conceptual understanding, they often provide an overly simplified 
understanding of neurological functioning. Cameron, Loewenstein and Prelec (2003) 
present a more useful categorization of human neural functioning (Table 2.1): 
 
Table 2.1:  Categorisation of Human Neural Functioning 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Adopted from Cameron, Loewenstein and Prelec (2003) 
 
To illustrate how these four quadrants (Table 2.1) operate in relation to everyday 
consumer behaviour, consider the following example: let’s assume that a customer walks 
into a travel agency and wants to book a well-deserved exotic vacation. Upon entering the 
store, the customer’s attention is immediately drawn to a big fancy flyer displaying the 
ultimate vacation, including a sunny location, palm trees, white sandy beaches and a 
breath-taking turquoise sea. The brain's motor cortex will guide that person’s arm to reach 
for the flyer drawing on two processes, namely the cognitive and automatic quadrant III 
 Cognitive Processes Affective Processes 
Controlled Processes 
 
(e.g. effortful, evoked 
deliberately, serial) 
 
 
                I 
  
         
                II 
Automated Processes 
 
(e.g. effortless, 
reflexive, parallel) 
 
 
               
               III 
  
 
            
                IV 
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(reaching) and the affective and automatic quadrant IV (pleasure and enjoyment). 
However, at the same time higher level processing might occur in the brain. For example, 
it could be that this particular person has recently been exposed to a documentary on 
sustainable tourism and anticipates that going on this holiday would perhaps disappoint 
important family members who recommended watching the documentary. These 
processes (explicit memory) and anticipation (planning) draw on two areas of the brain; 
the hippocampus and the prefrontal cortex, which are involved in controlled cognitive 
(quadrant I) and controlled affective (quadrant 2) processing.  
To keep things relatively simple, no social context was made explicit. Yet, it 
should already become clear from this hypothetical example that in most realistic 
decision-environments, all four neurological quadrants can potentially be activated (and 
interact) in a matter of seconds. A clear implication of a more advanced understanding of 
human behaviour is that in order to make communication efforts more effective, 
substantial efforts should be directed towards integrating cognitive, experiential and 
normative aspects of climate change communication. Particularly, increased cognitive 
understanding can help make behavioural change more sustainable in the long-term while 
experiential approaches can help elicit affective associations and facilitate learning and 
understanding through visualisation of the information presented.  
For example, research by Marx, Shome and Weber (2006) indicated that people 
retain more factual information about climate change when that information is presented 
in an experiential format. In addition, the overall message should be designed and framed 
in a context that illustrates that other people are also acting sustainably and that a strong 
pro-environmental norm is both expected, desired and rewarded. In conclusion, knowing 
how information is processed and integrated in the brain and subsequently affects 
behaviour should lead to the understanding that communication designs that take into 
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account positive interactive feedback loops between, cognitive, experiential and 
normative processes are likely to be more effective than “either / or” type strategies.  
 
5.2 The Pivotal Role of Determinants of Behaviour in Communicating Change 
 
 
While the previous section has established that cognitive, experiential and normative 
processes often operate simultaneously and affect environmental behaviour in an 
integrative manner, the relative importance (or contribution) of each factor is not always 
known. To this extent, it is useful to introduce a distinction between theories of change 
and models of behaviour (Darnton, 2008; van der Linden, 2013a). While “models of 
behaviour” aid in understanding specific behaviours by identifying the underlying 
psychological factors that influence them, “theories of change” show how behaviours can 
be changed and / or change over time (Darnton, 2008). Thus, while theories of change 
generally describe more conceptual and generic processes, models of behaviour are 
diagnostic and help illuminate the psychological determinants that explain and predict a 
given behaviour. For example, both the role and relative importance of cognitive 
(knowledge), experiential (affect) and normative (moral norms) factors in predicting and 
explaining transport behaviours is currently an active area of research (e.g. see Bamberg 
& Schmidt, 2001, 2003; Bamberg, Hunecke, & Blöbaum, 2007; Steg, 2005).  
It should be noted that while theories of change and models of behaviour have 
distinct purposes, they are also highly complementary. In fact, it is argued here that the 
ineffectiveness of climate change campaigns can, in part, be attributed to the fact that 
most public climate change interventions pay little to no attention to the psychological 
determinants of the behaviours that they are trying to change. For example, public 
campaigns that promote sustainable lifestyles and ‘good environmental conduct’ across 
the board (e.g. Doyle, 2011) do not take into account the determinants of pro-
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environmental behaviour. When campaigns do get specific, for example, in the case of 
meat consumption (Meat Free Monday, 2010; Peta2, 2008), little attention is paid to the 
social-psychological determinants of the behaviour under consideration.  
 In fact, a report by the Government Communication Network (2009) points out 
that attaining a better understanding of how relevant behaviours are determined and 
influenced should be considered a prerequisite for the design of effective communication 
campaigns (GCN 2009). It is important for evaluators to not only look at behavioural 
outcomes, as it is from studying the psychological determinants of behaviour that we 
learn why certain interventions were successful or not (Steg & Vlek, 2009). In short, 
successfully trying to change any given behaviour involves a thorough understanding of 
all the factors that determine and influence the behaviour under investigation.  
 
5.3 A New Framework for Communicating Climate Change 
 
 
 A conceptual framework to help guide the design of public climate change campaigns is 
presented in Figure 2.1. The central argument behind the framework is that persuasive 
communication is only persuasive (i.e. likely to elicit behavioural change) if it is based on 
an integrated understanding of the psychological processes that underlie and influence 
pro-environmental behaviour. In order to achieve this, three criteria need to be met;       
(1) interventions should design integrative communication messages that appeal to 
cognitive, experiential as well as normative dimensions of human behaviour, (2) the 
context and relevance of climate change needs to be made explicit and (3) specific 
behaviours should be targeted, paying close attention to the psychological determinants   
of the behaviours that need to be changed.  
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            Figure 2.1:  An Integrated Framework for Public Communication Interventions. 
 
To illustrate that little of these criteria are typically met in practice, consider the 
following three illustrative cases. One large-scale climate change information and 
awareness campaign was conducted in the Netherlands in 1996 and evaluated by Staats et 
al. (1996). The campaign employed a wide range of media tools, including billboards, 
posters, television commercials and information pamphlets. The aim of the campaign was 
to raise knowledge and awareness about the causes, consequences and solutions to 
climate change. Two strong points of the campaign were the explicit focus on climate 
change and a link was made between the greenhouse effect, climate change and relevant 
behaviours. Nevertheless, being one of the earlier campaigns, the intervention was nearly 
entirely focused on cognitive information and knowledge based factors (although some 
imagery was used to symbolically illustrate the greenhouse effect). Yet, only marginal 
focus was applied to “affective/experiential” processes and no attention was paid to 
“normative” influences. In fact, in their evaluation, Staats et al. (1996) highlight that the 
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disappointing results of the campaign can be attributed to the fact that little attention was 
paid to social factors. In addition, no effort was made to study the psychological 
determinants of the target behaviours. 
More than 10 years later, the “Act on Co2” (2009) campaign in the UK featured 
an advertisement where a little girl is read a scary bedtime story by her father about the 
potentially horrible consequences of climate change. While the commercial did feature 
some knowledge/information, the content was predominantly controlled by a '”fear 
frame” - focusing on the negative, scary and threatening consequences of climate change 
in the form of a cartoon that depicted “climate monsters” and drowning people. The 
cartoon implied that a “happy ending” is uncertain (hinting that a happy ending is 
dependent on people changing their behaviour). Falling prey to all the common pitfalls 
associated with the use of guilt and fear appeals (see section 3.3), the advertisement was 
not well received by the public as thousands of complaints were submitted to the UK 
Advertising Standards Authority (Sweney, 2010).  The focus of the commercial was 
predominantly geared towards the affective and experiential domain of human behaviour, 
neglecting both normative influences on behaviour as well as important informational 
aspects. While a link between climate change and energy consumption was made explicit, 
no attention was paid to the psychological determinants of the behaviours in question.  
Finally, more recently, the American 'Wasting Water is Weird' (2011) video 
campaign was released featuring a character called “Rip”. In the video, the Rip character 
visits people that are clearly wasting water (e.g. brushing their teeth with the tap running) 
and sarcastically illustrates that “they're weird” for wasting water. By trying to create a 
negative social identity around the notion of wasting water, the campaign fully relies on 
leveraging normative influences on behaviour. Thus, while zooming in on a particular 
behaviour (e.g. dishwashing), a major drawback of the campaign is that no attention is 
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paid to cognitive or experiential processes and no explicit contextual link is made in the 
videos to climate change. It is important to make the climate change context explicit, 
primarily because if people engage in conservation behaviours for hedonic or cost 
reasons, they are likely to stop doing so once the behaviour is no longer attractive or cost-
effective, whereas environmental motives have proven more robust against such changes 
(Steg, 2008). Finally, no effort was made to research the psychological determinants of, 
for example, residential water usage. If research had been conducted, it perhaps would 
have been more apparent that providing information on alternative courses of action is an 
important aspect of trying to change behaviours that have a strong habitual component, 
such as residential water consumption (Gregory & Di Leo, 2003).  
In conclusion, climate change campaigns often adopt an “either / or” approach, 
appealing to only one aspect of human behaviour, thereby failing to consider other 
important psychological processes. Unsurprisingly then, on the whole, evaluations of past 
public climate change campaigns have been disappointing at best (O’Neill & Hulme, 
2009; Steg, 2008). Figure 2.1 illustrates that in order for communications to be 
persuasive, they should take into account the interrelation between cognitive, experiential 
and normative influences on behaviour. Recent experimental evidence supports this 
notion. For example, Dolan and Metcalfe (2012) comment that little is known 
(empirically) about the interaction between social norms and basic information provision. 
Based on a large-scale energy conservation study, the authors concluded that, compared 
to only using a social norm prime, providing information alongside social norm messages 
was key to the success of the behavioural change intervention - nearly doubling the rate 
of energy conservation (Dolan & Metcalfe, 2012). These findings are corroborated by 
other recent experimental evidence, which has shown that providing people with 
information on the negative (environmental) impacts of bottled water consumption is 
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much more persuasive when preceded by “social proof” that referent others are changing 
their behaviour as well (van der Linden, 2013b). Similarly, a recent field study by De 
Groot, Abrahamse and Jones (2013) showed that the combination of different normative 
appeals reduced the use of plastic bags in supermarkets significantly more compared to 
when the messages were administered individually.  
It is no surprise that integrating these theoretical dimensions can help guide the 
practical design of public climate change interventions. To illustrate, consider that it is 
well documented that human attitudes encompass both cognitive and affective dimensions 
(Albarracín et al., 2005), especially in the context of climate change (Lorenzoni et al., 
2006). As a result, creating negative attitudes towards climate change draws on the 
interaction of both cognitive and affective processes. In addition, while knowledge about 
the potential consequences of climate change has been implicated in achieving 
behavioural change, this effect is enhanced when knowledge about consequences 
interacts with a feeling of personal and moral responsibility for those consequences 
(Bamberg & Mӧser, 2007; Joireman et al., 2004; Wall, 2005).  
While it is important that individuals believe that engaging in the target behaviour 
is the right thing to do (i.e. moral norm activation), this feeling is more easily elicited 
when people are under the impression that the target behaviour is also being performed by 
others (i.e. social norm activation). Because individual beliefs are often a function of the 
social group to which an individual belongs, an informational message is expected to be 
more persuasive if the right in-group source and context is provided (Mackie, Worth, & 
Asuncion, 1990; Van Knippenberg, Lossie, & Wilke, 1994). In sum, recent research is 
increasingly starting to validate the importance of exploring interactions between 
cognitive, experiential and normative influences on behaviour.  
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5.4       Conclusions 
 
 
The aim of this paper has been twofold. Firstly, to evaluate the theoretical and empirical 
evidence for three major approaches to public climate change communication (cognitive, 
experiential and normative) and secondly to advance a new communication model that is 
more likely to effectively encourage the behavioural shifts that climate change 
necessitates. It is concluded that in isolation, cognitive, experiential and normative 
approaches are unlikely to induce behavioural change. Instead, a new framework for 
communicating climate change is presented. It is argued that future interventions are 
more likely to reduce the gap between public communication and behavioural change 
when such campaigns: (1) effectively integrate cognitive, experiential and normative 
aspects of human behaviour in their message design (2) make the climate change context 
explicit and (3) foster a strong link between the behaviours that need to be changed and 
their psychological determinants. 
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Abstract 
 
 
Climate change represents a complex set of challenges, in part because it is marked by risks that 
are not easily observed and identified – risks that humans have significant difficulty estimating. A 
large body of research has shown that the construction of human risk perception is a complex, 
multi-faceted process. Determining viable mitigation and adaptation strategies toward climate 
change risks therefore necessitates models that appropriately reflect human knowledge systems 
and learning processes. In learning for a sustainable future, we must look beyond traditional 
measures of risk variables and obtain a more comprehensive and holistic understanding of risk 
behaviour. In this chapter, we aim to provide such an interdisciplinary overview. Using practical 
examples we outline five fundamental processes that help form, shape and guide human 
perceptions of climate-related risks, namely: (1) cognitive, (2) subconscious, (3) affective          
(4) socio-cultural and (5) individual factors. We subsequently critically review techniques for 
measuring risk perception, discuss (current) public risk perceptions of climate change and 
illuminate the mechanisms by which risk perception can influence public action. A major 
conclusion is that eliciting effective adaptation and mitigation responses requires greater public 
understanding of and multi-level engagement with climate change and to this extent, we provide 
several recommendations for public policy.   
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1.0 Introduction 
 
 
The scientific consensus on anthropogenic climate change is now unequivocal 
(Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007). As a result, humanity is increasingly 
faced with the prospect of vastly changing environmental conditions. In light of this fact, 
there are two broad challenges in learning towards and maintaining a sustainable future. 
The first relates to attaining a detailed understanding of the effects of changes in Earth’s 
systems, due to geophysical, biological, social, and economic causes. Second is the 
challenge of enabling effective mitigation and adaptation measures under such changing 
conditions. In this chapter we aim to address the latter challenge by illuminating the 
crucial role of risk perception in driving and shaping public responses to climate change.  
The apparent disconnect between risk perceptions of climate change and public 
action is undoubtedly linked to the kind of risk that climate change represents; a so-called 
“un-situated” risk (Hulme, 2009). The term “un-situated” implies that in most people’s 
daily environment, the risks associated with climate change are often not directly 
observable. Since climate change is a slow, cumulative and largely invisible process, it  
does not coincide with the way in which humans traditionally perceive threats in their 
direct environment, making it difficult for people to accurately estimate climate-related 
risks. Moreover, people’s perception of how climate change is likely to impact them 
personally often seems to differ from their perception of how climate change is likely to 
affect society as a whole. It is therefore important to develop a better understanding of 
how individuals construct their knowledge, learn and ultimately make decisions about 
climate change.  
We recognize that the complexities of climate change calls for an integrated 
approach. Consequently, we take an interdisciplinary perspective in this chapter and aim 
to present a holistic overview of risk understanding on the individual level. In the first 
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section, we address the multi-dimensional nature of human risk perception and explain, 
using practical examples, how perceptions of climate change related risks are constructed. 
The purpose of the second section is to look at ways of measuring risk perception and to 
critically discuss how current risk perceptions guide the formation of public responses to 
climate change. In the last section, we address societal change towards climate change 
and sustainability more generally and provide several public policy recommendations for 
eliciting and maintaining effective mitigation and adaption responses. 
2.0 Through the Looking-Glass: The Multi-Dimensional Nature of 
Risk Perception 
 
While risk perception is an inherently complex process, an extensive review of the 
literature allows for the identification of at least five different dimensions that underlie, 
influence and help shape human perceptions of risk2. These dimensions include:                
(1) cognitive, (2) subconscious, (3) affective, (4) socio-cultural and (5) individual factors.  
 
2.1 Reasoning About Risk 
  
 
Cognitive scientists have often described the way in which individuals process and 
organise incoming information as an interrelated network of mental structures. According 
to schema theory, knowledge should therefore be seen as an elaborate network of abstract 
mental structures that represent an individual's understanding of the external world 
(Anderson, 1977). More recently, the study of “mental models” has gained increased 
attention. A mental model is a person’s internal, personalized, intuitive and contextual 
understanding of how something works (Kearney & Kaplan, 1997). It is important to 
                                               
 
2 These five dimensions constructively build on the “triple stand” model proposed by Hillson and Murray-
Webster (2009). 
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consider how individuals learn, understand, and form mental representations of climate 
change risks, as mental models have three major functions: (1) they serve as a framework 
into which people fit new information; (2) they define how individuals approach and 
solve problems; and perhaps most importantly (3) they help formulate actions and 
behaviour (Carey, 1986; Morgan et al., 2002).  
Unfortunately, a sizable portion of the literature indicates that most people's 
mental model of climate change contains fundamental flaws and that a more substantial 
and meaningful understanding of the causes, impacts and solutions to climate change is 
still lacking (American Psychological Association, 2009; Leiserowitz, 2006; Steg & Vlek, 
2009). To highlight the importance of studying people's knowledge and mental models of 
risk factors, consider that some individuals erroneously perceive a few degrees increase in 
global average temperature to mean that winters will be less cold and that summers will 
be more “pleasant” (Meinders, 1998). More generally, such incorrect mental models tend 
to downplay people's understanding of the potential risks involved and thereby contribute 
to “wait and see” attitudes (Xiang, 2011). 
One reason why people hold such limited understanding of climate change is that 
its complexity often defies our intuitive understanding of concepts of stock and flow, as 
thinking about complex systems generally exceeds human cognitive capacity (Simon, 
1955). For example, in a set of experiments run by Sterman and Booth Sweeney (2002, 
2007) and Sterman (2008), MIT students deduced that a reduction in CO2 emissions 
would be followed immediately by a reduction in global mean temperature. While such 
matching heuristics are effective in daily experiences with simple system dynamics 
(where inputs and outputs are closely related in time and space), they are inappropriate 
for complex systems with multiple feedback loops and extended time delays such as 
climate change modelling (Xiang 2011). Another problem that occurs when trying to 
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communicate and educate people about the potential consequences of climate change lies 
in the fact that people tend to process information in a manner that is consistent with their 
pre-existing beliefs. Selectively attending to evidence that confirms pre-existing beliefs 
and the re-interpretation or distortion of information to the contrary is generally referred 
to as “confirmation bias” (Lewicka, 1998).  
In fact, much information that is retained in an individual’s memory tends to be 
information that supports pre-existing thoughts and beliefs. Consider two relevant 
empirical studies that clearly illustrate these concepts: the first study assessed how 
concerned Democrat and Republican voters were about the risks associated with climate 
change. Increased levels of concern were indeed associated with increased knowledge 
levels among Democrats and individuals that expressed trust in the scientific consensus 
on climate change. Yet, increased knowledge did not lead to more concern among 
individuals (e.g. Republicans) who were already sceptical about the occurrence of climate 
change from the outset (Malka, Krosnick, & Langer, 2009).  
A second example of the tendency to selectively retain information is illustrated 
by a case study on farmers in Illinois, USA. Farmers who believed that their region was 
undergoing climate change recalled temperatures and precipitation levels congruent with 
those beliefs. Yet, other farmers in the same region who believed in a constant climate 
recalled weather statistics congruent with those beliefs. In reality, both groups showed an 
equal amount of error in their recollection of weather statistics (Weber & Sonka, 1994). 
These cases studies serve to illustrate that the way in which we learn, process information 
and organise our knowledge strongly influences how we perceive the external world.  
However, the idea that human risk perception is predominantly influenced by 
knowledge and information is a fairly cognitivist point of view. In fact, from a purely 
cognitive and consequentialist perspective, the concept of “risk” has two sub-
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components: (1) uncertainty – which relates to the probability or likelihood of a potential 
danger and (2) an evaluation of how much the threat “matters”, (i.e. an estimation of the 
impact or severity of the potential risk (Hillson & Murray-Webster, 2009). Such mental 
“likelihood/impact” risk assessments require individuals to employ analytical reasoning 
skills based on the information they have at hand.  
The main (economic) model under which risk is appraised in this manner is 
Expected Utility (EU) theory (Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944). From an 
economist’s viewpoint, a risk preference can be seen as a descriptive label for the shape 
of a utility function that is assumed to underlie an individual's choices (i.e. a measure of 
the desirability of a good or service to an individual). Individual utility functions are 
derived from a set of choices over “risky alternatives”. The shape of a utility function 
then denotes an individual’s position on a risk continuum (i.e. risk averse, risk neutral or 
risk seeking). These attitudinal predispositions to risk are often thought to be 
representative of a general personality trait (Weber et al., 2002).  
In practice, such economic models of risk have often been used to estimate 
individual willingness to pay for public climate change mitigation policies. This is 
typically done by presenting individuals with a hypothetical set of certain-versus-risky 
investment choices. For example, Cameron and Gerdes (2007) found that more risk-
averse individuals and those who expect the cost of acting now to be preferable to the cost 
of acting in the future tend to express more support for mitigation policies. Thus, from 
this point of view, risk is mainly addressed with rational thought, logic, probability and 
utility maximization (Weber, 2006).  
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2.2 Conversations with the Unconscious 
 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) have long argued that EU theory fails to predict actual 
behaviour in many decisions involving risk. In particular, experiments have pointed out 
that individuals are not consistently classified as risk averse or risk seeking across time 
and situations (e.g. Shoemaker, 1990) and a wide variety of behavioural phenomena show 
that people’s actual preferences systematically violate the axioms of EU theory (e.g. see 
Ellsberg, 1961; Slovic, Fischoff, & Lichtenstein, 1979). 
 Simon (1955) suggested that the analytical demands of utility maximization 
generally exceed the cognitive capacity of the typical individual faced with complex 
decisions. Instead, actual decision-making behaviour, as opposed to a normative model of 
rational behaviour, involves simplified representations of complex problems and reliance 
on heuristics (rules-of-thumb). We take a “heuristic” to be an expression of fast, intuitive 
and unconscious information processing. Or, in the words of Gigerenzer (2007): the 
“adaptive intelligence of the unconscious”.  
To this extent, alternative approaches to EU have been introduced in the field of 
behavioural economics, most notably “Prospect Theory” (PT) (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979). Prospect theory focuses heavily on the framing of risk questions and has identified 
a large range of heuristics and unconscious “biases” that humans employ when making 
decisions under uncertainty. Without discussing all of these mechanisms in extensive 
detail, a particularly interesting and relevant implication of prospect theory is that 
individuals tend to be risk-averse in what is known as the “gain domain” (i.e. when there 
is something to be gained) and risk-seeking in the “loss-domain” (i.e. people are willing 
to take larger risks if they already have to lose something from the outset). Therefore, if 
the consequences of climate change can be framed under the loss domain, this might help 
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explain why individuals and societies are taking more risk (by not changing their 
behaviour) than what is generally advised by governments and scientists. 
 In addition, perhaps one of the most frequently quoted biases in explaining risk-
taking behaviour is what has become known as “optimism bias”: a systematic tendency 
for individuals to underestimate potential negative outcomes (Weinstein, 1980). 
Particularly in the context of climate change individuals tend to display an unrealistic 
sense of optimism; as most people believe that climate change is likely to affect others 
(e.g. the third world) but not the individual in question (O’Neill & Nicholson-Cole, 
2009). In sum, the task environment of climate change is defined by high-level ambiguity, 
where scientists, policy makers and the public often have to make decisions based on 
limited and uncertain information. Paired with cognitive constraints such as a low-level 
discernibility between numeric risks, individuals naturally tend towards heuristics to form 
a general view of climate change risks. 
 
2.3 Feeling at Risk 
 
Traditionally, most theories of decision making under uncertainty have completely 
neglected the role of emotions in risk perception (Loewenstein et al., 2001). Yet, it has 
become increasingly apparent that individuals have a hard time forming risk judgements, 
when the relevant risk is represented purely as a statistical probability. Mounting 
evidence from cognitive, social and clinical psychology has indicated that risk 
perceptions (across domains) are strongly influenced by affective and emotion-driven 
processes (e.g. Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Sloman, 1996; Weber, 2006). Emotional 
reactions to risks often diverge from cognitive judgements and when such divergence 
occurs, emotional influences generally override cognitive deliberation (Loewenstein et 
al., 2001). Some researchers go as far as stating that the public may not act upon simple 
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information about probabilities unless this information is given emotional significance 
(Slovic et al., 2004). These findings are not entirely surprising. The human brain is fast 
and experienced in mapping cues from the environment (i.e. threats) into affective 
responses (Weber, 2006). In fact, when responding to immediate environmental threats, 
instinctive emotions such as fear and anxiety arise in an evolutionarily older part of the 
brain known as the “amygdala” (which is the center of the brain's limbic system). The 
amygdala plays a key role in emotional memory and processing (Davis, 1992). A more 
subtle form of emotion defined specifically as a positive (like) or negative (dislike) 
evaluative feeling towards external stimuli is known as “affect” (Slovic et al., 2004). An 
affective response is often a first reaction that guides information processing and 
judgement (Zajonc, 1980). Particularly, people tend to rely on what is called an “affective 
pool”, which includes all the positive and negative affective associations that someone 
holds with regard to a risk representation, both consciously and unconsciously 
(Breakwell, 2010). For example, in one US study negative affect and imagery toward 
climate change were identified as the strongest predictors of global warming risk 
perceptions (e.g. Leiserowitz, 2006). Similar results were found in a Swedish study 
linking risk judgements of climate change to affective evaluations (Sundblad et al., 2007).  
It is important to note that different environmental risks can elicit different 
emotions (Böhm, 2003). For example, while broad and controllable human-caused risks 
(e.g. industrial pollution) tend to evoke negative emotions and lead to the boycott of the 
inflicting agent, risks brought about by one’s own activities (e.g. car pollution) often 
invoke ethical emotions such as guilt and shame. Yet, the most intense emotions 
associated with ecological risks are so-called prospective “consequence” based emotions, 
such as fear and worry (Böhm, 2003). Overall, these findings highlight the important role 
of affective and emotion-driven processes in shaping environmental risk perceptions.   
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2.4 A Culture of Risk?  
 
 
Cultural anthropologist Mary Douglas and political scientist Aaron Wildavsky have 
criticized existing theories of risk (including economic, cognitive and affective 
explanations) for neglecting the influence of social and cultural factors in the formation of 
individual risk perceptions. This criticism is reiterated by Dake (1991): “An 
understanding of who fears what and why, requires serious attention to the political, 
historical, and social context in which risks are framed and debated...mental models of 
risk are not solely matters of individual cognition but also correspond to worldviews 
entailing deeply held beliefs and values regarding society, its functioning and its potential 
fate” (p.62). The cultural theory of risk (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982) suggests that 
individuals and groups deploy different perceptual lenses to arrive at their particular 
interpretation of the world and proposes that both economic and psychometric approaches 
‘depoliticize’ risk and thereby do not accurately reflect an individual’s commitments to 
competing cultural and political structures.  
In short, cultural theory makes a distinction between social relations (the 
interpersonal level) and worldviews (broadly shared values and beliefs). Based on years 
of anthropological research, Douglas constructed a typology of risk culture, perhaps 
better known as the “grid-group” system, where these broad (global) competing cultural 
types are delineated in more detail. These typologies are; “egalitarianism”, 
“individualism”, “hierarchism” and “fatalism”. Their relative position on the group-grid 
scale is determined by the extent to which individuals feel bounded by feelings of 
belonging and solidarity (group) and the amount of control and structure that people 
maintain in their social roles (grid). While traditionally, the cultural theory of risk has 
been criticized for lacking empirical testing via recognized social science techniques (e.g. 
O’Riordan & Jordan, 1999), recent empirical research shows that such presuppositions 
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about the nature of society do lead people to perceive the same risks in different ways and 
as a result, cause a divergence in support of different public policies (e.g. Slovic et al., 
1998; Steg & Stievers 2000).  
For example, egalitarians are likely to show most concern for the environment 
whereas individualists tend to show least concern (e.g. Leiserowitz, 2006). A likely 
explanation is that while egalitarians generally perceive nature and the environment as 
fragile and at risk, most western capitalist societies have propagated an individualist 
worldview, disconnecting humans from nature by objectifying it as a commodity that can 
be bought and sold (Doyle, 2011). Another recent initiative is the ‘cultural-cognition’ 
project – a combined effort that seeks to connect cognitivist and cultural theories. The 
cultural cognition of risk acknowledges that cognitions are shaped and influenced by 
group-grid worldviews (Kahan, 2012). In addition, the mass media as well as 
interpersonal interactions play an important role in circulating existing social 
representations of risk in a given culture.  For example, the Social Amplification of Risk 
Framework (SARF) highlights how risk perceptions are often amplified or attenuated 
depending on how they are communicated (Kasperson et al., 1988).  
Given that, for most people, the popular media is a common source for acquiring 
information about climate change (e.g. Boykoff & Rajan, 2007; Ungar, 2000), it can 
significantly influence the public’s perception (e.g. Sampei & Aoyagi-Usui, 2009; Stamm 
et al., 2002). To this extent, Steg and Sievers (2000) advise: “risk communication should 
be in line with the cultural biases of the target group as people tend to have more trust in 
risk communication if the message is in line with their cultural biases”. In short, 
researchers have also clearly demonstrated the importance of social representations and 
cultural worldviews in the construction of environmental risk perceptions (e.g. Dake, 
1991; Leiserowitz, 2006). 
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2.5 The Risky Individual  
 
Finally, in addition to cognitive, subconscious, affective and socio-cultural 
considerations, clear individual differences in risk perception have also been noted. For 
example, research has indicated that there are significant differences in risk perception 
between men and women (e.g. Finucane et al., 1997). Furthermore, while some studies 
indicate systematic ethnic and socioeconomic differences in the perception of 
environmental risks (e.g. Flynn, Slovic, & Mertz, 1994), other recent research has 
indicated that substantial variation in individual risk behaviour is likely to arise as a result 
of genetic predispositions (Kreek et al., 2005; Kuhnen & Chiao, 2009). In addition, the 
concept of “self-efficacy” (Bandura, 1977) (i.e. an individual’s perception of the capacity 
to bring about change through his or her own behaviour) has been implicated in 
explaining variation in risk perception, as lower levels of self-efficacy imply a decreased 
ability to protect oneself, which tends to be associated with higher levels of perceived 
personal risk (e.g. Breakwell, 2010; Spence, Poortinga, Butler, & Pidgeon, 2011). Lastly, 
individual differences in the level of experience and familiarity with a risk also strongly 
influence perception (Song & Schwarz, 2009; Spence et al., 2011; Weber, 2006).  
So far we have discussed five fundamental elements that construct and help shape 
public risk perceptions of climate change. While each of these elements can be considered 
independently, we want to stress the interconnected nature of all the aforementioned 
factors and highlight that environmental risk perception is the result of cognitive, 
subconscious, emotional, socio-cultural and individual factors. Having discussed the 
fundamental principles of risk perception, we now turn to reviewing current perceptions 
of climate change risks and discuss how these perceptions are likely to influence public 
mitigation and adaptation responses. 
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3.0 Mind the Gap: Risk Perceptions of Climate Change and Public 
Action 
 
Direct experience is often thought to strongly influence risk perception (Whitmarsh, 
2008), particularly because experiences can invoke strong memorable feelings, possibly 
making them more dominant in processing (Loewenstein et al., 2001). Yet, if a 
precondition of risk perception is that humans must be able to perceive a threat or danger 
in their direct environment, as some perceptual psychologists would argue (e.g. Gibson, 
1972), then climate change provides a unique challenge. This is so because climate 
change is an intangible process that cannot be observed directly. However, the 
consequences that are likely to be associated with climate change can be observed (e.g. 
the increased frequency and severity of extreme weather events).  
Nonetheless, it remains questionable whether people actually attribute these 
consequences to climate change (Bickerstaff, 2004). In fact, some individuals may 
attribute natural disasters to higher powers, spiritual beliefs or other, unrelated factors. In 
addition, responses to climate change risks address mitigating the threat at hand (e.g. 
flooding) and not climate change as a broader societal issue. For example, a sensible 
response to flooding would be to build more robust infrastructures, buy insurance or to 
take other protective measures to ensure personal safety (i.e. adaptation responses). There 
is no reason to assume that whenever a person's house or property floods, this provides an 
incentive for the individual to actively diminish his or her carbon footprint.  
To illustrate, a recent study in the UK showed that flood victims did not 
particularly attribute the experienced flooding to climate change (Whitmarsh, 2008); 
instead, people rather identified local observable causes (e.g. lack of water-course 
maintenance). Thus, this implies that, while direct (environmental) experience certainly 
influences risk perceptions and behaviours, differences in perceptual attribution are likely 
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to determine the nature of the response behaviour. For example, although familiarity with 
risks has been shown to lower risk perceptions (Weber, 2006), evidence indicates that 
people living in low-lying coastal areas tend to have a heightened sense of personal risk 
(Brody et al., 2008).  
Still, it has remained relatively unclear whether living in places physically 
vulnerable to climate change (or having had prior experience with the consequences of 
climate change) also induces greater preparedness to take mitigative action. To this 
extent, a recent national UK study by Spence et al. (2011) found that past flooding 
experiences were significantly related to increased preparedness to reduce energy use. In 
particular, past flooding experiences influenced individual preparedness via risk 
perception. This is consistent with other research that has highlighted the role of personal 
risk perceptions in explaining behavioural intentions to address global warming (e.g. 
Bord, O’Connor, & Fisher, 2000).  
These recent findings suggest that risk perceptions seem to be able to elicit both 
adaptation and mitigation behaviours. The key take-away is that the effect of risk 
perception on behaviour is largely mediated by the extent to which individuals attribute 
their risk perceptions to a particular source (Figure 3.1). Note that adaptation is likely to 
occur in both instances (compared to mitigation), as it is often more pressing and less 
“optional”. A major implication is that if the goal is to stimulate mitigation behaviours, 
effort must be geared towards creating a strong(er) link between the occurrence of 
environmental changes and anthropogenic climate change.  
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    Figure 3.1:  Experience, Perception and Attribution of Risk. 
 
 
Thus far we have discussed instances where people were able to observe some of 
the consequences potentially associated with climate change. But often there is a 
disassociation between the cognitive information that informs individuals that there is in 
fact a risk to be worried about and the inability for many people to observe or experience 
this risk in their direct environment (Weber, 2006). Many studies have tried to get a sense 
of how individuals perceive such seemingly “un-situated” risks. Because there is no one 
coherent method of how an individual’s “risk perception” is measured, risk perception 
often represents an index of different constructs.  
For example, such measures may include “societal risk factors” or a measure of 
“general concern”, “perceived seriousness of a threat” (i.e. severity times likelihood 
estimations) or measures of “personal worry” (cf. Bord, O’Connor, & Fisher, 2000; 
Leiserowitz, 2007; Staats et al., 1996). In particular, the terms “concern”, “worry” and 
“perceived seriousness” are often used interchangeably. Yet, the literature often fails to 
note that these terms have different meanings. For example, it is entirely possible to be 
generally concerned about an issue without actively worrying about it. Worry is usually 
considered to be a more active emotional state and a stronger predictor of behaviour than 
either “concern” or perceived “seriousness” (Leiserowitz, 2007).  
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To illustrate the impact that such different definitions of “risk perception” can 
have on outcome measurements, we consider a study that was conducted by GlobeScan, 
covering 34 countries. The study found that the majority of people in each country 
believed that climate change was a somewhat to very serious problem (GlobeScan, 2000). 
In 2006, GlobeScan repeated the study and found that the percentage of respondents that 
believed that climate change was a ‘very serious threat” increased significantly in most 
countries (GlobesScan, 2006). Similarly, a study done in the UK also indicated that a high 
percentage (82%) of respondents reported to be concerned about climate change 
(Poortinga et al., 2006). Thus, general concern seems to be well established.  
Yet, The Pew Global Attitude Survey (2006) found that, (while varying among 
countries) personal levels of worry about climate change are generally much lower than 
either perceived seriousness of the issue or general stated concern. It is also questionable 
whether stated concern reflects the perception that the problem of climate change is 
urgent or of high priority. For example, while many people are concerned about climate 
change, they rank it as less important as many other social issues such as terrorism, health 
care and the economy (Krosnick et al., 2006). This may explain why global climate 
change remains a relatively low priority compared to other issues of individual concern.  
Similar evidence is provided by Poortinga and Pidgeon (2003). Based on a large 
number of face-to-face interviews, the researchers found that while there was some 
moderate concern for all risks mentioned in the study (e.g. radioactive waste, genetically 
modified food), climate change was ranked among the least important issues. 
Additionally, in a qualitative study conducted by Bedford et al. (2004), respondents 
reported feeling no immediate need for the implementation of any significant lifestyle 
changes. Similarly, work by Lowe et al. (2006) also indicated that people did not think 
climate change would impact their day-to-day life directly. In sum, a review of the 
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evidence leads to the conclusion that although general concern is expressed, there is also 
a dominant belief that climate change is a non-urgent and non-personal threat that does 
not require immediate personal action. 
 
4.0 Conclusion and Policy Implications 
 
 
The aim of the current chapter has been to shed light on the role of risk perception in the 
development of public responses to climate change. We have illustrated that risk 
perceptions of climate change are formed by five fundamental mechanisms, including; 
cognitive, subconscious, affective, socio-cultural and individual processes. A major 
conclusion is that a lack of public understanding is perpetuating incorrect mental 
representations of climate change. Existing (flawed) mental models downplay the 
perceived risks and as a result, hinder public action. The creation of viable mitigation and 
adaptation strategies towards climate change risks therefore requires greater public 
understanding of the nature of complex system modelling as well as a more holistic 
understanding of the climate change problem. In fact, O’Neill and Hulme (2009) argue 
that: “cognitive engagement is imperative: if individuals do not have an adequate 
understanding of the issue, any mitigation policy risks being ineffective or even rejected”.  
Yet, as discussed throughout this chapter, cognitive knowledge plays just one part 
in explaining perceptions and behaviour, while other factors such as heuristics, emotions, 
socio-cultural norms, given infrastructures and context conditions in which knowledge 
arises or is situated are in many cases equally relevant to understanding behaviour. For 
example, while it is known that (affective) experiences with climate-related risks can  
inspire mitigation behaviours through heightened risk perceptions, this is most likely to 
occur under the condition that individuals actually (consciously) attribute their perceptual 
experience with extreme weather to anthropogenic climate change. Thus, a recurring 
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policy question is how to develop a system that breaches this divide and encourages 
individuals to take ownership over adaptation and mitigation responses. To this extent, we 
look ahead and identify two potential approaches that, in the face of accelerating change, 
can assist policy makers in stimulating the link between public engagement with climate 
change and learning for a more sustainable future.  
In the realm of public policy, “nudge'” and “think” strategies have become 
popularized (John et al., 2011; Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). To start with the former, 
“nudging” focuses on minimizing the cost of behavioural change by altering people’s 
choice environment in an attempt to encourage them to act in ways that are more 
beneficial to both themselves and society as a whole. The “think” approach on the other 
hand, assumes that individuals can step away from day-to-day life and reflect on a wide 
range of public policy choices. “Think” suggests that people are “knowledge hungry”, 
“learn to process new information” and reach “new heights of reflection” (John et al., 
2011, p. 19). Thus, think strategies stimulate group participation and encourages the 
design of democratic institutional platforms that support citizen-lead investigations. This 
view is in line with the concept of “post-normal science”, which supports the idea of an 
“extended peer community”, where all those that are affected by an issue (e.g. climate 
change) and prepared to enter into dialogue on it are welcomed to share their knowledge 
and understanding (Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1991). 
While both nudge and think strategies can be thought of as independent 
instruments, it is likely that an integrative approach will more effectively encourage the 
adoption of mitigation and adaption behaviours. Such an integrative approach should 
explore not only traditional but also new, interactive and experiential ways of providing 
people with information, knowledge and learning opportunities. For example, a number 
of recent policy-oriented studies on household energy use are highlighting that combining 
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traditional modes of conveying information (e.g. energy statements) with non-traditional 
methods, such as providing people with “smart readers” (i.e. experiential learning) and / 
or informing them about the positive energy-saving behaviour of their peers (i.e. “social 
nudging”) stands a greater chance of successfully promoting sustainable behaviours than 
either strategy alone (e.g. Dolan & Metcalfe, 2011; UK Cabinet Office, 2011). 
 In conclusion, in the realm of complex risks like climate change, public policies 
should aim to foster the link between knowledge acquisition, individual and social 
learning and the implementation of mitigation and adaptation responses. As discussed 
throughout this chapter, this essentially implies co-production of knowledge and applying 
the understanding and use of that knowledge to promoting and maintaining more 
sustainable behavioural and societal changes. 
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Abstract  
 
This study seeks to provide a detailed understanding of the social-psychological determinants of 
climate change risk perceptions. In doing so, the current research advances a climate change risk 
perception model that integrates socio-demographic, cognitive, experiential and socio-cultural 
factors. Using a set of highly reliable measures, the conceptual model is tested empirically using a 
national sample (N = 808) of the UK population. Results indicate that the full model is able to 
explain nearly 70% of the variance in risk perceptions of climate change. Gender, political party, 
knowledge of the causes, impacts and responses to climate change, descriptive and prescriptive 
social norms, biospheric values, holistic affect and personal experience with extreme weather 
events were all identified as significant predictors. Experiential and socio-cultural factors 
explained significantly more variance in risk perception than either cognitive or socio-
demographic characteristics. Results also confirm that the factor-analytic structure of climate 
change risk perceptions can be conceptualised along two key dimensions, namely: personal and 
societal risk judgements and that both dimensions have different psychological antecedents. 
Implications for both theory and risk communication are discussed. 
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1.0     Introduction 
 
 
While climate change is a complex global hazard that poses significant challenges to 
societies worldwide (Swim et al., 2011), the extent to which it is publicly viewed as 
a risk that requires urgent attention varies substantially (cf. Kim & Wolinsky-
Nahmias, 2014; Leiserowitz, 2005; Lorenzoni & Pidgeon, 2006; Lorenzoni et al., 
2006; Pidgeon, 2012). This is a peculiar but inevitable result of the fact that the 
nature of human perception allows for a differentiation between real-world threats 
and the subjective perceptual experience of those threats (Pidgeon, Kasperson, & 
Slovic, 2003). Indeed, the perception of risk is a mental construct (Sjöberg, 2000a). 
As Slovic (1992) points out, the notion of “risk” is a human invention and as such, 
“it does not exist independent of our minds and culture” (p. 690).   
Moreover, as an object of risk representation, climate change is relatively 
unique (Breakwell, 2010). It is unique in the sense that both the magnitude and 
complexity of the climate change problem are unprecedented in terms of the scale 
(i.e. global) as well as the time-line involved (i.e. stretching over centuries). 
Furthermore, because climate change is a slow, cumulative and largely invisible 
process, it cannot be experienced directly (Weber, 2010) and as such, it is markedly 
different from the way that our ancestors have traditionally perceived threats in their 
direct environment (Gifford, 2011; Helgeson, van der Linden, & Chabay, 2012). In 
other words, human-caused climate change is an evolutionarily “novel” risk 
(Griskevicius, Cantu, & van Vugt, 2012).  
 Advancing a more detailed understanding of the psychological factors that 
drive and shape public risk perceptions of climate change is therefore a pivotal task, 
especially since an increasing amount of studies are indicating that risk perception is 
an important predictor of public willingness to help reduce climate change (e.g. 
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Leiserowitz, 2006; O’Connor, Bord, & Fisher, 1999; Semenza et al., 2008; Spence, 
Poortinga, Butler, & Pidgeon, 2011; Spence, Poortinga, & Pidgeon, 2012; Tobler, 
Visschers, & Siegrist, 2012a). In order to get a more systematic overview of the 
current state of research, a survey of the peer-reviewed literature was conducted 
using the search terms “risk perception”, “climate change” and “global warming”3. 
Studies were selected based on the relative explanatory power (R2) of the reported 
models and a detailed overview of the search results is provided in Table 4.1.   
A number of conclusions can be drawn from the table. To start with,            
(a) while a variety of different models and approaches have contributed to explaining 
risk perceptions of climate change, a more systematic and detailed organisation of 
key social-psychological determinants is currently lacking, making it difficult for 
both researchers and practitioners to see the forest for the trees, (b) a majority of the 
studies have been conducted in the Unites States and (c) the amount of variance 
explained ranges between 22% to 55% (with an average of about 40%), leaving 
substantial room to further develop both the theoretical as well as the empirical 
explanatory power of current risk perception models. 
In addition, it is also worth mentioning that many of the studies listed in 
Table 4.1 use different measures of risk perception, which makes a comparison of 
behavioural determinants difficult and therefore some caution should be exercised in 
making any direct comparisons. For example, whereas some studies used the term 
“global warming” others used “climate change” or “global climate change” - which 
could explain some variation in itself (Villar & Krosnick, 2011; Whitmarsh, 2009). 
In addition, while terms such as perceived “seriousness”, “concern” and “worry” are 
                                               
 
3 The following databases were used: PsychInfo, Scopus, Google Scholar and Web of Science.  
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often used synonymously in the literature, they actually mean different things (van 
der Linden, 2014a). To illustrate, it is possible to be broadly and generally concerned 
about an issue without actively worrying about it (Leiserowitz, 2007). In fact, 
climate change is often characterized as a distant psychological risk, both spatially as 
well as temporally – happening in the “future” to “other” people and places (Spence 
et al., 2012).  To some extent, this characterisation may be a natural consequence of 
what Weinstein (1989) referred to as; “optimism bias” (i.e. the erroneous belief that 
others are more likely to be affected by the same risk).   
The difference between self vs. other risk comparisons is also nicely captured 
by the “impersonal impact hypothesis”, which has long suggested a conceptual 
distinction between societal and personal level risk judgements (Tyler & Cook, 
1984). This differentiation is important to consider, as several studies have shown 
that when asked to assess the threat of climate change for society as a whole, people 
tend to provide systematically higher ratings than when asked to evaluate climate 
change as a personal risk (Bord, O’Connor, & Fisher, 2000; Leiserowitz, 2005) - a 
phenomenon also known as “risk denial” (Sjöberg, 2012).  
Surprisingly, risk research has often failed to make this differentiation in the 
context of climate change. In fact, while occasionally noted (Bord et al., 2000; 
Roser-Renouf & Nisbet, 2008), no research has examined to what extent risk 
perceptions of climate change can be viewed empirically as a two-dimensional 
construct, and more importantly, whether societal and personal risk perceptions have 
different psychological antecedents - which could have important implications for 
risk communication (Bord et al., 2000; Leiserowitz, 2005; Sjöberg, 2012). The 
purpose of the current study is therefore twofold. First, in order to provide a more 
systematic and theoretically integrated overview of the main social-psychological 
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determinants of climate change risk perceptions, a new climate change risk 
perception model is advanced. The explanatory power of the model is subsequently 
tested empirically using a national sample of the British population and a set of 
highly reliable measurement constructs.  
Second, this study examines whether climate change risk perceptions can be 
further divided into societal and personal level risk judgements and to what extent 
these dimensions have different psychological antecedents. The rest of this paper is 
divided as follows; first, a detailed theoretical discussion of past research is 
provided, followed by the development of a new conceptual model, an overview of 
the methodology and a presentation and discussion of the results. Last but certainly 
not least, limitations are discussed and some suggestions are offered for future 
research in this area.  
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  Table 4.1:  Overview of Major Risk Perception Studies (ordered by explanatory power) 
 
Authors Key Explanatory Variables Dependent 
Variable 
Sample Explained 
Variance 
Akerlof et al. 
(2013)  
(a) Personal experience, (b) cultural worldviews 
(proxy), (c) political ideology, (d) place 
attachment and (e) socio-demographics. 
Local climate change risk            
(8 items, α = 0.96) 
Alger County, Michigan, 
USA (local)                          
(N = 765) 
55% 
Spence, 
Poortinga & 
Pidgeon (2012)    
    Psychological distance variables,                   
(a) temporal, (b) spatial and (c) uncertainty. 
Risk Perception Index                  
(3 items, α = 0.83) 
Great Britain (national)                 
(N = 1822) 
54% 
Leiserowitz 
(2006) and 
Smith & 
Leiserowitz
 
(2012)       
(a) Holistic negative affect, (b) image affect,     
(c) naysayers, (d) alarmists, (e) political ideology, 
(f) cultural worldviews (egalitarian/individualist), 
(g) member of environmental group,                  
(h) newspaper reader and (i) socio-demographics. 
Risk Perception Index                 
(9 items, α = 0.94 / 0.96) 
USA (national)                  
(N = 673 and N =  1,001) 
47%-52% 
Kellstedt, 
Zahran & 
Vedlitz
 
(2008) 
(a) Ecological values (NEP), (b) personal 
efficacy, (c) self-reported knowledge about 
climate change, (d) trust in media, (e) trust in 
experts, (f) confidence in science, (g) political 
ideology and (h) socio-demographics. 
Risk Perception Index                 
(6 items, α = 0.87) 
 USA (national)                     
(N = 1,093) 
43% 
Brody, Zahran 
& Vedlitz 
(2008) 
(a) Physical vulnerability variables, (b) ecological 
values (NEP), (c) self-efficacy, (d) knowledge, 
(e) network interest and (f) socio-demographics. 
Risk Perception Index                 
(3 items, α = 0.84) 
 USA (national)                   
(N = 1,093) 
42% 
Milfont (2012) (a) Ecological values (NEP), (b) political 
ideology, (c) self-reported knowledge about 
climate change, (d) perceived efficacy, (e) trust in 
media, (f) trust in experts, (g) confidence in 
science and (h) socio-demographics. 
Risk Perception Index                 
(6 items, α = 0.86) 
New Zealand                
(national - 1yr panel)           
(N = 269) 
38%-48% 
Menny et al.  
(2011)      
(a) Beliefs about climate change, (b) interest in 
climate change, (c) knowledge about climate 
change, (d) mass media influence, (e) personal 
experience with extreme weather and (f) socio-
demographics. 
Personal Risk Index                  
(17 items, α = not  
reported) 
Mannheim, Germany  
(local) (N = 157) 
31% 
Sundblad, Biel 
& Gärling 
(2007) 
(a) Knowledge about climate change,                 
(b) worry/affect and (c) socio-demographics. 
Risk Perception Index                  
(9 items, α = 0.91) 
Sweden (national)               
(N = 621) 
24-26% 
Malka, 
Krosnick & 
Langer (2009)    
(a) Self-reported knowledge, (b) trust in scientists 
and (c) socio-demographics. 
Single-Items          
(Perceived general and                 
national  seriousness) 
 USA (national)                   
(N = 1,002) 
22-25% 
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2.0  The Present Research 
 
 
New risk perception models are generally welcomed (Sjöberg, 2002) - especially 
since “the aim of the work is to find a model which is as fully explanatory as 
possible” (Sjöberg, 2012, p. 665). Moreover, while existing models often slice risk 
perception into different dimensions, little explanation is provided as to why people 
experience risk in these dimensions or while explanations may exist, no coherent 
effort has been made to piece them together (Wåhlberg, 2001). The purpose of the 
current research is exactly this: to provide a new conceptual framework to help 
organise and integrate different theoretical perspectives and offer a comprehensive 
overview of key psychological determinants that jointly, explain a substantial 
amount of the variance in climate change risk perceptions.  
While public risk perceptions are clearly complex and multidimensional 
(Slovic, Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, 1982) past research has suggested that risk 
perceptions of climate change are primarily influenced by four key dimensions, 
namely; socio-demographic, cognitive, experiential and socio-cultural factors 
(Helgeson et al., 2012). The current section expands on this broad conceptual 
structure by outlining and delineating each of these dimensions in further detail.  
 
2.1   Cognitive Dimensions of Risk 
 
 
2.1.1     Knowledge about Climate Change 
 
 
In order to estimate both, the probability with which global warming is likely to 
occur and the severity of associated consequences, knowledge of these factors must 
be acquired first. To this extent, knowledge about climate change is generally 
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regarded as a cognitive aspect of risk judgements (Sundblad et al., 2007). However, 
it remains relatively unclear to what extent a cognitive understanding of climate 
change can explain and predict public risk perceptions. For example, while Brody et 
al. (2008) find no significant relationship between knowledge and risk perception, 
both Malka, Krosnick and Langer (2009) and Menny et al. (2011) provide mixed 
evidence, suggesting that increased knowledge about climate change only leads to 
higher concern for some groups (e.g. liberals) but not for others (e.g. conservatives). 
Kellstedt, Zahran and Vedlitz (2008) actually found that knowledge is negatively 
associated with risk perceptions of climate change.  
Yet, a growing number of studies report the opposite: that knowledge is in 
fact a significant and positive predictor of climate change risk perceptions (e.g. 
Hidalgo & Pisano, 2010; Milfont, 2012; O’Connor et al., 1999; Reser et al., 2012; 
Sundblad et al., 2007; Tobler et al., 2012a). To some extent, these contradictory 
findings are attributable to differences in how knowledge about climate change is 
measured. For example, while some studies use single-item measures of subjective, 
self-reported knowledge (e.g. Kellstedt et al., 2008; Malka et al., 2009) other studies 
have tried to objectively determine how much actual knowledge people hold about 
climate change (e.g. Sundblad et al., 2007; Tobler et al., 2012b).  
It is important to note that the way in which “knowledge” is operationalised 
can bear significantly on the results (Menny et al., 2011; Reser et al., 2012), 
particularly because self-reported measures tend to be (a) less reliable and (b) 
confound different types of knowledge. Thus, their use should be avoided (Reser et 
al., 2012; Roser-Renouf & Nisbet, 2008). In fact, Kaiser and Fuhrer (2003) argue 
that the role of knowledge often goes undetected because researchers fail to make a 
conceptual distinction between different forms of knowledge. Accordingly, in line 
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with other recent research (e.g. Sundblad et al., 2007; Tobler et al., 2012b), the 
current study aims to provide a more comprehensive and objective assessment by 
measuring three interrelated and converging subject areas, namely; public 
knowledge about the causes, impacts and responses to climate change. 
 
2.2   Experiential Processes 
 
 
2.2.1   Affect  
 
 
It is now widely recognized that human information processing is guided by emotion 
and affect (Damasio, 1994; Marx et al., 2007; Zajonc, 1980) and accordingly, both 
the “risk-as-feelings” hypothesis (Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001) and 
the “affect-heuristic” have become influential in describing and understanding 
public risk perceptions (Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, & Johnson, 2000; Slovic, 
Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2004). When a risk judgement is complex and 
mental resources are limited, relying on a so-called “holistic affective impression” 
can serve as an efficient heuristic (Slovic et al., 2007). The term “affect” here is 
meant to indicate a more subtle form of emotion, defined as a positive (like) or 
negative (dislike) evaluative feeling towards an external stimuli (Slovic et al., 2007). 
An “affective response” can then be described as a first, associative and automatic 
reaction that guides information processing and judgement (Zajonc, 1980). 
While a number of studies have shown that both affective imagery and 
holistic affect are strong and important predictors of climate change risk perceptions 
(e.g. Leiserowitz, 2006; Smith & Leiserowitz, 2012; Sundblad et al., 2007), others 
have argued that emotion and affect explain very little variance in risk perception 
(Sjöberg, 1998a, 2006). In fact, Kobbeltved et al. (2005) report in their study that 
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they find little support for the “risk as feelings” hypothesis. In addition, Sjöberg 
(2006) argues that if affect is operationalised as an evaluative measure (like/dislike) - 
this tends to be closer conceptually to a measure of attitude. Thus, if affect is really 
operationalised as an attitudinal measure and because the term “emotion” is often 
mistakenly equated with affect, it is easy to falsely conclude that emotions are an 
important determinant of risk perception.  
Although a fair criticism, Slovic et al. (2007) are careful not to confuse the 
term emotion with affect and duly acknowledge the similarities between evaluative 
attitudes and the affect heuristic. In fact, an “attitude” has traditionally been defined 
as: “the affect for or against a psychological object” (Thurstone, 1931, p. 261).  
Accordingly, no issue is taken here with the conceptual overlap between affect and 
attitudes more generally, given that it is widely agreed upon that attitudes have a 
strong “affective” component (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993), especially in the context of 
climate change (Poortinga et al., 2011). While Wardman (2006) expresses some 
sentiment for Sjöberg’s argument, he concludes that these definitional issues do not 
weigh up against converging evidence from across the behavioural sciences in 
favour of the role of affect in risk perception.  
Yet, while Peters and Slovic (2007) conclude that affect is best 
conceptualised as a global evaluative measure, the current research does note that 
previous studies have predominantly used single-item measures to assess holistic 
affect (e.g. Leiserowitz, 2006; Poortinga et al., 2011; Smith & Leiserowitz, 2012) 
and thus the reliability of such measures cannot be sufficiently assessed. In addition, 
the present study also argues that when “holistic affect” is meant to reflect a global 
evaluation of the quality of an object, good/bad dimensions are best avoided since 
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these items are likely to tap into a moral dimension4 (Manstead, 2000). The current 
research constructively builds on these issues by using multiple indicators that draw 
on a range of affective-laden adjectives to establish a clearly formulated and reliable 
measure of generalised affect.  
 
2.2.2    Personal Experience 
 
 
A more direct path to establishing visceral concern relies on personal experience 
with a threat or hazard (Weber, 2006), as direct experiences can elicit strong 
emotions, making them more memorable and dominant in processing (Loewenstein 
et al., 2001). Indeed, people’s emotional reactions to risks often depend on the 
vividness with which negative consequences can be imagined or experienced 
(Loewenstein et al., 2001; Weber, 2006). However, since climate change cannot be 
experienced directly (Whitmarsh, 2008), for most people, affective evaluations of 
global warming are largely influenced by the popular media (Swim et al., 2011).  
Yet, while climate change cannot be experienced directly, most people are 
able to accurately detect changes in local weather patterns (Howe, Markowitz, Ming- 
Lee, & Leiserowitz, 2013). To this extent, several studies have indicated that heat 
primes and warmer daysinfluence public perceptions of global warming (e.g. 
Joireman, Truelove, & Duell, 2010; Zaval, Keenan, Johnson, & Weber, 2014). In 
addition, people may also experience some of the impacts of climate change (e.g. 
extreme weather events) – although the nature of this relationship hinges on the 
assumption that people actually causally attribute their experience with extreme 
weather events to climate change (Helgeson et al., 2012; Weber, 2010). Yet, an 
                                               
 
4 Moral emotions such as guilt and regret are conceptually closer aligned with a post-behavioural concept 
known as anticipated affect (van der Pligt et al., 1998). 
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increasing amount of evidence now suggests that personal experience with extreme 
weather events does in fact influence risk perceptions of climate change (e.g. 
Akerlof et al., 2013; Brody et al., 2008; Krosnick et al., 2006; Reser et al., 2012; 
Spence et al., 2011) -  although some exceptions exist (e.g. Whitmarsh, 2008).   
It is worth noting that past studies have primarily focused on experience with 
flooding events (given its saliency as a likely consequence of climate change). Yet, 
this might not accurately capture an individual’s full range of experience with 
extreme weather and temperatures (e.g. the 2012 UK heat wave). Accordingly, to 
further build on this research, this study adopts a wider approach to personal 
experience, measuring a respondent’s experience with both flooding as well as other 
types of extreme weather events (e.g. heat waves, freak storms, droughts etc.).    
 
2.3   Socio-Cultural Influences 
 
 
2.3.1   Culture, Values and Worldviews 
 
 
Existing theories of risk perception (including cognitive and affective explanations) have 
been criticized for “depoliticizing risk” and for neglecting the important role of 
competing social and cultural structures in shaping individual risk perceptions (Jackson, 
Allum, & Gaskell, 2006). To this extent, “the cultural theory of risk” (Douglas, 1970; 
Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982) has become a popular approach to account for cultural 
differences in risk perception. Cultural theory is based on anthropological research and 
proposes a conceptual typology of risk culture (i.e. the “grid-group” system), where four 
broad competing cultural types or “worldviews” are delineated. In short, these include 
“egalitarianism”, “individualism”, “hierarchism” and “fatalism”. The relative position of 
the cultural types on the group-grid scale is determined by the extent to which individuals 
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feel bounded by feelings of belonging and solidarity (group) and the amount of control 
and structure that people maintain in their social roles (grid).  
First operationalised empirically by Wildavsky and Dake (1990) recent studies 
have found a significant relationship between “cultural worldviews” and risk perceptions 
of climate change (e.g. Akerlof et al., 2013; Kahan et al., 2012; Leiserowitz, 2006; Smith 
& Leiserowitz, 2012). Yet, others have fiercely criticised its use. For example, Sjöberg 
(1997, 1998b) and others (e.g. Boholm, 1996; Oltedal, Moen, Klempe, & Rundmo, 2004) 
have repeatedly argued that cultural worldviews have low explanatory power - even 
positing that “cultural theory is simply wrong” (Sjöberg, 1998b, p. 150). Others have 
similarly argued that cultural theory explains little variance, but take a less extreme 
position and don’t dismiss the theory in its entirety (e.g. Marris, Langford, & O’Riordan, 
1998) while some continue to support its use (e.g. Slovic & Peters, 1998). 
Overall, two main criticisms can be delineated. The first deals with the question of 
how to operationalise cultural theory empirically while the second relates to whether or 
not it is appropriate (or even possible) to infer cultural biases from individual-level data. 
With regard to the latter, existing measures have repeatedly been criticised for lacking 
construct validity both in terms of scale-reliability as well in terms of discriminant 
validity between the proposed cultural types (Boholm, 1996; Rippl, 2002; Sjöberg, 
1998b). In fact, it’s not uncommon for subjects to have high scores on competing scales, 
which is problematic, since in theory, individuals cannot be characterised by mutually 
inconsistent worldviews (Kahan, 2012). Yet, even when construct validity is improved, 
this does not appear to increase the explanatory power of the theory (Rippl, 2002). The 
second major criticism revolves around the idea that a cultural worldview is simply not an 
innate psychological tendency that can be inferred from individual-level data (Rippl, 
2002).  While this paper expresses some support for the idea of a latent “cultural type”, 
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this does not discount the argument that systematic cultural differences are best measured 
between countries and not between individuals5 (Oreg & Katz-Gerro, 2006). 
 Given the many complications (both theoretical as well as empirical) associated 
with the cultural theory of risk (Price, Walker, & Boschetti, 2014),  the current paper 
argues that broad value orientations are a more reliable proxy for modeling cultural 
influences. In order to understand why, some conceptual distinctions need to be made 
between the terms “values” “culture” and “worldviews”. Values differ from worldviews 
in two important ways; first, (a) values precede worldviews (Stern, Dietz, & Guagnano, 
1995; Stern et al., 1999) and (b) values can be seen as fundamental guiding principles that 
are more specific and more stable than worldviews (Schwartz & Wolfgang, 1987; Stern, 
2000). Yet, cultural worldviews and values tend to overlap conceptually6 (Corner, 
Markowitz, & Pidgeon, 2014), given that cultures are essentially comprised of and 
characterized by their underlying value structures (Hofstede, 2001; Schwartz, 1992). 
While sceptical, Sjöberg (2012) argues that the role of values in risk perception 
has not been explored sufficiently and that more relevant value structures need to be 
identified. Accordingly, instead of using Schwartz’s (1992) value inventory in its entirety, 
in the environmental domain, three broad value orientations are considered to be relevant 
(Stern, Dietz, & Kalof, 1993). These include: (1) egoistic values (i.e. maximizing 
individual outcomes), (2) socio-altruistic values (i.e. caring about others) and (3) 
biospheric values (i.e. caring for non-human nature and the biosphere itself). While these 
value structures tend to be the same in different cultures (Schwartz & Sagiv, 1995), 
individuals are likely to prioritize them differently (Steg & De Groot, 2012).   
                                               
 
5 It should be noted however that cultural theory is sometimes (successfully) used to represent preferences 
for the role of government (e.g. see Akerlof et al., 2013; Price et al., 2014). 
 
6 To illustrate the conceptual overlap: egalitarian societies tend to be characterised by strong socio-altruistic 
values whereas egoistic values tend to be more pronounced in individualistic cultures.  
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In contrast to the cultural typology of risk, the construct validity of broad value 
orientations has been reliably established in a series of extensive studies across various 
contexts and cultures (De Groot & Steg, 2007, 2008, 2010; Schultz, 2001; Steg et al., 
2011; Steg & De Groot, 2012; Stern & Dietz, 1994). In fact, De Groot, Steg and Poortinga 
(2013) have recently echoed similar concerns about cultural theory and provide support 
for the use of broad value orientations in understanding risk perception. A similar view 
and approach is adopted in the current paper.  
 
2.3.2    The Social Construction of Risk 
 
 
Inevitably, the way in which people approach and evaluate risks is influenced by 
other people (Joffe, 2003). In fact, both Social Representations Theory (SRT)  
developed by Moscovici (1984) and the Social Amplification of Risk Framework 
(SARF) developed by Kasperson et al. (1988) highlight that interpersonal 
interactions and the mass media play a crucial role in further circulating existing 
social representations of risk in a given culture. While the SARF highlights that 
public risk perceptions are often amplified or attenuated depending on how a risk is 
communicated, SRT focuses on how the “we’” becomes contained in the response of 
the “I” (Joffe, 2003, p. 60).  While certainly useful in their own right (e.g. Smith & 
Joffe, 2013), both SRT and the SARF framework have been criticised for being 
rather vague meta-theories (e.g. see Wåhlberg, 2001; Voelklein & Howarth, 2005). 
Because both frameworks are more sociological in nature (at least in their level of 
analysis), it is somewhat unclear how relevant concepts can be readily applied to 
individual-level data. For example, Renn (2010) acknowledges; “SARF is not a 
causal theory and does not lead us to identify or quantify the factors that shape and 
influence the amplification and attenuation processes” (p. 158). 
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It is surprising that with few exceptions (e.g. Brody et al., 2008), little to no 
(quantitative) studies have looked at the role of social factors in driving (individual) 
risk perceptions of climate change. Given that normative factors are likely to 
influence risk perceptions (Swim et al., 2011; Renn, 2010) the current study adds to 
this literature by measuring the normative influence of important social referents 
directly using a social norms approach (Cialdini, Kallgren, & Reno, 1991). Social 
norms are broadly defined as “expectations of how people are supposed to act, think 
or feel in specific situations” (Popenoe, 1983, p. 598). 
In accordance with the “focus theory of normative conduct” (Cialdini et al., 
1991), the current study measures both “descriptive social norms” (i.e. the extent to 
which referent others are taking action to help reduce the risk of climate change) as 
well as “prescriptive social norms” (i.e. the extent to which an individual feels 
socially pressured to view climate change as a risk that requires action). It is 
hypothesised that normative influences bear significantly on an individual’s risk 
perception. In other words, the greater the extent to which climate change is viewed 
as a risk by important social referents (e.g. friends, family etc.), the more it amplifies 
and intensifies an individual’s own risk perception. 
 
2.4      Socio-Demographic Characteristics 
 
 
It has been consistently documented that females tend to have higher risk 
perceptions than males for a wide range of hazards (Slovic, 1999), including climate 
change (e.g. Brody et al., 2008; O’Connor et al., 1999; Sundblad et al., 2007) – this 
has also been referred to as the “white-male” effect (Finucane et al., 2000). One 
possible explanation for this is that women are more aware of environmental risks  
(Dietz, Stern, & Guagnano, 1998) and experience and create more vivid and intense 
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affective imageries (Loewenstein et al., 2001). In addition to gender, political 
ideology is also often identified as a predictor of risk perception (e.g. Leiserowitz, 
2006; Malka et al., 2009; Smith & Leiserowitz, 2012), where liberals express more 
concern about climate change than conservatives. Lastly, it is sometimes assumed 
that a higher education and socio-economic status provides people with an increased 
sense of control (and thus lower risk perceptions). While there is some marginal 
support for this hypothesis (e.g. Akerlof et al., 2013; O’Connor et al., 1999), most 
studies find little to no correlation between income, age, education and risk 
perceptions of climate change (e.g. Brody et al., 2008; Milfont, 2012; Sjöberg, 
2000b; Sundblad et al., 2007). Given the often inconsistent effect of socio-
demographics, they mainly serve as control variables here to assess the net influence 
of cognitive, experiential and socio-cultural factors on risk perception. 
 
3.0 The Climate Change Risk Perception Model (CCRPM) 
 
 
Based on the preceding discussion, a conceptual overview of the overarching 
psychological dimensions and included predictor variables is delineated in Figure 
4.1. Risk perceptions of climate change can be described as a function of cognitive 
factors (i.e. knowledge about the causes, impacts and solutions to climate change), 
experiential processing (i.e. affective evaluations and personal experience with 
extreme weather events) and socio-cultural influences (including descriptive and 
prescriptive social norms as well as egoistic, altruistic and biospheric value 
orientations) - while controlling for key socio-demographic characteristics. While 
these dimensions are deemed to be particularly critical in explaining public risk 
perceptions of climate change, the framework (Figure 4.1) is not meant to provide an 
ultimate explanation nor is the list of included predictors meant to be exhaustive. 
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 It should also be mentioned that the model’s dimensions are not implied to 
operate independently of each other. On the contrary, on a neurological level, 
affective and cognitive processing mechanisms typically operate in parallel and 
continuously interact with each other (Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Marx et al., 2007; 
van der Linden, 2014b; Weber, 2006). In turn, both cognitive and affective 
processing mechanisms might be conditioned on a third factor such as cultural 
differences (Kahan, 2012). The aim of this paper is however not to explore the 
interrelationship between these dimensions. Instead, the current study seeks to 
provide a useful framework to (a) help structurally organise key psychological 
predictors, (b) validate the importance of cognitive, experiential and socio-cultural 
factors in their own right and (c) illustrate that jointly they are able to account for 
most of the variance in risk perceptions of climate change. 
 
  
Figure 4.1:  The Climate Change Risk Perception Model. 
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4.0  Method 
 
 
4.1  Participants 
 
The data set is based on a nationwide sample (N=808) of the population of the United 
Kingdom (i.e. England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland). The high degree of 
internet penetration in this country (about 77% of the population) allowed for an online 
survey via a survey sampling company. A national quota sample7 (based on gender, age 
and region) was drawn from a large mixed panel of people who were willing to 
participate in web-based research for a small (non-monetary) reward. The final sample 
obtained was composed of 50% male and 50% female respondents. The age of 
participants ranged between 18 and 65, with a modal age bracket of 35-44.  
 
4.2  Materials and Procedure 
 
During the design stage of the survey instrument, input was obtained from a panel of 
three academic and professional experts. In addition, to ensure that the survey questions 
and response categories were clear and unambiguous, a pilot study was conducted at the 
behavioural research lab of the London School of Economics using a focus group of 
(N=15) members of the general public. Results of the pilot study were used to refine the 
questionnaire. The survey was administered online in October 2012, took about 15 to 20 
minutes to complete and respondents were assured that their responses remain 
anonymous. Because the survey was part of larger study designed to explore and 
investigate a wide range of perceptions, attitudes and behaviours related to climate 
change, only relevant constructs are reported here.  
                                               
 
7 Although multi-stage randomisation was employed to select panellists, given the use of a nonprobability 
(i.e. quota) sample no data was provided (or collected) on response rates.   
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4.3  Measures 
 
 
4.3.1    Risk Perception  
 
 
Drawing on items developed by Bord et al. (2000) and Leiserowitz (2006), a total of 
8 measures were used to create a holistic assessment of risk perception, covering 
both spatial and temporal dimensions. The first two questions asked respondents to 
judge how likely they think it is that they will personally experience threats to their 
overall well-being as a result of climate change. The same was asked for society as a 
whole. Three questions asked respondents to evaluate how serious of a threat they 
think climate change is to the natural environment, the UK and to them personally. 
Respondents were also asked how serious they would rate current impacts around 
the world, how concerned they are and how often they worry about climate change. 
For analysis, three indices were created, a global/societal risk perception index (α = 
0.95), a personal risk index (α = 0.87) and a holistic risk perception index (α = 0.96). 
 
4.3.2   Knowledge about Climate Change 
 
 
Each knowledge scale was assessed with 13 items presented in random order (7 of 
which were correct statements and 6 were incorrect). The correctness of all 
statements was based on expert reports (e.g. IPCC) and checked by two academic 
climate scientists. Responses were dichotomized as either right (1) or wrong (0) and 
scored and indexed based on the number of correct answers (0 - 13) – where more 
correct answers indicate a higher knowledge score (method adopted from 
Leiserowitz, Smith and Marlon, 2010). For the cause-knowledge scale respondents 
were asked to what extent each item (e.g. burning fossil fuels) contributes to climate 
change (i.e. major, minor or no contribution). A reliable scale was obtained for 
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cause-knowledge (α = 0.90). The climate change consequences / impacts knowledge 
scale asked respondents to estimate whether each item (e.g. global sea level) is likely 
to increase, decrease or not change at all as a result of climate change. Similarly, a 
reliable scale was created for impact-knowledge (α = 0.88).  Finally, the response-
behaviours scale asked respondents to rate how much each item (e.g. conserving 
energy) is likely to reduce climate change if done worldwide (a lot, a little, not at 
all). A reliable scale for response-knowledge was obtained as well (α = 0.94).   
 
4.3.3   Holistic Affect 
 
 
Following the recommendations of Peters and Slovic (2007) holistic affect was 
measured using three 7-point bi-polar adjective scales, e.g. ‘I feel that climate 
change is” (very unpleasant-pleasant, unfavourable-favourable, negative-positive).  
A reliable scale was obtained (α = 0.85). 
 
4.3.4    Personal Experience with Extreme Weather Events 
 
 
Two questions were used to assess prior experience with extreme weather events. 
Respondents were asked to recall how often in the last five years they had 
experienced (a) flooding and (b) other extreme weather events (e.g. severe heat 
waves, droughts, freak storms etc.) while residing in the United Kingdom. 
Responses were combined and dichotomized to form an index describing personal 
experience (0 = no experience, 1 = experience). 
 
4.3.5 Broad Value Orientations 
 
 
Drawing on previous work by Schwartz (1992) and Stern et al. (1999), De Groot and 
Steg (2007) developed a standardised value scale comprised of four egoistic, socio-
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altruistic and biospheric items. The same measures were used here. Respondents 
were asked to rate the importance of 12 values “as guiding principles in their lives” 
on a 9 point scale, ranging from -1 opposed to my values, 0 not important to 7 
extremely important. Items were randomly ordered. Reliable scales were obtained 
for egoistic (α = 0.79), altruistic (α = 0.87) and biospheric (α = 0.93) values. 
 
4.3.6 Social Norms 
 
 
Descriptive Norm 
 
 
On a 7-point Likert-scale, respondents answered three questions about how likely 
they think it is that important referent others are taking personal action to help tackle 
climate change. A reliable index was obtained (α = 0.97). 
 
Prescriptive (Injunctive) Norm 
 
 
Similarly, on a 7-point Likert-Scale, respondents answered four questions about the 
extent to which they feel socially pressured to personally help reduce the risk of 
climate change. A reliable index was obtained here as well (α = 0.81). 
 
4.3.7 Socio-Demographic Characteristics 
 
 
Lastly, a range of socio-demographic information was collected, including a 
respondent’s age, gender (female = 1), education, income, religiosity and political 
party / affiliation. For ease of interpretation, political party and level of education 
were recoded into binary responses (1 = liberal, 0 = conservative) and (1 = higher 
and 0 = lower education). 
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5.0  Results 
 
 
5.1  Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
An overview of the intercorrelations, means and standard deviations of the variables 
used in this study is provided in Table 4.2.  
 
Table 4.2:  Descriptive Statistics and Intercorrelations   
 
Note: Mean scale reliabilities are provided along the diagonal. * p <0.05, ** p <0.01, ***p < 0.001. All variables are 
coded so that higher values reflect more of the construct. 
 
 
 
N = 808    1    2   3        4        5       6         7        8     9  10     11           Mean    SD 
 1. Biospheric  
Values 
(0.93) 
          
6.22 1.79 
              
 2. Egoistic 
Values    
0.23*** (0.79) 
         
4.55 1.45 
              
 3. Altruistic 
Values    
0.68***  0.27*** (0.87) 
        
6.76 1.56 
              
 4. Cause-
Knowledge 
0.11** -0.02  0.04  (0.90) 
       
6.24 1.92 
              
 5. Impact-
Knowledge 
0.27*** -0.01  0.20***   0.51***  (0.88) 
      
7.19 2.52 
              
 6. Response-
Knowledge    
0.22***  0.02  0.17***   0.55***   0.61*** (0.94) 
     
8.03 2.69 
              
 7. Descriptive 
Social Norm   
0.35***  0.09**  0.23***  -0.01 0.16*** 0.18*** (0.97) 
    
4.21 1.46 
            
 
 
 8. Prescriptive 
Social Norm 
0.43*** 0.14***  0.33***   0.07* 0.27*** 0.31*** 0.62*** (0.81) 
   
4.52 1.11 
              
9. Affect  0.31*** -0.09** 0.26***   0.22*** 0.40*** 0.35*** 0.20*** 0.33*** (0.85) 
  
5.33 1.20 
  
             
10. Personal 
Experience 
0.13*** 0.16***  0.11**  -0.02   0.09* 0.15*** 0.17*** 0.18***  0.08* (1.0) 
 
NA NA 
              
 11. Risk 
Perception                            
0.54***  0.10**  0.38***   0.09* 0.38***   0.36***   0.51***  0.62***  0.54***  0.22*** (0.96) 4.83 1.36 
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5.2     The Climate Change Risk Perception Model  
 
 
Using a theory-based approach, hierarchical multiple regression analysis was used to 
evaluate to what extent cognitive, experiential and socio-cultural dimensions can 
explain and predict risk perceptions of climate change (Table 4.3). Starting with a 
baseline model8, the influence of relevant socio-demographic characteristics is 
presented in model 1. Results show that gender, education and political party 
identification are all significant predictors9, explaining a total of 6% of the variance 
in risk perception (F(3, 643) = 15.30, p < 0.001, Adj. R2  = 0.06).  In other words, 
being female, higher educated and holding liberal political views is associated with 
increased risk perceptions of climate change.   
Model 2 tested whether cognitive factors explain any additional variance in 
risk perception while controlling for socio-demographic characteristics. Inspection 
of the beta weights revealed significant effects for knowledge of the (a) causes,       
(b) impacts and (c) responses to climate change, explaining an additional 21% of the 
variance in risk perception (F(3, 640) = 58.72, p < 0.001, Adj. R2change = 0.21). Thus, 
increased knowledge of the causes, impact and solutions to climate change is also 
associated with higher risk perceptions.  
Model 3 explored the influence of experiential processes on risk perception 
above and beyond the effect of cognitive and socio-demographic factors. Both affect 
and personal experience with extreme weather events were significant predictors, 
explaining an additional 25% of the variance in risk perception (F(2, 571) = 136.07, 
                                               
 
8 About 80% of respondents answered all relevant socio-demographic questions (n = 647). 
 
9 Income, age and religiosity were non-significant predictors and therefore not further reported here.   
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p < 0.001, Adj. R2change
  = 0.25). Thus, personal experience and negative affective 
evaluations of climate change were both associated with increased risk perceptions.  
Model 4 investigated the explanatory power of socio-cultural influences on 
risk perception in addition to experiential, cognitive and socio-demographic 
characteristics. Descriptive social norms, prescriptive social norms and biospheric 
values were all found to be significant predictors, explaining an additional 16% of 
the variance risk perception (F(5, 566) = 58.35, p < 0.001, Adj. R2 change = 0.16). The 
more individuals perceive that others are taking action to help combat the risk of 
climate change and the more people perceive it is also expected of them, the higher 
their risk perceptions of climate change. In addition, individuals with stronger 
biospheric value orientations also tend to view climate change as a greater risk. In 
contrast, altruistic and egoistic value orientations were non-significant predictors. 
 In the final (full) model, gender, political party identification, cause-
knowledge, impact-knowledge, response-knowledge, holistic affect, personal 
experience with extreme weather events, descriptive social norms, prescriptive social 
norms and biospheric value orientations were all identified as significant predictors, 
accounting for 68% of the variance in climate change risk perceptions (F(13, 566) = 
93.53, p < 0.001, Adj. R2  = 0.68)10.  
 
 
                                               
 
10 Examination of the collinearity statistics revealed that each predictor fell within acceptable 
boundaries of tolerance (> 0.20) and the VIF coefficient (< 5.0), ruling out potential multicollinearity 
problems (O’Brien, 2007). 
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Table 4.3:  Climate Change Risk Perception Model (CCRPM) Results 
     
 
 
Note: Dependent variable is holistic risk perception. Entries are standardised beta coefficients;       
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 (n.s. = not significant). 
Independent 
Variables 
     Socio-
Demographics 
  
Cognitive 
  Factors  
 Experiential         
   Processes       
  Socio-  
 Cultural 
    
     Model 1  
       (β) 
 Model 2  
     (β) 
 Model 3                   
    (β) 
 Model 4 
     (β) 
     
Gender       0.14***    0.13***    0.08**  0.05* 
     
Education        0.10***     n.s.     n.s.   n.s. 
     
Political Party       0.20***     0.13***    0.09**  0.06* 
     
Cause Knowledge           -    0.20***    0.19***  0.11*** 
 
Impact Knowledge           -    0.31***    0.13***  0.09** 
     
Response Knowledge 
 
Affect 
 
Personal Experience 
 
Descriptive Norm 
 
Prescriptive Norm 
 
Biospheric Values 
 
Altruistic Values 
 
Egoistic Values 
         - 
 
         - 
 
         - 
  
         - 
         
         - 
 
         -                       
 
         - 
 
         -                                  
   0.29*** 
  
      - 
 
      - 
      
      - 
     
      -  
 
      - 
 
      - 
 
-
   0.17*** 
 
   0.54*** 
 
   0.11*** 
    
     - 
    
     - 
 
     - 
 
     - 
 
     - 
 0.10** 
 
 0.37*** 
 
 0.05* 
 
 0.14*** 
 
 0.25*** 
 
 0.20*** 
 
  n.s. 
 
  n.s. 
     
N        647     647   580               580 
adj. R2 
∆ adj.  
       0.06     0.27 
    0.21 
  0.52 
  0.25 
 0.68 
 0.16 
Fchange       15.30   58.72 136.07                        58.35 
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5.3  The Relative Importance of Cognitive, Experiential and Socio-Cultural 
Factors in Explaining Climate Change Risk Perceptions 
 
Zero-order correlations and standardised beta weights are commonly used to judge 
the relative importance of predictor variables in psychological research (Darlington, 
1990). Yet, examining them in isolation can be misleading. Therefore, this paper 
follows a method developed by Pratt (1987) who advanced a theoretically justified 
and intuitive way of partitioning explained variance among predictor variables. Pratt 
defined the relative importance of the j-th independent variable as the product of two 
terms: its bivariate correlation with the dependent variable ( 𝑟𝑗) and its standardised 
coefficient in the multiple regression ( 𝛽𝑗), where ∑ (𝛽𝑗 ∗ 𝑟𝑗𝑗 ) =  𝑅
2. Using Pratt’s 
(1987) measure, Table 4.4 shows how the adjusted R2 of the full model is partitioned 
among all predictor variables as well as for each conceptual dimension as a whole. 
A few clear observations are made. First, it becomes evident that overall, 
experiential processes (22.08%) and socio-cultural influences (34.40%) contribute 
the majority (56.48%) of explained variance in climate change risk perceptions, 
whereas cognitive (9.30%) and socio-demographic (2.17%) factors (while 
significant) jointly contribute substantially less (11.47%). Overall, holistic affect 
(20.83%) is the single strongest relative predictor of climate change risk perceptions.  
It is somewhat surprising that most of the variance contribution in experiential 
processing can be attributed to affect while direct experience with extreme weather 
events only contributes marginally (1.30%). Finally, it is interesting to note that 
cause-knowledge (1.02%) contributes somewhat less to the explained variance in 
risk perception when compared to impact (4.39%) and response-knowledge (3.94%). 
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Table 4.4:  Relative Importance of Socio-Demographic, Cognitive, Experiential 
and Socio-Cultural Influences. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Independent  
Variables 
Partitioning of 
Explained Variance  
  
Socio-Demographics  
  
Gender 0.83% 
Political Party  1.34% 
  
Total Variance Explained 2.17% 
  
Cognitive Factors  
  
Cause-Knowledge 1.02% 
Impact-Knowledge 4.34% 
Response-Knowledge 3.94% 
  
Total Variance Explained 9.30% 
  
Experiential Processes  
  
Affect 20.83% 
Personal Experience  1.25% 
  
Total Variance Explained 22.08% 
  
Socio-Cultural Influences  
  
Descriptive Norm 7.10% 
Prescriptive Norm 15.10% 
Biospheric Values 12.20% 
  
Total Variance Explained 34.40% 
  
Overall Variance Explained 68% 
Note: Judgements of relative importance of a dimension should not (only) be made in 
absolute terms but rather in reference to other constructs in the model.  Note: Simple 
correlations can be obtained by rewriting ∑ (𝛽𝑗 ∗ 𝑟𝑗𝑗 ) =  𝑅
2 so that  𝑟𝑗 = (
𝑅2𝑗
𝛽𝑗
).   
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5.4     Climate Change Risk Perception: A Two Dimensional Construct? 
 
 
Judged on a scale of 1 to 7, overall risk perceptions of climate change were 
reasonably high ( x = 4.83, SD = 1.36). In order to examine differences in risk 
judgements in more detail, the eight risk perception items were split into four 
“global/societal” and four perceived “personal risk” measures. The difference in 
mean scores between the two dimensions is highly significant ( x  = 6.45 > x  = 
4.44, SEdiff = 0.03), t(807) = 67.88, p < 0.001). A confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) 
was conducted to test the hypothesis that a two-factor (societal and personal) risk 
perception solution fits the observed (sample) data better than a unidimensional 
(one-factor) solution. The factor loadings of the societal and personal risk measures 
are presented in Table 4.5 and are all sufficiently high (ranging from 0.77 to 0.92).  
 Model fit11 indices are presented in Table 4.6. It is generally recommended 
to provide a range of goodness of fit statistics that cover different aspects of model 
fit. The first statistic in Table 4.6 is the Chi2 test - where lower values indicate better 
fit. The CFI and TLI are comparative (relative) fit indices, where a cut off value of 
0.95 indicates good fit and > 0.95 excellent fit.  The RMSEA and SRMR are 
absolute fit indices where cut off values between 0.05 and 0.10 indicate a reasonable 
fit and values < 0.05 excellent fit. AIC and BIC are parsimony fit indices and 
especially useful for model comparison – lower values indicate better fit. A review 
of the fit statistics suggests that while a unidimensional structure is acceptable, a 
two-factor solution provides a significantly better fit to the data (Table 4.6).  
                                               
 
11 CFI and SRMR are generally preferred (Iacobucci, 2010). For a detailed discussion of goodness of fit 
statistics and appropriate cut-off value see Hu and Bentler (1999) and McDonald and Ho (2002). 
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Table 4.6:  Goodness of Fit Statistics for a Two vs. One Factor Solution (CFA) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.5    Psychological Antecedents of Societal and Personal Risk Perceptions 
 
Since risk perceptions of climate change can be conceptualised as having a two-
dimensional structure, in addition to analyzing holistic risk perception, a logical next 
step is to examine to what extent cognitive, experiential and socio-cultural factors 
can explain both societal and personal risk perceptions and whether these two 
Risk Perception  
Measures 
  Factor Loadings  
  (Two-Factor Solution) 
Societal Risk Perception Measure   1 0.88 
Societal Risk Perception Measure   2 0.92 
Societal Risk Perception Measure   3 0.93 
Societal Risk Perception Measure   4 0.92 
 
Personal Risk Perception Measure  1 0.77 
Personal Risk Perception Measure  2 0.91 
Personal Risk Perception Measure  3  
Personal Risk Perception Measure  4 
0.79 
                             0.93 
Risk Perception                   χ2  (d.f.)                      ∆χ2              CFI       TLI      RMSEA   SRMR      AIC        BIC      
 (N= 808)  
 
One-Factor Solution          345.11 (14)*                     0.94       0.91        0.16        0.04       15700     15798         
(Unidimensional) 
 
Two-Factor Solution       181.35  (13)*                    0.97       0.95        0.11        0.03       15537     15641 
   
                                                                  164.76(1)* 
 Note: * p < 0.001. The following measures of fit are reported: Comparative Fit Index (CFI); Tucker Lewis Index 
(TLI): Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA); Standardised Root Mean Square Residual (SRMSR); 
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC); Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC).  
 
 
 
 
     Table 4.5:  Factor Loadings for Societal and Personal Risk Perception Measures.  
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dimensions have different psychological antecedents. In order to systematically 
analyse differences in determinants of societal (model 1) and personal (model 2) risk 
perceptions, two separate regressions were run (Table 4.7) using the same variables 
that were included in the final regression model in Table 4.3. Results point to three 
important differences. First, when controlling for all other variables in the 
regression, knowledge of the causes, impacts and responses to climate change are 
significant predictors of societal risk perception but not personal risk perception.  
Second, while personal experience is a significant predictor of personal risk 
perception, it does not predict societal risk perception. Third, while egoistic value 
orientations are a significant predictor of personal risk, they do not predict societal 
risk perception. Gender, political party identification, social norms, biospheric value 
orientations and affect predicted both personal as well as societal risk perceptions. 
Comparatively, while socio-demographic, cognitive, experiential and socio-cultural 
factors jointly explain 56% of the overall variance in personal risk perceptions 
(F(12, 572) = 61.88, p < 0.001, Adj. R2 = 0.56), they explain 69% of the variance in 
societal risk perceptions (F(12, 585) = 106.48, p < 0.001, Adj. R2 = 0.69). 
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Table 4.7:  Antecedents of Societal and Personal Risk Perceptions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Independent  
Variables 
 Societal Risk 
  
    Model 1                  
Personal Risk  
  
 Model 2 
         β      β 
   
Gender       0.05*    0.07** 
   
Political Party       0.06**    0.08** 
   
Cause Knowledge 
 
Impact Knowledge 
 
Response Knowledge 
      0.10*** 
 
      0.12*** 
 
      0.09*** 
    n.s. 
 
    n.s. 
 
    n.s. 
  
Affect 
 
Personal Experience 
 
Descriptive Norm 
 
Prescriptive Norm 
 
Biospheric Values 
 
Egoistic Values 
 
Altruistic Values 
      0.39*** 
 
       n.s. 
 
      0.14*** 
          
      0.23*** 
         
      0.22*** 
 
       n.s.                      
 
       n.s.                                 
   0.29*** 
 
   0.06* 
 
   0.16*** 
      
   0.26*** 
      
   0.23*** 
 
   0.07* 
 
n.s. 
 
N       585    585 
adj. R2       0.69    0.56 
F      106.43   61.88 
 
Note: entries are standardised beta coefficients, * p < 0.05, 
** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 (n.s. = not significant).  
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6.0  Discussion  
 
 
Public risk perceptions of climate change are clearly complex and multidimensional. 
The purpose of this paper has been to provide a more systematic and detailed 
understanding of the social-psychological determinants that underlie risk perceptions 
of climate change. To this extent, a climate change risk perception model was 
advanced, combining cognitive, experiential and socio-cultural factors to explain and 
predict risk perceptions of climate change (while controlling for key socio-
demographic factors). Using a national sample, the current study validates the 
predictive and explanatory power of the model.  
  
6.1  Evidence for a Climate Change Risk Perception Model  
 
 
It was stated earlier that “the aim of the work is to find a model which is as fully 
explanatory as possible” (Sjöberg, 2012, p. 665). The current research has shown 
that four conceptual dimensions can be validated empirically: cognitive, experiential, 
socio-cultural and demographic factors all play a significant role in explaining and 
predicting holistic risk perceptions of climate change, accounting for more than two-
thirds (68%) of the variance - which is substantially more than any published study 
to date. In fact, in terms of explaining “true variance”, it may very well approximate 
the ceiling (Sjöberg, 2002). Overall, experiential and socio-cultural processes were 
most influential, weighing in substantially more than either cognitive or socio-
demographic factors in explaining public risk perceptions of climate change. 
Congruent with the work of Tyler and Cook (1984), this study also provides 
empirical evidence for a two-dimensional structure (personal vs. societal risk 
perceptions) and highlights important differences in their psychological antecedents. 
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6.1.2 Socio-Demographic Characteristics  
 
 
In terms of the model’s components, socio-demographic factors such as gender and 
political orientation were found to be significant and consistent predictors of both 
personal as well as societal risk perceptions of climate change. In particular, females 
and liberals tend to view climate change as a greater risk, which is consistent with 
previous research (e.g. Brody et al., 2008; Leiserowitz, 2006; Malka et al., 2009; 
O’Connor et al., 1999; Sundblad et al., 2007).  
While some research has suggested that higher income and higher education 
should provide people with an increased sense of control and thus lower risk 
perceptions (e.g. Akerlof et al., 2013; O’Connor et al., 1999), the current research 
finds little support for this hypothesis, as level of education quickly lost its 
significance after controlling for knowledge-factors. Moreover, income and age had 
no significant effect on risk perception - which is also consistent with other recent 
research (e.g. Kellstedt et al., 2008; Milfont, 2012; Sundblad et al., 2007). Overall, 
socio-demographics only accounted for a relatively small amount of variance in 
climate change risk perceptions. 
 
6.1.3 Cognitive Factors  
 
 
While a substantial amount of confusion has surrounded the role of knowledge in 
risk perception (Kellstedt et al., 2008; Malka et al., 2009; Reser et al., 2012; Tobler 
et al., 2012b), this study distinguishes between three types of knowledge and 
confirms that knowledge about the (a) causes, (b) impacts and (c) responses to 
climate change are all positively and significantly related to holistic risk perceptions 
of climate change. Thus, people tend to view climate change as a higher risk when 
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they have knowledge about the causes of climate change, knowledge of what the 
likely impacts are as well as information about appropriate response behaviours.  
Yet, overall, cause-knowledge contributed less to the explained variance than 
either impact or response knowledge.  One possible explanation is that (as opposed 
to abstract knowledge about cause mechanisms) knowledge about the negative 
consequences of climate change is likely to elicit more vivid risk perceptions 
(Weber, 2006). Moreover, upon closer examination it becomes clear that the 
contribution of knowledge largely stems from its effect on societal risk perception, 
given that the knowledge items did not explain any variance in personal risk 
perceptions (when controlling for all other variables). It may very well be that since 
most of the knowledge items were measured on a general level they are likely to 
correspond more strongly with societal rather than personal risk measures. Yet, this 
seems to suggest that general knowledge about climate change may not readily map 
onto a personalized sense of risk. 
 
6.1.4 Experiential Processes  
 
 
While some research has been dismissive of the role of emotion and affect in risk 
perception (e.g. Sjöberg, 2006), the current research finds that holistic affect is the 
single most important predictor of both personal as well as societal risk perceptions 
of climate change. These results are entirely consistent with research conducted in 
the US context (e.g. Leiserowitz, 2006; Smith & Leiserowitz, 2012) and provide 
robust evidence for the role of affect in risk perception. In addition, the current study 
also provides further support for the growing link between personal experience with 
extreme weather events and risk perceptions of climate change (e.g. Akerlof et al., 
2013; Krosknick et al., 2006; Spence et al., 2011). 
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While, on average, people who have experienced extreme weather events 
tend to have significantly higher risk perceptions of climate change, the relative 
explanatory power of personal experience proved not particularly strong. This 
finding may be explained by the fact that an explicit (perceptual) link needs to be 
made salient in order for people to actually causally attribute their experience to 
climate change (Helgeson et al., 2012; Weber, 2010; Whitmarsh, 2008). For 
example, other recent research has indicated that personal experience with extreme 
weather influences beliefs about the reality of climate change (Myers et al., 2012), 
possibly by helping to reduce its abstract nature, as every day weather is something 
people are familiar with and can easily relate to (Smith & Joffe, 2013). 
Yet, although personal experience correlated significantly with both personal 
and societal risk perceptions, it remains questionable whether personal experience 
with extreme weather also breeds concern for society as a whole, given that it was 
not a significant predictor of societal risk perceptions (after controlling for all other 
factors). Thus, the role of personal experience with extreme weather (and how it 
influences risk perceptions) clearly deserves more attention in future research.   
 
6.1.5 Socio-Cultural Influences 
 
 
Surprisingly, very little quantitative research has investigated the role of social 
factors in shaping individual risk perceptions of climate change. The current study 
focused on assessing normative influence from a social norms perspective. Results 
indicate that both descriptive and prescriptive social norms show strong associations 
with risk perceptions of climate change. In other words, the more social referents 
recognize and act upon the risk of climate change, the more it amplifies and 
intensifies an individual’s risk perception - confirming that social norms 
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significantly influence perceptions of climate change (Renn, 2010; Swim et al., 
2011). Furthermore, in line with other recent research (e.g. De Groot et al., 2013) the 
current study also supports the inclusion of broad value orientations as important 
predictors of climate change risk perceptions.  
In particular, while biospheric values (i.e. caring about nature and the 
biosphere) were identified as a strong predictor of both personal as well as societal 
climate change risk perceptions, social-altruistic values did not predict either. A 
likely explanation for the non-significant role of altruistic values is that biospheric 
and altruistic values tend to be strongly and positively correlated. Therefore, in the 
context of environmental problems, the activation of biospheric values is more 
salient and hence altruistic values do not add any additional variance, unless both 
value orientations are in conflict (De Groot & Steg, 2007). The finding that egoistic 
value orientations predicted personal but not societal risk perceptions is non-
controversial: self-centred concerns about climate change impacts are unlikely to 
predict concern for society as a whole. Overall, socio-cultural influences explained 
most of the variance in risk perception. 
 
6.2   Implications for Risk Communication and Future Research 
 
 
The present study has important implications for risk communication. First and 
foremost, because risk perceptions of climate change are influenced by cognitive, 
experiential as well as socio-cultural factors, risk messages are likely to be more 
effective when they not only provide people with increased knowledge of the causes, 
consequences and solutions to climate change, but they should also appeal to 
affective and experiential processing mechanisms whilst being sensitive to different 
socio-cultural value orientations. Indeed, public interventions that appeal to multiple 
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aspects of human behaviour simultaneously are more likely to be successful (van der 
Linden, 2014a). For example, a strategy that advances public knowledge about 
climate change (i.e. cognitions) whilst fostering a social norm to view climate 
change as a hazard that needs to be addressed (i.e. social amplification) is likely to 
enhance risk perceptions of climate change (Whitmarsh, 2008).  
Yet, at the same time, in order to avoid backlash, such messages need to be 
considerate of and tailored to different cultural and socio-political audiences, 
especially in countries where political polarisation is high, such as the United States 
(Hart & Nisbet, 2012; McCright & Dunlap, 2011). In addition, other research has 
also advocated the potential of experientially based information processing (Marx et 
al., 2007), potentially through personal or vicarious experience with extreme weather 
events (Myers et al., 2012). While of course no single weather event can be 
attributed to climate change, the current study does suggest that making the link 
between climate change and the rising frequency with which extreme weather events 
are occurring more explicit can indeed be a useful communication strategy.  
Nonetheless, it has been argued that this approach could prove problematic in 
the face of more extreme winters. Yet, recent research by Capstick and Pidgeon 
(2014) suggests that because the term ”climate change” (rather than global warming) 
has increasingly been used as the predominant frame in the UK, “extremely cold 
winters” are not necessarily interpreted by the public as evidence against a rise in 
average global temperatures. A sensible risk communication approach is therefore 
the suggestion that cold weather extremes are not inconsistent with global warming 
(Capstick & Pidgeon, 2014). 
In line with the “impersonal impact hypothesis” (Tyler & Cook, 1984), risk 
communication messages should also take into account important differences in 
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determinants between personal and societal risk perceptions. For example, while 
increased knowledge of climate change may lead to increased concern for society as 
a whole, it does not readily translate into a personalized sense of risk. Future 
research could investigate making knowledge about the causes, impacts and 
responses to climate change more personally and locally relevant. 
Lastly, the current study is of course not without limitations. First, it should 
be noted that results of the current study are based on a national quota sample of 
British respondents and thus it remains unclear to what extent results are 
generalisable to other contexts and cultures. Although, as mentioned, findings of the 
current study do appear to be strongly aligned with the US context, particularly 
regarding the importance of experiential and socio-cultural variables in explaining 
risk perceptions of climate change.  
Second, while the aim of the current study was to examine key social-
psychological determinants, the list is certainly not exhaustive, as other important 
factors have also been noted to influence risk perception, such as trust in 
scientists/experts and exposure to popular media (e.g. Kellstedt et al., 2008; Malka et 
al., 2009; Slovic, 2006). Future research could also constructively build on the 
current study by further exploring the interrelated nature of cognitive, experiential 
and socio-cultural factors in shaping risk perceptions of climate change. Lastly, 
while designed for the context of climate change, future research may find the 
psychological framework outlined in this paper equally useful for predicting risk 
perceptions of other types of (environmental) risks. 
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7.0    Conclusion   
 
 
This paper advanced a social-psychological model of climate change risk perceptions. 
Using a large set of reliable measures, the model was tested on a national sample. Results 
provide robust evidence for the influence of cognitive, experiential and socio-cultural 
factors – jointly explaining nearly 70% of the variance in climate change risk perceptions 
(after controlling for key socio-demographic characteristics). In line with previous 
research, findings also confirm an empirical distinction between societal and personal risk 
perceptions and highlight important differences in their psychological antecedents. Taken 
together, these results suggest that risk perceptions of climate change are complex and 
multidimensional and that risk communicators should take an integrative approach by 
appealing to multiple aspects of human judgement and behaviour. 
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Abstract 
 
 
Examining the conceptual relationship between personal experience, affect and risk perception is 
crucial in improving our understanding of how emotional and cognitive process mechanisms 
shape public perceptions of climate change. This study is the first to investigate the interrelated 
nature of these variables by contrasting three prominent social-psychological theories. In the first 
model, affect is viewed as a fast and associative information processing heuristic that guides 
perceptions of risk. In the second model, affect is seen as flowing from cognitive appraisals (i.e. 
affect is thought of as a post-cognitive process). Lastly, a third, dual-process model is advanced 
that integrates aspects from both theoretical perspectives. Four structural equation models were 
tested on a national sample (N = 808) of the UK population. Results initially provide support for 
the “cognitive” model, where personal experience with extreme weather is best conceptualised as 
a predictor of climate change risk perception, and in turn, risk perception a predictor of affect. 
Yet, closer examination strongly indicates that at the same time, risk perception and affect 
reciprocally influence each other in a stable feedback system. It is therefore concluded that both 
theoretical claims are valid and that a dual-process perspective provides a superior fit to the data. 
Implications for theory and risk communication are discussed. 
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1.0 Introduction 
 
 
A “risk” is not something that exists “out there”, independent of our minds and 
culture (Slovic, 1992, p. 119). Indeed, unlike a physical threat or danger, the human 
notion of “risk” is a mental construct (Sjöberg, 1979), it cannot be sensed - it is only 
perceived (Fischhoff, Slovic, & Lichtenstein, 1983). Climate change is mostly a 
statistical concept, referring to the average long-term variability in the earth’s 
climate (Solomon et al., 2007) and as such, it cannot be experienced directly (Swim 
et al., 2011). Compared to many other hazards, the threat of climate change is 
therefore relatively unique: not only because of its scope and breadth (Breakwell, 
2010) but also in the sense that it is not directly “situated” in our daily environments 
(Helgeson, van der Linden, & Chabay, 2012).   
Nevertheless, an increasing amount of research has shown that people can (to 
some extent) accurately detect changes in their local climate and relate this 
perceptual experience to climate change (e.g. Akerlof et al., 2013; Howe et al., 2013; 
Joireman, Truelove, & Duell, 2010). Moreover, the rising incidence rate of extreme 
weather events is now increasingly being associated with climate change (Coumou 
& Rahmstorf, 2012). In fact, a number of studies have indicated that personal 
experience with extreme weather events is a significant predictor of climate change 
risk perceptions (e.g. Akerlof et al., 2013; Brody et al., 2008; Krosnick et al., 2006; 
Spence et al., 2011).  
Personal experience also plays a key role in affective processing, as affective 
responses are essentially formed through learning and experience (Damasio, 1994). 
An “affective” response is usually defined as a fast, associative and automatic 
reaction that guides information processing and judgement (Zajonc, 1980). It is often 
described as a faint whisper of emotion, defined specifically as a positive (like) or 
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negative (dislike) evaluative feeling towards a stimulus (Slovic et al., 2004). Since 
affective evaluations of future risks largely depend on the vividness with which 
negative consequences can be represented mentally (Damasio, 1994; Weber, 2006), 
it logically follows that personal experience with the impacts of climate change and 
affective processing are closely interrelated (Marx et al., 2007). However, it is not 
only direct personal experience and affective processing that go hand in hand. In 
fact, it is often proposed that any perception (including risk) inevitably contains 
some affect (Zajonc, 1980). Indeed, negative affect has shown to be an important 
predictor of climate change risk perceptions (e.g. Leiserowitz, 2006; Smith & 
Leiserowitz, 2012; Sundblad, Biel, & Gärling, 2007).  
Taken together, these research findings raise a number of important and 
unresolved questions about the relationship between personal experience, affect, and 
risk perception: does personal experience with extreme weather predict affective 
judgements? And in turn, do these affective judgements guide public risk 
perceptions of climate change? Or does personal experience predict risk perception, 
and in turn, does risk perception predict affect? Alternatively, is it possible that 
personal experience predicts risk perception and that risk perception and affect 
simultaneously and reciprocally influence each other? 
In short, past research has failed to address the cognition-emotion dilemma in 
the context of climate change. Doing so is important because more effective public 
engagement with climate change necessitates risk communication strategies that can 
better take into account the way in which cognitive and experiential processes shape 
and influence public perceptions of climate change (Marx et al., 2007). Moreover, as 
Finucane (2012) notes; “clarifying the mechanisms by which feelings and cognitions 
are related and integrated in human judgement and decision making is a critical 
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next step in understanding perceived risk” (p. 61). As I will illustrate in the next 
section, the conceptual relationship between personal experience, affect and risk 
perceptions of climate change can be represented within the frame of three 
competing social-psychological theories.  
2.0 The Present Study 
 
 
2.1 Model 1:  Affect as an Information Processing Heuristic        
                      
 
Much research on affective processing assumes (either implicitly or explicitly) that 
affect is a driver of risk perception (rather than vice versa). For example, Zajonc 
(1980) unmistakably stated that; “affective judgements are fairly independent of, and 
precede in time, perceptual and cognitive operations” (p.1). In a similar vein, Slovic 
et al. (2007) more subtly state that; “the affect heuristic guides perceptions of risk” 
(p. 1343). The notion that people rely on affective cues when making risk 
judgements is pervasive and based on a substantial amount of experimental as well 
as clinical research (e.g. Damasio, 1994; Dohle, Keller, & Siegrist, 2010; Fiuncane 
et al., 2000; Johnson & Tverksy, 1983; LeDoux, 1996; Schwartz & Clore, 1983; 
Zajonc, 1984). The underlying idea is that relying on such heuristics is an 
evolutionarily adaptive and efficient way of processing information, especially when 
navigating in a complex, uncertain and dangerous world (Slovic et al., 2007).   
Until now (and with good reason), affect has mostly been conceptualised as a 
predictor of climate change risk perceptions (e.g. Leiserowitz, 2006; Smith & 
Leiserowitz, 2012; Sundblad et al., 2007). In line with this view, the hypothesised 
causal relationship is expected to be unidirectional; where more personal experience 
with extreme weather leads to the development of negative affective evaluations, 
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which in turn cultivate higher risk perceptions of climate change. A description of 
the “affective” model is presented in Figure 5.1. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1:  Hypothesised Causal Flow Model 1 (the “affective” model). 
 
2.2 Model 2:  Affect as a Post-Cognitive Process        
 
 
Other recent experimental research has questioned the extent to which affect can be seen 
as an associative construct (e.g. Townsend, Spence, & Knowles, 2013) and suggests 
appraisal theory as a means of understanding the role of emotion in risk perception (e.g. 
Keller et al., 2012). In fact, diametrically opposed to Zajonc (1980, 1984), Lazarus (1981, 
1984) proposed that cognitive processes mediate the relation between environmental 
situations and specific emotional reactions (i.e. emotions are seen as a post-cognitive 
process). In order to explain how different people can experience different emotions in 
identical situations, Lazarus argued that events are first appraised (i.e. perceived and 
interpreted) in terms of their personal meaning (i.e. how they relate to an individual’s past 
experiences, personal values and overall well-being). Like information-processing 
theories, “appraisal theory” has marshaled substantial empirical support (e.g. Roseman, 
1984; Scherer, Shorr, & Johnstone 2001; Siemer, Maus, & Gross, 2007). In fact, more 
generally, Loewenstein et al. (2001) state; “few would question that cognitive evaluations 
give rise to affective responses” (p. 271).                                                                   
In support of this view, Kobbeltved et al. (2005) report in their (cross-lagged) 
panel study that; “it is unlikely that our subjects allowed their affective impressions to 
guide their risk judgements” (p. 431). Instead, the authors note that over time, risk 
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judgements gave rise to negative emotions but not vice versa. Thus, in line with this 
paradigm (and in contrast to the “affect-heuristic” hypothesis), an alternative causal 
relationship is one where more personal experience with extreme weather events leads to 
higher risk perceptions, which in turn, create (more) negative affective evaluations of 
climate change. A description of the “cognitive” model is presented in Figure 5.2.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2:  Hypothesised Causal Flow Model 2 (the “cognitive” model). 
 
 
2.3 Model 3: A Dual-Processing Perspective: The Case of Climate Change 
 
 
It is important to recognize, however, that both theoretical perspectives have validity 
and are not mutually exclusive. For example, although it is now obvious that certain 
older, subcortical structures in the brain can receive (sensory) information 
independently of the neocortical structures related to cognition (LeDoux, 1996), 
when an individual is faced with extreme weather he or she is likely to activate both 
affective processing (e.g. danger) as well as cognitive information about its 
ontological category (e.g. tornado, climate change). Indeed, humans perceive risk in 
two fundamental ways, namely; in a cognitive-analytical and experiential-affective 
manner (Slovic & Peters, 2006). Yet, there is an increasing consensus that the way in 
which affect functions in relation to cognition is strongly dependent on the context 
(Lai, Hagoort, & Casasanto, 2012).  
In fact, Loewenstein et al. (2001) suggest that when cognitive and emotional 
reactions diverge, responses are more likely to be guided by affect. Yet, climate 
change is an evolutionarily novel risk that does not represent a clearly observable 
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physical danger and, thus, there is no environmental cue present to automatically 
trigger an affective, fear-based fight-flight type response that bypasses cognition 
completely (Griskevicius, Cantú, & van Vugt, 2012; Weber, 2006). Instead, it is 
much more likely that when someone personally experiences the likely 
consequences of climate change (i.e. extreme weather), the individual must first 
cognitively and causally attribute his or her perceptual experience to climate change 
(Weber, 2010; Helgeson et al., 2012). At the same time, when this link has been 
made salient, it is equally likely that negative affective reactions guide and exert a 
strong influence over risk perceptions. This idea is consistent with neurobiological 
evidence which suggests that affect can influence cognition and cognition can 
influence affect (LeDoux, 1989). To this extent, appraisal studies have started to 
conceptualize the link between emotion and cognition as bi-directional (e.g. Nerb & 
Spada, 2001) and research is now steadily moving toward a dual-process perspective 
– emphasising the interplay between cognitive and affective processes (Clore & 
Ortony, 2000; Gray, 2004; Loewenstein et al., 2001; Pessoa, 2008; Phelps, 2006).  
Consistent with this view, the current study presents a dual-process model 
(Figure 5.3), where more personal experience with extreme weather is expected to 
predict higher risk perceptions, and while higher risk perceptions in turn predict 
affect, negative affective evaluations are expected to simultaneously influence and 
drive higher risk perceptions of climate change. The purpose of the present research 
is to empirically evaluate the plausibility of all three hypothesised model structures.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3:  Hypothesised Causal Flow Model 3 (the “dual-process” model). 
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3.0 Method 
 
 
3.1 Sample and Participants 
 
The data set consists of a national sample (N=808) of the population of the United 
Kingdom.  Because the United Kingdom has a high degree of internet users (about 77% 
of the population), the survey was conducted online via a survey sampling company. A 
nationally balanced quota sample12 (based on gender, age and region) was obtained from 
a large mixed panel of people who were willing to participate in web-based research for a 
small (symbolic) reward. Multi-stage randomisation was used to select participants from 
the panel. The sample comprised 50% male and 50% female respondents. The age of 
participants ranged between 18 and 65, with a modal age bracket of 35-44.   
 
3.2 Materials and Procedure 
 
Because the survey is part of a larger study that aims to explore and investigate a wide 
range of perceptions, attitudes and behaviours related to climate change, only relevant 
constructs and results are reported here. The survey instrument was designed with input 
from a panel of three academic and professional experts. Furthermore, to ensure that the 
survey questions and response categories were clear and unambiguous, a pilot study was 
conducted at the behavioural research lab of the London School of Economics and 
Political Science with a focus group of (N=15) members of the general public. Results of 
the pilot study were used to refine the questionnaire. The survey was administered online 
in October 2012 and took about 15 to 20 minutes to complete.  
 
                                               
 
12 Quotas reflect the 2001 census data for the Great British population.  
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3.3 Measures 
 
 
3.3.1 Risk Perception 
 
 
A total of eight measures were used to assess risk perception. Drawing on 
standardised items developed by O’Connor, Bord and Fisher (1999) and Leiserowitz 
(2006), all constructs were measured on 7-point (unipolar) Likert-type scales and 
covered both spatial as well as temporal risk dimensions. The first two questions 
asked respondents to judge how likely they think it is that they will personally 
experience threats to their overall well-being as a result of climate change. The same 
was asked for society as a whole. Three questions asked respondents to evaluate how 
serious of a threat they think climate change is to the natural environment, the 
United Kingdom and to them personally. Respondents were also asked how serious 
they would rate current impacts around the world and how concerned they are about 
climate change in general. For analysis, a reliable and holistic measure of risk 
perception was created (α = 0.96). 
 
3.3.2 Generalised Affect 
 
 
Peters and Slovic (2007) tested and cross-compared numerous ways of measuring 
self-reported affect (e.g. through imagery, discrete emotions etc.). The authors found 
that among all measures, broadly valenced or “holistic” affective evaluations proved 
to be most reliable. Accordingly, generalised affect was measured with three broadly 
evaluative bipolar adjective scales, for example ‘I feel that climate change is” (very 
unpleasant - pleasant, unfavourable-favourable, negative-positive). A reliable scale 
was obtained (α = 0.85). 
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3.3.3 Personal Experience with Extreme Weather Events 
 
 
Because rising sea levels are one of the most probable consequences of climate 
change (Solomon et al., 2007), previous research on extreme weather has 
predominantly focused on flooding events (e.g. Spence et al., 2011; Whitmarsh, 
2008). Yet, to account for a potentially wider range of personal experiences with 
extreme weather, two separate questions were used. Respondents were first asked to 
recall how often in the last five years they had experienced (a) flooding and (b) other 
extreme weather events (e.g. severe heat waves, droughts, freak storms etc.) whilst 
in the United Kingdom. An affirmative response to either question counted towards 
personal experience. Responses were combined and dichotomized to form an index 
describing personal experience (0 = no experience, 1 = experience).  
 
3.3.4 Cause Knowledge 
 
 
Knowledge about the causes of climate change is used in the current study as an 
auxiliary “instrument” (discussed in more detail in the following section). Measures 
that try to assess subjective or “self-reported knowledge” with a single item tend to 
be unreliable (Roser-Renouf & Nisbet, 2008). Therefore, cause knowledge was 
assessed with 13 items that were presented in random order (7 of which were correct 
statements and 6 were incorrect). The correctness of all statements was based on 
expert reports (e.g. IPCC) and checked by two climate scientists. Respondents were 
asked to what extent each item (e.g. burning fossil fuels) contributes to climate 
change (i.e. major, minor or no contribution). Following a method developed by 
Leiserowitz, Smith and Marlon (2010), responses were scored as either right (1) or 
wrong (0) and indexed (0 - 13) based on the number of correct answers, where more 
correct answers reflect higher knowledge. A reliable scale was obtained (α = 0.90). 
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4.0 Results 
 
 
4.1 Overview of Statistical Analyses 
 
 
All analyses were performed using a latent variable structural equation modelling 
approach (Bollen, 2005; Ullman & Bentler, 2013).  
 
4.1.1 Recursive vs. Non-Recursive Structural Equation Models 
 
 
The hypothesised relationships of the “cognitive” and “affective” models are 
estimated with a standard recursive (i.e. unidirectional) structural equation approach. 
However, the dual-process model is estimated using a non-recursive (i.e. a bi-
directional) structural equation model. Non-recursive structural equation models are 
more complicated in the sense that both variables (here risk perception and affect) 
are thought to simultaneously “cause” or influence each other. The problem of 
simultaneous causation is often addressed with cross-lagged models, yet, this is 
certainly not always appropriate because (a) the assumed “lag” between cause and 
effect is often unknown (Wong & Law, 1999) and (b) cause does not have to precede 
effect in time (e.g. it is very reasonable to assume that the perception of risk and the 
experience of negative affect occur simultaneously or at least, in short succession). 
 In fact, non-recursive structural equation models estimated on cross-
sectional data implicitly make a so-called “functional equilibrium” assumption 
(Schaubroeck, 1990) in order to obtain unbiased regression estimates (Kenny, 1979). 
The assumption implies that if a causal feedback loop has not fully materialised or 
stabilised yet, cross-sectional data would not be able to substantiate a synchronous 
bi-directional relationship. Another important (and often neglected) assumption of 
non-recursive structural equation models is that they need to be empirically 
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identified (Kenny, 1979) - which is only truly the case when each endogenous 
variable in the model has its own instrument (i.e. an exogenous variable that 
influences Y1 (affect) but not Y2 (risk) and vice versa). In other words, if two variables 
are believed to “cause” each other, a third variable (the “instrument”) is needed to 
partition the variance into endogenous and exogenous components.  
For example, in the current study, a valid instrument would be a variable that 
is significantly correlated with affect but not (or only marginally) to risk perception. 
The instrumental variable approach to causal inference is a powerful but 
underutilised tool in psychology (Bollen, 2012). In the current study, knowledge 
about the causes of climate change is introduced as an “instrument”. It is argued here 
that cause-knowledge is a valid instrument because it is both theoretically and 
empirically related to affect (Y1) but only marginally to risk perception (Y2).  
To illustrate, in contrast to knowledge about the impacts of climate change 
(which are often vivid descriptions of a risk event), knowledge about the physical 
causes is expected to share a much weaker theoretical link with risk perception. 
Particularly, because regardless of whether climate change is seen as a natural or 
human-caused threat, it remains a risk. Yet, the fact that it is human-caused is likely 
to trigger strong negative emotional reactions. Indeed, the main perceptual difference 
between natural and man-made risks often lies in negative affective reactions 
towards the inflicting agent (Böhm, 2003; Brun, 1992).  
 
4.1.2 Assessment of Model Fit 
 
 
Model fit is assessed using a range of goodness of fit statistics. The first test statistic 
reported is the χ2 (Chi-square) – for which lower values indicate better fit. The 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) and the Tucker Lewis Index (TLI) are comparative 
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(relative) fit indices where a cut off value of 0.95 indicates good fit and > 0.95 
excellent fit. The Root Mean Square Error Approximation (RMSEA) is an absolute 
fit index that measures lack of fit per degree of freedom, where cut off values 
between 0.05 and 0.10 indicate reasonable fit and values < 0.05 excellent fit13.  
Nested models (i.e. when a model is simply a less restricted version of the other) are 
assessed with a Chi-square difference test. Non-nested models are evaluated with 
parsimony fit indices such as the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the 
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) where again, lower values indicate better fit. 
More specifically, a difference of 10 or more provides very strong evidence that the 
model with the more negative values has better fit (Raftery, 1995).  
 
4.2 Validating the Measurement Model 
 
 
With regard to the measurement model, it is important to first establish sufficient 
content and construct validity of the measures. As discussed, most of the items used 
for risk perception and affect are relatively standardised and their usefulness has 
been established in prior research. Nonetheless, convergent and discriminant validity 
of the items is assessed using the multitrait-multimethod (MTMT) approach 
(Campbell & Fiske, 1959) as well as confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) – for which 
results are presented in Tables 5.1 and 5.2. The factor loadings are provided in Table 
5.1 and indicate that all risk perception and affect items load highly on their 
respective factors, illustrating good convergent validity (Farrell & Rudd, 2009). In 
addition, the MTMT approach suggests that an item should correlate more strongly 
with all items of the same construct than with measures of other constructs 
                                               
 
13 For detailed guidelines of goodness of fit statistics in SEM please see McDonald and Ho (2002) and Hu 
and Bentler (1999) for a good overview.  
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(Campbell & Fiske, 1959). For example, the items measuring risk perception should 
correlate more strongly with each other than with the items measuring affect. In 
other words, the inter-correlation between risk perception and affect (r = 0.54) 
should not exceed the value of Cronbach’s alpha (α = 0.96) since α is an intra-class 
correlation coefficient. This is clearly the case, as Table 5.2 illustrates. All inter-
correlations are well below their mean scale reliabilities14, indicating sufficient 
discriminant validity between the measures (Farrell & Rudd, 2009). 
                                         
Table 5.1: Factor Loadings and Scale Reliabilities of Measurement Items 
 
Note: All factor loadings are significant at p < 0.001. Factor loadings can be squared (λ2) to obtain the 
amount of variance that the item explains in the latent construct.  
 
 
 
 
                                               
 
14 Similarly, the CFA results can be used to prove that the shared variance (squared correlation) between 
each pair of constructs is lower than the extracted variance (the average of the squared factor loadings). 
Risk Perception  
Measures 
Factor Loadings             Cronbach’s α 
 
Risk Perception Index 
 
 Risk Perception Item  1                          
                                   0.96 
 
0.90  
 Risk Perception Item  2         0.72   
 Risk Perception Item  3         0.86    
 Risk Perception Item  4         0.91    
 Risk Perception Item  5         0.92   
 Risk Perception Item  6 
               Risk Perception Item  7 
               Risk Perception Item  8                                       
              
           Generalised Affect Index 
 
                    Affect Item 1 
                    Affect Item 2 
                    Affect Item 3 
        0.86  
        0.92                     
0.76
 
                                                 0.85 
 
        0.89                   
        0.91 
        0.70 
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Table 5.2:  Descriptive Statistics and Intercorrelations. 
 
 
 
Note: Measures are coded so that higher scores reflect more of the construct. Reliability scores (α) are  
provided in parentheses along the main diagonal. *p < 0.05, **p < 0 .01, ***p < 0.001. 
 
4.3 The “Affective” vs. “Cognitive” Model  
 
 
The structural equation models were estimated using STATA’s (StataCorp, 2013) 
SEM package15 and results are presented below in Figures 5.4 and 5.5. The 
“affective” model is presented first in Figure 5.4, where affect is conceptualised as 
an antecedent of risk perception (i.e. cognition). Results indicate that both paths, 
from personal experience to negative affect (β = 0.10, SE = 0.04, p < 0.01) and from 
negative affect to risk perception (β = 0.67, SE = 0.02, p < 0.001) are significant. 
Yet, while personal experience with extreme weather seems to explain very little to 
no variance in negative affect (R2 = 0.006), negative affect explains a substantial 
amount of variance in risk perceptions of climate change (R2 = 0.29).  
                                               
 
15 Due to some item non-response (approx. 10%), the model was estimated using a full information 
maximum likelihood procedure (FIML) – which produces unbiased estimates and is highly recommended 
(Enders & Bandalos, 2001). 
 
 
 
   N = 808 Risk 
Perception 
Generalised
Affect 
Cause- 
Knowledge 
Personal 
Experience 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Risk  
Perception 
     (0.96)           4.83 1.36 
 
Generalised 
Affect 
       
      0.54*** 
       
     (0.86) 
                                           
        
 
5.33 
 
1.20 
 
Cause- 
Knowledge 
 
Personal 
Experience 
       
      0.09* 
 
 
     0.22*** 
      
      0.22*** 
 
 
 0.08* 
         
     (0.90) 
 
 
     -0.02 
 
 
 
 
(1.0) 
 
      6.24                           
 
 
N.A                                  
 
1.92
 
 
N.A
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Figure 5.4: Affect as an Information Processing Heuristic (i.e. the “affective” 
model). Entries are standardised beta coefficients. Only main results are depicted 
for ease of interpretation, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. 
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Figure 5.5: Affect as a Post-Cognitive Process (i.e. the “cognitive” model). 
Entries are standardised beta coefficients. Only main results are depicted for ease 
of interpretation,   *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. 
 
In contrast, the “cognitive” model, where risk perception is conceptualised as 
an antecedent of affect, seems to be better specified in terms of predictive ability - 
given the magnitude of the personal experience to risk perception path (nearly 
double) and improved R2 = 0.05 (Figure 5.5). Moreover, a detailed inspection of the 
direct and indirect effects (followed by a mediation test) indicates that the impact of 
personal experience on affect is in fact fully mediated by risk perception (z = 5.67, 
SE = 0.05, p < 0.001). In terms of overall model fit, the “cognitive” model (Figure 
5.5) also has a lower χ2 (51) = 378.75, p < 0.001 than the “affective” model (Figure 
5.4) χ2 (51) = 402.71, p < 0.001 – which is preferable. Yet, since these models are 
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non-nested (i.e. one model is not simply a more restricted version of the other), the 
parsimony fit indices are also compared to further assess model fit. The differences 
in the Akaike Information Criterion ∆(AIK) = -24 and the Bayesian Information 
Criterion ∆(BIC) = -23 are also strongly in favour of the “cognitive” model. While 
both models seem to have a reasonable absolute fit (RMSEA = 0.09), the “cognitive” 
model is clearly superior in terms of its R2 and relative fit - where personal 
experience is best conceptualised as a predictor of risk perception, and in turn, risk 
perception a predictor of affect (i.e. affect is post-cognitive).  
 
 4.4 A Dual-Process Model of Risk Perception and Affect  
 
 
The above recursive (i.e. unidirectional) models provide few clues about the 
potentially interdependent and reciprocal relationship between risk perception and 
affect. Therefore, a logical next step is to compare the recursive “cognitive” model to 
a dual-process model where risk perception and affect simultaneously influence each 
other. Yet, in order to estimate a non-recursive (feedback) model, each of the 
endogenous variables (risk perception and affect) require an exogenous instrument. 
As hypothesised in the introduction, without any (conscious) cognitive attribution of 
the risk event, personal experience with extreme weather seems to have little 
theoretical connection with affectivity towards climate change. The data supports 
this hypothesis, given that the influence of personal experience on affect is fully 
mediated by risk perception. In fact, as Table 5.2 indicates, while personal 
experience is significantly correlated to risk perception (r = 0.22, p < 0.001) it is 
only marginally related to affect (r = 0.08, p < 0.05). Thus, personal experience 
naturally functions as a viable instrument for risk perception.   
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The second instrument employed is knowledge about the causes of climate 
change. It was hypothesised that knowledge about the physical causes of climate 
change would share a weak theoretical relationship with risk perception but not with 
affect. This notion is also supported, as Table 5.2 clearly shows that cause-
knowledge is significantly related to affect (r = 0.22, p < 0.001) but only marginally 
to risk perception (r = 0.09, p < 0.05). Moreover, the effect of cause-knowledge on 
risk perception is fully mediated by affect (z = 6.10, SE = 0.01, p < 0.001). One 
potential concern to keep in mind is that if the instruments have differential effects 
on their corresponding endogenous variables, the variable with the weaker 
instrument will have a greater disturbance term (Wong & Law, 1999). 
The recursive “cognitive” model is estimated first (Figure 5.6) and 
subsequently compared to the reciprocal (non-recursive) model (Figure 5.7).  
A few observations are immediately evident. First, to mitigate concerns about the 
instruments, their standardised effect on each of the corresponding endogenous 
variables appears to be equal (β = 0.17, SE = 0.03, p < 0.001 vs. β = 0.18, SE = 0.03, 
p < 0.001). Second, both of the path coefficients; from risk perception to affect        
(β = 0.40, SE = 0.15, p < 0.01) and from affect to risk perception (β = 0.45,             
SE = 0.12, p < 0.001) are significant. Third, the overall explained variance (R2 = 
0.41) of the reciprocal (dual-process) model is substantially higher than that of the 
unidirectional model (R2 = 0.09).  
In terms of model fit, since the two models are nested (i.e. one is a less 
restricted version of the other), a Chi-square difference test was performed. The 
difference in ∆χ2 (1) = 9.45 between the two models is significant (p < 0.01), 
indicating that the non-recursive (i.e., reciprocal) model fits the observed variance-
covariance matrix better than the unidirectional model. The difference in the 
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parsimony fit indices, ∆ AIC (-7) and ∆ BIC (-3) are equally in favour of the 
reciprocal model (Figure 5.7). To further examine the plausibility of the bi-
directional relationship, the path coefficients between risk perception and affect were 
constrained to be equal (this adds a degree of freedom as now only one path needs to 
be estimated - causing the model to be overidentified).  
The difference in ∆χ2 (1) = 2.19 between the constrained and freely estimated 
model is not significant, indicating that the two path coefficients are equal. Lastly, 
the functional equilibrium assumption was tested. A stable model returns an index 
eigenvalue between 0 and 1. Since the returned value was 0.41, the non-recursive 
model satisfied the stability condition (Bentler & Freeman, 1983). Overall, these 
findings strongly point to the conclusion that a non-recursive model (where risk 
perception and affect reciprocally influence each other) provides a better and more 
plausible fit to the data than a recursive (i.e. unidirectional) model. 
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Figure 5.6: Recursive Structural Equation Model. Entries are standardised beta 
coefficients. Only main results are depicted for ease of interpretation. Endogenous 
variables covary freely, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. 
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Figure 5.7:  Non-Recursive (Dual-Process) Model. Entries are standardised 
beta coefficients. R2’s are Bentler-Raykov squared multiple correlations 
(Bentler & Raykov, 2000). *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. 
 
 5.0 Discussion 
 
 
 5.1 A Causal Tale: Personal Experience with Extreme Weather, Negative 
Affective Evaluations and Risk Perceptions of Climate Change. 
 
The current study set out to explore the complex and intricate causal relationship 
between personal experience with extreme weather events, negative affect and risk 
perceptions of climate change. Using a structural equation modelling approach, three 
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competing theories were contrasted, namely: (a) the “affective” model (where affect 
is seen as information-processing heuristic), (b) the “cognitive” model (where affect 
is viewed as a post-cognitive process) and (c) a “dual-process” model that integrates 
aspects from both theoretical perspectives. Results initially provided support for the 
post-cognitive specification, where personal experience predicts risk perception and 
in turn, risk perception predicts (negative) affect. However, further examination of 
the relationship between risk perception and affect revealed that while personal 
experience is indeed best conceptualised as a predictor of risk perception, a mutually 
reinforcing and reciprocal relationship between affect and risk perception provides a 
significantly better fit to the data than a unidirectional model. 
  
 5.2 Towards a Dual Processing Perspective 
 
Previous research has noted that because climate change (as an object) cannot be 
experienced directly it fails to activate a primal affective/associative risk response 
(Weber, 2006). In fact, it has been suggested that in order for an individual to 
develop negative affectivity towards climate change, that individual must first 
cognitively attribute his or her personal experience with extreme weather to climate 
change (Helgeson et al., 2012; Weber, 2010). Results of the current study are 
congruent with this post-cognitive interpretation, as the effect of personal experience 
with extreme weather events is fully mediated by risk perception. These findings 
strongly suggest that people first perceive, interpret and appraise risk events in terms 
of their personal meaning and relevance (at least in the context of climate change). 
As such, these results are consistent with appraisal theory (e.g. Böhm, 2003; 
Lazarus, 1984; Nerb & Spada, 2001; Zaalberg et al., 2009; Yang & Kahlor, 2013), 
other risk perception studies (e.g. Kobbeltved et al., 2005) as well as with recent 
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research that has provided evidence for a reciprocal relationship between personal 
experience and belief certainty that climate change is happening (Myers et al., 2012).  
It is important to note that these results by no means negate the role of affect 
as a fast and associative response heuristic that guides information processing and 
risk judgements, as suggested by Zajonc (1980) and Slovic et al., (2004). In fact, it is 
very likely that extreme weather events trigger biologically hard-wired affective 
reactions (e.g. an impending hurricane is likely to stir up negative emotional 
reactions). Yet, the experienced affect is geared towards the risk object (i.e. the 
hurricane) and does not necessarily influence perceptions of climate change (unless a 
conscious link between the extreme weather event and climate change is made 
salient). However, as this study shows, once this link is established, negative 
affective reactions appear to be a strong determinant of climate change risk 
perceptions, where risk perception and affect mutually reinforce each other in a 
stable feedback system. This is consistent with prior research that has shown that 
affective judgements of climate change predict cognitive risk perceptions and vice 
versa (Sundblad et al., 2007).  
In conclusion, the current study strongly suggests that (at least in the context 
of climate change) both theoretical perspectives hold true: affect can be seen as a 
post-cognitive process as well as an information-processing heuristic that guides 
perceptions of risk. These findings are entirely consistent with research that has 
pointed out the interrelated neurological connections between the brain’s subcortical 
and neocortical structures (e.g. LeDoux, 1995; Pessoa, 2008) and provide further 
evidence for the validity of dual-processing theories that highlight the interplay 
between cognition and emotion (e.g. Loewenstein et al., 2001; Sloman, 1996).  
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5.2 Implications for Risk Communication   
 
 
The practical value of this research is evident in that risk perception, and the 
experiential system in general have been implicated as important determinants of 
actions to help reduce climate change (e.g. Leiserowitz, 2006; Marx et al., 2007; 
O’Connor et al., 1999; Semenza et al., 2008; Spence et al., 2011). Results of this 
study suggest that in order to design effective social-psychological interventions, 
risk communication messages should take into account the interrelated nature of 
personal experience, affect and risk perception and the way in which these variables 
shape perceptions of and beliefs about climate change. Indeed, the interactive 
engagement of both cognitive and emotional processing mechanisms is key to 
fostering more public involvement with climate change.   
For example, based on the findings of this study and others’ (e.g. Capstick & 
Pidgeon, 2014; Myers et al., 2012), risk communication campaigns should try to 
emphasise the association between (recent) increases in extreme weather events and 
climate change. Particularly, because once this link is made salient, a mutually 
reinforcing relationship between risk perception and affect is established. In 
addition, results suggest that negative affective evaluations can also be elicited by 
improving the public’s (cognitive) knowledge of the human causes of climate 
change. In turn, negative affect is then likely to further guide information-seeking 
behaviour (Yang & Kahlor, 2013). Facilitating the cognition-emotion link is 
congruent with recent research on climate change communication, which equally 
suggests that appealing to both cognitive and affective processing mechanisms is 
likely to be a more successful approach (van der Linden, 2014). 
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5.3 Some Final Thoughts on Cognition, Emotion, Causality and Future Research 
 
 
It is well-known that the cognition vs. emotion debate in psychology is held back by 
semantics (Kleinginna & Kleinginna, 1985; LeDoux, 1995). In other words, the 
relationship between cognition and affect, to some extent, depends on how we 
choose to define these concepts. I should therefore note that the risk perception 
measures used in this study might not be entirely cognitive and similarly, measures 
of affect might not be judged as purely emotional either, depending on the reader’s 
definition of these concepts. Yet they don’t need to be: the standardised measures 
used in the current study display sufficient convergent and discriminant validity. 
Moreover, the purpose of this paper has been to illustrate how these psychological 
constructs function in relation to each other in the context of climate change. In line 
with the views of Lai, Hagoort, and Casasanto (2012), future research is advised to 
move away from discussing semantics and instead focus on exploring the functional 
relationships between cognitive and experiential constructs in specific contexts. 
In addition, I would like to offer a final note on the term “causality” and how 
it relates to structural equation modelling (SEM). As Pearl (2012) summarized; the 
critical reader might ask, “structural equation modelling cannot prove causation so 
how can it yield results that have a causal interpretation?” (p. 1). While it is true 
that no statistical method can in or by itself truly prove “causality”, the current study 
stresses that through a combination of theory and observation, parameters can 
certainly have a causal interpretation (Iacobucci, 2009; Pearl, 2012) and encourages 
the view that SEM should be seen as a tool to assess the plausibility of different 
hypothesised causal path relationships (based on how well such theoretical structures 
fit the observed variance-covariance matrix).  
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As Fabrigar, Porter, and Norris (2010) state; “If one model is found to be 
clearly superior to other models, a researcher might reasonably make the case that 
certain causal assumptions are more plausible than others for the given dataset” (p. 
222). It is always good to keep in mind that depending on (a) one’s philosophy of 
causality, (b) the data at hand and (c) the extent to which all the assumptions of a 
given statistical method are met, “it will not in general be indisputably clear that an 
experimental approach accords with all the criteria for causation better than a non-
experimental approach” (Bagozzi, 2010, p. 210).  
Human social life is invariably complex and attaining a better understanding 
of causal relationships necessitates a methodology that is flexible and dynamic 
enough to model intricate behavioural systems. To this extent, SEM can help 
researchers offer tentative causal conclusions (Bullock, Harlow, & Mulaik, 1994; 
Fabrigar et al., 2010; Markus, 2010). The emphasis here is on the term tentative and 
future research could constructively build on the current study by using experimental 
techniques as well as panel data to further assess the causal structure between 
personal experience, risk perception and affect and explore how these relationships 
are likely to function over time as well as how they relate to intention and behaviour. 
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Abstract 
 
 
This paper advances a domain-context-behaviour (DCB) model. The DCB model structurally 
organises the social-psychological determinants of a wide range of climate change mitigation 
behaviours in three causal steps. In particular, psychological motivations are assumed to start with 
the development of broad pro-environmental/biospheric value orientations (i.e. the domain). 
These value orientations in turn predict key climate change “context” variables, including; risk 
perception, response-knowledge and perceived social support. Both values and climate change 
context variables then feed into a more general intention to act. A central feature of the DCB 
model is the notion that both mitigation intentions and behaviour-specific determinants are 
influenced, activated and preceded by a broader and more generally defined orienting intention to 
help reduce climate change. This general intention influences specific mitigation intentions 
directly as well as indirectly via behaviour-specific determinants such as attitudes, perceived 
behavioural control and situational constraints. Lastly, the model suggests that mitigation 
behaviour is predicted by both mitigation intentions as well as habitual processes. The model is 
subsequently tested and validated on a national sample of the UK population. The model 
constructs were surveyed in wave 1 (N = 808) and self-reported behaviour was obtained in wave 2 
(N = 501). Overall, the DCB model explains 66% of the variance in general intentions to help 
reduce climate change, 57% of the variance in specific mitigation intentions and 35% of the 
variance in aggregate mitigation behaviour. Interesting and important differences emerge between 
the determinants of high-cost, high-impact and low-cost, low-impact behavioural changes. 
Implications for theory and practice are discussed. 
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1.0 Introduction 
 
 
Addressing climate change is one of the biggest societal challenges of the twenty-first 
century (Swim et al., 2011). Indeed, multiple lines of evidence now suggest that over 97% 
of independent climate scientists take the consensus position that global climate change is 
mainly driven by human activities (e.g. Anderegg et al., 2010; Cook et al., 2013; Doran & 
Zimmerman, 2009). These activities predominantly refer to behaviours that result in the 
release of greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) such as carbon dioxide (CO2) and methane 
(CH4). Therefore, in order to help mitigate or reduce climate change, it is pivotal to 
change existing behaviour and consumption patterns (Gifford, Kormos, & McIntyre, 
2011) - for which the collective potential has clearly been demonstrated (e.g. Dietz et al., 
2009; Dietz, Stern, & Weber, 2013; Gardner & Stern, 2008).  In fact, figures from both 
the US and the UK indicate that changes in individual lifestyles could reduce national 
carbon dioxide emissions by as much as 20% to 30% (Dietz et al., 2009; UK Energy 
Research Centre, 2009).  
It is astonishing however, that compared to economic and technological solutions, 
psychological research remains severely underrepresented in the mitigation debate 
(Spence & Pidgeon, 2009; Klöckner, 2011; Ernst & Wenzel, 2014). This is especially 
surprising given that the ultimate goal of applied psychology is to change behaviour in 
response to a problem (Kaiser, Schultz, & Scheuthle, 2007). Yet, in order to effectively 
change any behaviour, a grounded understanding of all the determinant factors that shape 
and influence a behaviour must be established first (Darnton, 2008; Gifford et al., 2011; 
Klöckner, 2013; van der Linden, 2014). In fact, van der Linden (2013) asks;…”is it not 
presumptuous to think that sustainable behavioural change can be achieved without 
understanding the factors that underlie, drive and differentiate the behaviours under 
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investigation?” (p. 213). While the psychological determinants of environmental 
behaviour in general have been actively studied for over thirty years, a specific focus on 
climate change has been lacking (Roser-Renouf & Nisbet, 2008). Indeed, while there 
appears to be widespread awareness and concern about climate change (e.g. Bord, 
O’Connor, & Fisher, 1998; Leiserowitz, 2007; Lorenzoni & Pidgeon, 2006; Pidgeon, 
2012), behavioural change has not followed (Whitmarsh, Seyfang, & O’Neill, 2011). Yet, 
since Gardner and Stern (2009) advanced their short-list of the most “effective” 
behaviours that individuals can adopt to reduce climate change, research has slowly 
moved towards a discourse of “low-carbon lifestyles” (Whitmarsh, O’Neill, & Lorenzoni, 
2011) and “GHG-mitigating behaviours” (Gifford et al., 2011). In fact, some initial 
headway has been made towards mapping the determinants of climate change mitigation 
intentions and behaviours (e.g. Bord, O’Connor, & Fisher, 2000; Brody, Grover, & 
Vedlitz, 2012; Ngo et al., 2009; Poortinga, Spence, Demski, & Pidgeon, 2012; Tobler, 
Visschers, & Siegrist, 2012a; Whitmarsh, 2009; Whitmarsh & O’Neill, 2010). 
However, two substantial issues remain. First, most previous work has used 
extremely broad measures of intention, ranging from very general conceptualisations such 
as “I plan to take some actions to stop global warming” (e.g. Heath & Gifford, 2006; 
Hidalgo & Pisano, 2010), to somewhat more specific phrasings such as “I am prepared to 
greatly reduce my energy use to help tackle climate change” (e.g. Spence, Poortinga, 
Butler, & Pidgeon, 2011) while only a handful of studies have measured intentions to 
perform more specific behaviours (e.g. O’Connor, Bord, & Fisher, 1999; O’Neill & 
Whitmarsh, 2010; Tobler et al., 2012a; Whitmarsh, 2009). Moreover, with a few 
exceptions (e.g. Semenza et al., 2008; Swim & Becker, 2012; Whitmarsh, 2009), very 
little research has (systematically) investigated (actual) mitigation behaviour. In addition, 
existing research has mostly been regional (e.g. Semenza et al., 2008; Tobler et al., 2012; 
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Whitmarsh, 2009) and has not longitudinally assessed to what extent perceptions and 
beliefs about climate change in T1 actually predict behavioural changes in T2. A major 
consequence of the broad-stroke intention approach (coupled with a lack of research on 
actual behaviour) is that it remains largely unclear what such general intentions actually 
translate to. This is especially prudent given the noted asymmetry between impact and 
intent-oriented research (Stern, 2000; Whitmarsh, 2009), which has indicated that 
people’s intentions often do not correspond with behaviours that actually help reduce 
climate change. For example, people who report to act pro-environmentally do not 
necessarily use less energy (Gatersleben, Steg, & Vlek, 2002).  
A second important issue is that research in this area has thus far mostly been 
exploratory. For example, while past studies have focused on the role of climate change 
relevant norms, beliefs, values and perceptions, the conceptual relationship between these 
variables and their influence on specific intentions and behaviours remains unclear. As 
Whitmarsh (2009) states; “future work should focus on identifying the relationships 
between relevant theoretical constructs (p. 22). Accordingly, the current study employs a 
longitudinal national sample of the UK population to introduce and test an applied model 
of behaviour that is referred to here as the “domain-context-behaviour” (DCB) model. By 
reliably assessing a large number of relevant behaviours and determinants, the DCB 
model aims to systematically illuminate the way in which theoretically-relevant 
constructs shape and influence climate change mitigation intentions and behaviour.  
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2.0 The Present Study: A Domain-Context-Behaviour (DCB) Model 
 
 
A substantial number of studies have reported significant relationships between (what are 
referred to here as) “climate change context” variables and broad behavioural intentions 
to tackle climate change16. Perhaps the two most salient and theoretically relevant 
predictors are; risk perceptions of climate change (e.g. Brody et al., 2012; Leiserowitz, 
2006; O’Connor et al., 1999; Spence, Poortinga, & Pidgeon, 2012; Tobler et al., 2012a) 
and knowledge about climate change (e.g. Bord et al., 2000; Heath & Gifford, 2006; Ngo 
et al., 2009; O’Connor, Bord, Yamal, & Wiefek, 2002; Truelove & Parks, 2012). Yet, 
there is a fundamental problem with the way climate change context variables have been 
conceptualised as individual predictors of climate change mitigation intentions and 
behaviours. For example, while O’Connor et al. (2002) state that the relationship between 
risk perception and intention seems “obvious” (p.2), from a social-psychological 
viewpoint, this relationship is in fact far from obvious.    
To illustrate, the Theory of Planned Behaviour (Ajzen, 1991) is one of the most 
widely applied frameworks for predicting human behaviour (Armitage & Conner, 2001) 
and suggests that the most proximal antecedent of behaviour is an individual’s intention 
to perform the behaviour in question (see appendix B for a visual depiction of the TPB). 
Variables such as risk perception and knowledge are then not considered to be direct 
predictors of specific intentions, rather, they are seen as background factors or 
“antecedents” that influence intention only indirectly via more proximal behaviour-
specific determinants such as an individual’s attitude toward or perceived sense of control 
over performing the behaviour (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010).  
                                               
 
16 A general intention is defined here as an intention that is non-specific with regard to context and time 
elements (see also Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). 
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Moreover, the principle of measurement correspondence (Ajzen & Fishbein, 
1977) suggests that when predicting behaviour, the criterion variable should be 
operationalised at the same level of specificity as the explanatory variable. For example, 
if the explanatory variable is conceptualised at a broad level (e.g. risk perception of 
climate change), the criterion variable should be assessed on an equally broad and general 
level (e.g. intention to tackle climate change). However, as mentioned, it is entirely 
unclear what such broad intentions actually translate to. Alternatively, when risk 
perceptions of climate change (a broad object) are related to a more specific action (e.g. 
intention to conserve energy) – evaluative inconsistencies arise (Kaiser, Byrka, & Hartig, 
2010). To illustrate, it is likely that the relationship between risk perceptions of climate 
change and intentions to conserve energy is fully mediated by factors that are 
conceptually more proximal to the behaviour, such as an individual’s personal attitude 
toward (or ability to use) less energy. To further illustrate this principle, a visualisation of 
the “measurement correspondence” problem is presented in Figure 6.1. 
 
 
                 
   
Figure 6.1:  The Measurement Correspondence Problem. 
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While the principle of measurement correspondence is generally well-supported 
empirically (e.g. Heberlein & Black, 1976; Weigel & Newman, 1976; Weigel, Vernon, & 
Tognacci, 1974; Vining & Ebreo, 1992), criticism towards overreliance on one particular 
measurement paradigm has been expressed (e.g. Kaiser, Schultz, & Scheuthle, 2007). 
Still, there remains substantial confusion about the causal role of broad values and general 
environmental beliefs in specific mitigation actions. For example, a study by Bamberg 
(2003) showed that the effect of broad environmental concern on specific behaviour (e.g. 
inquiring about green energy) was fully mediated by situation-specific cognitions. In 
addition, Ajzen et al. (2011) reported that general environmental knowledge and attitudes 
did not explain any variance in energy conservation behaviour after controlling for 
specific norms, attitudes and intentions to conserve energy. In a similar vein, Whitmarsh 
and O’Neill (2010) reported that when controlling for behaviour-specific factors, values 
did not add to the prediction of intentions to perform a specific behaviour (e.g. carbon 
offsetting). Yet, Stern et al. (1999) argue that values may affect behaviour directly.  
With regard to beliefs about climate change, Poortinga et al. (2012) report that the 
effect of broad values on low-carbon behaviours was fully mediated by more specific 
beliefs, concerns and norms about climate change. While Vainio and Paloniemi (2013) 
also argue that the relationship between gemera; values and mitigation behaviour is 
mediated by belief in climate change, Price, Walker and Boschetti (2014) argue the 
opposite: that the effect of values on carbon-relevant behaviour is mostly direct and only 
weakly mediated by specific beliefs about climate change. Results from both Whitmarsh 
(2009) and Whitmarsh and O’Neill (2010) indicate that risk perceptions of and 
knowledge about climate change do not seem to significantly predict behaviour.  
 The present study argues that the relationship between environmental values, 
climate change “context” variables and specific mitigation intentions and behaviours has 
                                                                     246 
 
 
been obscured by the fact that, with a few exceptions (e.g. Ajzen et al., 2011; Whitmarsh 
& O’Neill, 2010) studies often do not measure (actual) behaviour and when they do, often 
fail to control for the effect of behaviour-specific determinants. Moreover, thus far, the 
literature has mostly mapped the psychological determinants of climate change mitigation 
behaviours in a largely exploratory fashion (Whitmarsh, 2009), without much regard for 
existing behavioural models and with little theorising as to how these variables are 
conceptually related to (a) one another and (b) intention and behaviour.  
Indeed, how are broad and general environmental values, more detailed beliefs 
and perceptions about climate change and behaviour-specific determinants conceptually 
related to both each other as well as to specific mitigation intentions and behaviours? To 
answer this question, the present study introduces a domain-context-behaviour model 
(DCB). The DCB proposes a linear causal progression from the most “distant” 
antecedents (i.e. domain-relevant variables), to (mediating) context-variables to 
ultimately the most proximal predictors of individual action (i.e. behaviour-specific 
variables). In particular, it is suggested that climate change context variables share no 
direct relationship with specific mitigation intentions and behaviour (hypothesis 1). 
Instead, context variables are assumed to be conceptually related to an individual’s broad 
and general intention to help reduce climate change (hypothesis 2). It is assumed that this 
general intention then activates and directs motivation and attention towards more 
specific mitigation intentions (hypothesis 3). 
One major objective of the current study is to identify how broad value 
orientations and beliefs about climate change influence more specifically defined 
intentions and behaviours (in terms of both context and time-elements). In fact, it is 
crucial for applied researchers to be specific and to identify to what extent these 
constructs play a role - not only in broadly or vaguely defined terms, but also in people’s 
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day-to-day life. Are existing cognitions, norms and emotions about the environment and 
climate change predictive of individual action in the short-term, and if so, how?  
A key feature of the DCB model is the notion that general intentions serve as a 
situation-invariant (psychological) “orienting” mechanism, mediating the relationship 
between climate change context variables and specific mitigation intentions. One way to 
think about this metaphorically is that general intentions are very much like the earth’s 
climate –an invisible and long-term background condition, whereas specific intentions 
and behaviours are more like the weather, concrete manifestations of a more general 
state17. The notion that general intentions (i.e. free of context and time elements) can 
prime, activate and predict situation-specific intentions is theoretically coherent (Ajzen, 
personal communication) and in line with other work which has suggested that specific 
intentions are likely to be conditional upon the existence of a more global antecedent 
intention (Warshaw, 1980). However, recognizing that human (mitigation) behaviour is 
the product of both intentional and unintentional (i.e. automated) processes (Barr, Gilg, & 
Ford, 2005; Triandis, 1977), the DCB model suggests that mitigation behaviour is 
ultimately a function of both intention and habit. A more detailed explanation of the DCB 
model’s main components is provided below. 
 
2.1. The Domain: Environmental Value Structures 
 
 
Climate change is inevitably intertwined with and part of a much broader domain that 
encompasses a wide range of environmental problems and behaviours. While often 
ignored, in order to assess the overall relevance of specific climate change context 
variables, it is important to demonstrate their explanatory power above and beyond an 
individual’s general pro-environmental values. While some past studies have controlled 
                                               
 
17 I would like to thank Anthony Leiserowitz for bringing this metaphor to my attention.  
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for broad environmental worldviews (e.g. O’Connor et al., 1999; Whitmarsh, 2008), they 
have often relied on shortened versions of the New Environmental Paradigm (NEP) scale 
(Dunlap & Van Liere, 2008). This is problematic in the sense that such measures are 
limited to only one dimension (i.e. environmental values) and do not account for the fact 
that humans have multidimensional and competing value structures (Steg et al., 2011; 
Tsirogianni & Gaskell, 2011).  
Values are usually defined as broad and stable situation-transcending goals that 
serve as guiding principles in a person’s life (Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1992; Tsirogianni 
& Gaskell, 2011). As such, values generally affect behaviour indirectly (e.g. De Groot & 
Steg, 2009; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Nordlund & Garvill, 2002; Poortinga et al., 2012; 
Schultz et al., 2005; Stern et al., 1999). While values have sometimes shown to affect 
behaviour directly, this only tends to occur when studies fail to control for behaviour-
specific factors (De Groot & Thøgersen, 2013). In line with Stern et al.’s (1999) Value-
Belief-Norm (VBN) theory (see appendix B), the DCB model starts the causal flow with 
general value orientations. Particularly because (a) broad value structures precede and are 
more fundamental than worldviews (Schwartz & Wolfgang, 1987; Stern et al., 1999) and 
(b) changes in a person’s fundamental value orientations are likely to cause a shift in a 
wide range of perceptions, beliefs, attitudes and behaviours (De Groot & Steg, 2009).  
In the environmental domain, the validity of three broad value structures has 
recently been thoroughly established across cultures and contexts (e.g. see De Groot & 
Steg, 2007, 2008; Schultz, 2001; Schultz et al., 2005; Stern, Dietz, & Kalof, 1993). These 
distinct, fundamental value structures include; biospheric values (i.e. caring for nature 
and the environment itself), altruistic values (i.e. caring for others) and egoistic values 
(i.e. caring for one’s self) and will be adopted in the current study accordingly.  
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Although value structures tend to be same in different cultures (Schwartz & Sagiv, 
1995), people tend to prioritize them differently (De Groot & Thøgersen, 2013). It is 
hypothesised that biospheric, altruistic and egoistic value orientations influence an 
individual’s risk perception of climate change, an individual’s knowledge about the 
causes, consequences and solutions to climate change as well as the extent to which an 
individual associates with other people who intend to help reduce climate change. This 
conceptualisation is in line with the idea that values shape human perception, influence 
the cognitive accessibility of relevant knowledge and shape the way that people attend to 
and select information (Stern & Dietz, 1994; De Groot & Thøgersen, 2013). While values 
are taken here as the fundamental starting point of the development of psychological 
motivations, one may of course in turn ask; where do values come from? Values are 
believed to derive from the socialisation process (Stern & Dietz, 1994; Schwartz, 1994). 
Yet, the present study hypothesises that the influence of socio-demographic variables on 
voluntary mitigation behaviour is fully mediated by psychological processes (which is a 
common assumption, e.g. see Abrahamse & Steg, 2011; Diamantopoulos et al., 2003). 
 
2.2 The Context: Climate Change 
 
 
As an object of risk representation, climate change is as unique as it is complex 
(Breakwell, 2010). It is complex in the sense that, psychologically, public risk perceptions 
of climate change have shown to be multidimensional (Helgeson, van der Linden, & 
Chabay, 2012; Leiserowitz, 2006; Spence et al., 2012). Climate change is unique not only 
in terms of its global scope but also in terms of its “un-situated” nature. For example, 
while people may be able to accurately perceive changes in local weather patterns (Howe, 
Markowitz, Ming-Lee, & Leiserowitz, 2013), climate change in and of itself cannot be 
experienced directly (Whitmarsh, 2008). It is not a type of risk for which humans have 
                                                                     250 
 
 
evolved a biologically hard-wired response (Griskevicius, Cantú, & van Vugt, 2012; 
Weber, 2006). In fact, climate change has been characterised as a psychologically distant 
risk, both temporally as well as spatially (Spence et al., 2012).  
Yet, the complex and multidimensional nature of climate change risk perceptions 
poses challenges for accurate assessment, as the way in which perceived risk is measured 
can bear significantly on the outcome (Helgeson et al., 2012). To illustrate, different 
terms (e.g. concern, worry, perceived seriousness) are often used synonymously while 
they may have differential effects on behaviour. For example, “worry” is a specific 
emotional state and generally a stronger motivator of behaviour than general concern or 
perceived seriousness (Leiserowitz, 2007). In short, it is relatively easy to misrepresent 
the role of perceived risk in behaviour. Accordingly, in line with other recent research 
that has adopted the use of more “holistic” risk assessments (e.g. Smith & Leiserowitz, 
2012; Spence et al., 2012), this study uses a measure of perceived risk that taps into a 
combination of spatial, temporal, cognitive and emotional risk dimensions.  
In addition to risk perception, a significant amount of studies have indicated that 
knowledge about the causes of climate change is a key determinant of climate change 
mitigation intentions (e.g. Bord et al., 2000; Hidalgo & Pisano, 2010; O’Connor et al., 
1999; O’Connor et al., 2002; Whitmarsh, 2009). Indeed, lack of basic knowledge about 
climate change (particularly solutions) has been noted as an important barrier to 
engagement (e.g. Lorenzoni, Nicholson-Cole, & Whitmarsh, 2007; Semenza et al., 2008).  
Yet, the effect of knowledge on behaviour may have been systematically 
underestimated due to the fact that studies often fail to include and differentiate various 
forms of knowledge that affect behaviour in a convergent manner (Kaiser & Fuhrer, 
2003). Moreover, it is now clear that so-called subjective or “self-reported” knowledge 
measures tend to be unreliable (Roser-Renouf & Nisbet, 2008). Instead, recent research is 
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increasingly encouraging the use of objective knowledge measures that make a 
conceptual distinction between knowledge about the causes (physical mechanisms), 
consequences (impacts) and solutions (action) to climate change (e.g. Sundblad, Biel, & 
Gärling; Tobler et al., 2012b). In line with these suggestions, the present study employs 
an objective knowledge measure that covers all three major dimensions to provide an 
accurate assessment of the role of knowledge in mitigation intentions and behaviours.  
Last but certainly not least is the notion of “social knowledge”. Social knowledge 
refers to and consists mostly of normative beliefs about the motives and intentions of 
others (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955; Kaiser & Fuhrer, 2003). It is important to include a 
social norm measure, as people take social cues from observing others (Festinger, 1954) 
and tend to behave like their friends and peers (Cialdini, Kallgren, & Reno, 1991). For 
example, social norms have shown to influence energy consumption (Midden & Ritsema, 
1983), particularly, people tend to adjust their energy use to conform to the group norm 
(Schultz et al., 2007). Yet, on the whole, social factors have been neglected in research on 
climate change mitigation behaviour (Griskevicius, Cialdini, & Goldstein, 2008; Tobler et 
al., 2012a). Accordingly, in this study, social knowledge is conceptualised as a 
descriptive social norm (i.e. beliefs about what referent others are doing to help tackle 
climate change), particularly because the behaviour of others provides information that 
people are likely to use in deciding their own course of action (Cialdini et al., 1991).  
  
2.3 The Behaviour: Situation-Specific Influences 
 
It is important to note that in contrast to the Theory of Planned Behaviour (Ajzen, 1991), 
Stern et al.’s (1999) Value-Belief-Norm (VBN) theory assumes that the most proximal 
antecedent of pro-environmental behaviour is not intention but rather, a person’s moral 
norm (i.e. a feeling of personal obligation) – this notion is largely based on Schwartz’s 
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(1977) Norm-Activation Model (Schwartz, 1977). While initially tempting, most 
comparative empirical evaluations find that intentions are psychologically closer to 
behaviour than a person’s moral norm (even in the environmental domain) and as such, 
an individual’s “intention” is better situated as an antecedent of behaviour than an 
individual’s moral norm (e.g. see Bamberg & Schmidt, 2003; Kaiser, Hübner, & Bogner, 
2005; Klöckner & Blobaum, 2010)18. In fact, moral norms are better conceptualised as a 
predictor of intention rather than behaviour (Bamberg & Mӧser, 2007; Nordlund & 
Garvill, 2003; van der Linden, 2011). Consistent with this notion, mitigation intentions 
are conceptualised as the most proximal antecedent of behaviour in the DCB model.  
In turn, mitigation intentions are assumed to be predicted by behaviour-specific 
determinants. In fact, the attitude-behaviour relationship is perhaps one of the most 
widely discussed topics in social psychology (Ajzen, 2001; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993) and 
its importance in theories of environmental behaviour has not gone unnoticed (e.g. Hansla 
et al., 2008; Hines, Hungerford, & Tomera, 1986; Kaiser, Wölfing, & Fuhrer, 1999; 
Newhouse, 1990) – although some behaviour models that claim comprehensive coverage 
have failed to include attitudinal measures (e.g. Klöckner & Blobaum, 2010). As 
discussed, a weak attitude-behaviour relationship tends to arise particularly when there is 
a mismatch in the level of correspondence between the two constructs (Ajzen & Fishbein, 
1977; Rajecki, 1982). In the DCB model, a key determinant of specific mitigation 
intentions is therefore an individual’s attitude toward specific mitigation behaviours. 
The popularity of the attitude construct is perhaps rivaled only by the notion of an 
individual’s sense of perceived control over performing a behaviour (Ajzen, 1991). 
Perceived control in this sense is somewhat related to Bandura’s (1977) concept of “self-
                                               
 
18 This does however not imply that mitigation behaviour cannot successfully be predicted from a personal 
(moral) norm, on the contrary (e.g. see Nordlund & Garvill, 2002; Poortinga et al., 2012).  
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efficacy” (i.e. an individual’s perceived ability to produce the required change). Yet, 
without strictly defining whether the locus of control is external or internal, perceived 
control can be seen as a global evaluation of the amount of volitional control that 
someone has over performing an action (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010). In the TPB, perceived 
behavioural control (PBC) is used as a proxy for “actual” control. Given that intentions 
are unlikely to materialise into behaviour when people have little control over 
implementing the desired change (e.g. driving less if driving is a mandatory aspect of 
one’s job), the main idea behind the inclusion of the PBC construct was to reduce the 
notorious intention-behaviour gap (Ajzen & Madden, 1986; Sheeran, 2002). 
Yet, some notable criticism has been expressed with regard to only measuring 
(conscious) intentions and people’s perceived sense of control, as other situational 
constraints often prevent people from carrying out their intentions (e.g. Klöckner & 
Blobaum, 2010; Ölander & Thøgersen, 1995; Steg & Vlek, 2009; Tobler et al., 2012a; 
Triandis, 1977). Therefore, to better account for the influence of “situational” barriers on 
behaviour (e.g. cost, time, inconvenience), the present study also includes a 
comprehensive measure of “situational constraints” as well as “habit”. Unsustainable 
habits are pervasive in consumer lifestyles and need to be considered in modelling 
behaviour (Biel, 2003). Habits are generally defined as learned sequences of acts that 
have become automatic responses to specific contextual cues as a result of some 
rewarding consequence (Ouellete & Wood, 1998; Verplanken & Aarts, 1999). Overall, 
when habit strength for a behaviour increases, it is less likely to be guided by intentions 
(Triandis, 1977; Verplanken et al., 1998). Congruent with the Theory of Interpersonal 
Behaviour (see appendix B), it is therefore expected that habitual processes not only 
predict behaviour but also moderate the intention-behaviour relationship. 
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A quick note is offered here on the various moderation hypotheses that can be 
postulated with regard to “contextual” factors and the intention-behaviour relationship. 
Both perceived control and situational constraints are not assumed to be direct predictors 
or moderators of behaviour in the DCB model. The reason for this is that when 
aggregating actions cross-behaviourally and cross-situationally (as is done here), the 
situation-specific (unique) variance between behaviours is canceled out (Epstein, 1983). 
Thus, while playing an important role in the formation of psychological intent, these 
factors are not assumed to affect behaviour directly (Kaiser & Gutscher, 2003). A visual 
depiction of the domain-context-behaviour (DCB) model is provided below in Figure 6.2. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2:  The Domain-Context-Behaviour Model (DCB). Note: Broad value structures 
influence general intentions to help reduce climate change directly as well as indirectly via 
climate change context variables. General intentions influence specific mitigation intentions 
directly as well as indirectly via behaviour-specific determinants (by creating more favourable 
attitudes, more perceived control and less perceived situational constraints). In turn, specific 
intentions and habit jointly predict mitigation behaviour. 
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3.0 Climate Change Mitigation Intentions and Behaviour 
 
 
Drawing on a growing amount of research (e.g. Defra, 2008; Gardner & Stern, 2008; 
Leiserowitz et al., 2009; Tobler et al., 2012a; Truelove, 2009; Whitmarsh, 2009) and 
results of a UK focus group (N = 15) study, the current paper presents a comprehensive 
climate change mitigation scale that is comprised of 21 behavioural items. Together, these 
items represent a specific assortment of “effective” mitigation behaviours, representing 
all major categories, both direct (e.g. home energy conservation) as well as often 
neglected but important indirect behaviours such as meat consumption (e.g. de Boer, 
Schösler, & Boersema, 2012) and air travel (Cohen & Higham, 2011).  
 
3.1 One To Bind Them All?  
 
 
The current study takes note of the fact that treating climate change “mitigation” actions 
as a homogenous and undifferentiated class of behaviours (i.e. a unidimensional 
construct) might come at the expense of overlooking important differences in 
determinants between behaviours (Lindenberg & Steg, 2007; Whitmarsh & O’Neill, 
2010; Tobler et al., 2012a). For this reason, some scholars have expressed support for the 
alternative; theorising each behaviour separately (e.g. Balderjahn, 1988; Gatersleben, 
2013; McKenzie-Mohr et al., 1995; Pickett, Kangun, & Grove, 1993; Stern, 2000). 
 It seems highly unlikely however, that the psychological determinants of different 
mitigation behaviours share little to no commonalities between them, in fact, they tend to 
be significantly correlated (Ölander & Thøgersen, 2006; Price et al., 2014; Tobler et al., 
2012a). Moreover, addressing urgent large-scale problems such as climate change one 
behaviour at a time has been referred to as “too slow, inefficient and inconsequential” 
(Kaiser & Wilson, 2004; Thøgersen, 1999). There are many benefits (both conceptual as 
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well as empirical) to treating climate change mitigation behaviours as a homogenous 
construct. First, collapsing different behaviours into a single index cancels out the effect 
of situation-specific ambiguities, which is useful when trying to identify broad patterns 
(Epstein, 1983; Kaiser, 1998; Kaiser et al., 2007). Moreover, finding a common set of 
antecedents for a common set of mitigation behaviours would help reduce complexity and 
increase the impact of environmental psychology in the mitigation debate (Klöckner, 
2013). It would also allow interventionists to change multiple behaviours simultaneously 
by targeting only a key number of determinants (Steg & Vlek, 2009). 
 Nonetheless, it must still be recognized that certain behaviours (e.g. switching off 
lights) are categorically different from other behaviours (e.g. purchasing a fuel-efficient 
car) – not only at the conceptual level but also in terms of their psychological 
determinants (Truelove, 2009). In the words of Stern (2000); “a distinction between 
behavioural types is not only conceptually coherent, but statistically reliable and 
psychologically meaningful” (p. 410). In particular, a distinction is often made between 
curtailment and efficiency behaviours (Stern & Gardner, 1981). While the former refers to 
routine behaviours that reduce consumption (e.g. switching off lights) the latter is 
concerned with one-off choices that result in the adoption of more efficient technology 
(e.g. purchasing a fuel-efficient car). It is often noted that curtailment behaviours are 
overrepresented in the literature because people are more likely to implement simple, 
low-impact changes (Gatersleben et al., 2002; Gifford et al., 2011) and accordingly, pro-
environmental intentions are often thought to be more predictive of low-cost than high-
cost changes (Diekmann & Preisendörfer, 2003; Steg & Vlek, 2009).  
The present study therefore recognises the importance of also studying the 
behavioural determinants of people’s intention to perform high-impact changes. In fact, 
perhaps the single most debated and impactful dimension along which behavioural 
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changes can be distinguished is the low-cost, low-impact and high-cost, high-impact 
curve19, especially in terms of their psychological antecedents (e.g. Diekmann & 
Preisendörfer, 2003; Gatersleben et al., 2002; Gifford et al., 2011; Guagnano, Stern, & 
Dietz, 1995; Roser-Renouf & Nisbet, 2008; Schultz & Oskamp, 1996; Whitmarsh, 2009).  
Accordingly, the current study measures intentions to implement easier, low-impact 
changes (e.g. hang-drying clothes) as well as intentions to implement more costly, high-
impact changes (e.g. purchasing green energy) so that neither category is 
underrepresented and differences in determinants can be systematically assessed.  
 
4.0 Method 
 
  
4.1 Sample and Participants 
 
 
The data set is based on a national quota sample (N = 808) of the population of the United 
Kingdom20. Quotas were based on gender, age and region. The survey was administered 
(longitudinally) in two waves. In the first wave, N = 808 responses were collected and N 
= 501 (or 72%) of panel members responded in the second wave, four weeks later. The 
high degree of internet penetration in the UK (about 77% of the population) allowed for 
an online survey via a survey sampling company. Multi-stage randomisation was used to 
select participants from a large mixed panel of people who were willing to participate in 
web-based research for a small (non-monetary) reward. The final sample is comprised of 
50% male and 50% female respondents. The age of participants ranges between 18 and 
65 with a modal age bracket of 35-44.   
                                               
 
19 This distinction works well as a general rule, exceptions (e.g. low-cost, high-impact) of course exist. 
20 The United Kingdom includes England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. Quotas reflect the 2001 
Census data for the Great British population.  
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4.2 Materials and Procedure 
 
 
Because the survey was part of a larger study on climate change perceptions and 
behaviours, only relevant constructs are reported here. The survey instrument was 
designed with the input from a panel of three academic and professional experts. 
Furthermore, in keeping with recommendations to avoid common method bias (Podsakoff 
et al., 2003), anonymity of responses was assured, questions were positioned so to avoid 
priming effects and whenever possible, items were presented in random order.  
Furthermore, because respondents evaluated a large number of behavioural items at a 
time, the response scales of the predictor variables (e.g. attitude, PBC) were varied from 
that of the behavioural measures. Psychological separation of measurement between 
intention and behaviour was achieved with a longitudinal design.  
In addition, as suggested by Leiserowitz (personal communication), to account for 
the fact that certain actions may not be relevant21 (e.g. reducing meat consumption if you 
are a vegetarian) or the fact that some people might not be able to accurately reflect on 
their knowledge, for all relevant questions, a “not applicable” or “don’t know” option was 
provided as well. Finally, to ensure that the survey questions and response categories 
were clear and unambiguous, a pilot study was conducted with (N = 15) members of the 
general public at the behavioural research lab of the London School of Economics and 
Political Science. Results of the pilot study were used to fine tune the questionnaire.  
The first wave (T1) of the survey was administered online in October 2012, took 
about 15 to 20 minutes to complete and measured all constructs except for self-reported 
behaviour. The second wave (T2) took place four weeks later. During the follow up, the 
                                               
 
21 It is important to note that if a respondent does not intend to perform a certain behaviour because it is not 
relevant to his or her situation, this will not affect the intention-behaviour relationship - which is of main 
interest here (as intention and behaviour would both = N/A).  
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survey was sent out again to all panel members and respondents were asked to report on 
their actual behaviour. A time period of four weeks was chosen as an appropriate 
“temporal sequence” for three reasons; (a) to reduce cognitive accessibility of responses 
to previous answers (Podsakoff et al., 2003), (b) to strike a good balance between 
allowing enough time, on average, for psychological dispositions such as intentions to 
materialise into behaviour but (c) not to the extent that the time lapsed will significantly 
“erode” the potential cause-effect relationship (Ajzen & Madden, 1986; Ajzen, 2011) or 
to the extent that it becomes too difficult for respondents to accurately reflect on their 
behaviour (Gaskell, Wright, & O’Muircheartaigh, 2000). 
  
4.3 Measures 
 
 
4.3.1 Biospheric, Altruistic and Egoistic Values 
 
 
Based on previous work by Schwartz (1992) and Stern et al. (1994), De Groot and 
Steg (2007, 2008) advanced a standardised scale for measuring egoistic, altruistic 
and biospheric values. All value orientations are measured with four items each and 
the same measures were adopted here. In total, respondents were asked to rate and 
consider the importance of 12 values “as guiding principles in their lives” on a 9 
point scale, ranging from -1 opposed to my values, 0 not important to 7 extremely 
important. Items were randomly ordered and reliable scales were obtained for 
egoistic (α = 0.79), altruistic (α = 0.87) and biospheric (α = 0.93) values. 
 
4.3.2 Risk Perception 
 
 
Drawing on items previously developed by O’Connor et al. (1999) and Leiserowitz 
(2006), a total of 8 measures were used to assess risk perception (all 7-point Likert-
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type scales). The items measured spatial, temporal, cognitive as well as emotional 
dimensions of perceived risk. The first question asked respondents to judge how 
likely they think it is that they will personally experience threats to their overall 
well-being as a result of climate change. The same was asked for society as a whole. 
Three questions asked respondents to evaluate how serious of a threat they think 
climate change is to the United Kingdom, the natural environment and to them 
personally. Respondents were also asked how serious they would rate current 
impacts around the world, how concerned they are in general and how often they 
personally worry about climate change. For analysis, a holistic measure of risk 
perception was created (α = 0.96). 
 
4.3.3    Knowledge about Climate Change 
 
 
Three scales were used to assess a respondent’s knowledge about the causes, 
consequences and solutions to climate change.  Each knowledge scale consisted of 
13 items that were presented in random order (7 of which were correct statements 
and 6 were incorrect). The correctness of all statements was based on expert reports 
(e.g. IPCC) and checked by two academic climate scientists. Responses were 
dichotomized as either right (1) or wrong (0) and indexed based on the number of 
correct answers (0 – 13) – where more correct answers indicate a higher knowledge 
score (method adopted from Leiserowitz, Smith & Marlon, 2010).  
For cause-knowledge, respondents were asked to what extent each item (e.g. 
burning fossil fuels) contributes to climate change (i.e. major, minor or no 
contribution). A reliable scale was obtained (α = 0.90). The knowledge scale for 
climate change impacts asked respondents to estimate whether each item (e.g. global 
sea level) is likely to increase, decrease or not change at all as a result of climate 
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change. Similarly, a reliable scale was obtained (α = 0.88). Lastly, the knowledge of 
response behaviours scale asked respondents to rate how much each item (e.g. 
conserving energy) is likely to reduce climate change if done worldwide (a lot, a 
little, not at all). A reliable scale was obtained here as well (α = 0.94).   
 
4.3.4    Descriptive Social Norm 
 
 
On a 7-point scale, respondents answered three questions about how likely they 
think it is that important referent others are taking personal action to help tackle 
climate change (e.g. “most people who are important to me, are personally doing 
something to help reduce climate change”). A reliable index was created (α = 0.97). 
 
4.3.5    Attitude Toward the Behaviour  
 
 
Attitude toward the behaviour was assessed on a 7-point bipolar scale by asking 
respondents how they would evaluate (favourable-unfavourable) performing each of 
the 21 mitigation behaviours. A reliable scale was formed (α = 0.91). 
 
4.3.6    Perceived Behavioural Control  
 
 
Similarly, perceived control over the behaviour was assessed on a 7-point Likert 
scale (strongly disagree – strongly agree). For each of the 21 behavioural items, the 
respondent was presented with the following statement; “If I wanted to do so, I 
firmly believe that I have the ability to...” (e.g. insulate my home or apartment).       
A reliable scale was formed (α = 0.94). 
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4.3.7    Situational Constraints   
 
Respondents were presented with the following statement; “For each of the behaviours 
listed below, please tick ALL barriers that are relevant to your situation”.  For each of the 
21 behaviours, respondents could tick; “I can’t afford it”, “I don’t have the time”, 
“Decision is not entirely up to me”, “I don’t know how to”, “Too inconvenient”, “Other 
reason” or “No barriers apply”. An index of situational constraints was created by 
summing and averaging the number of perceived barriers (if any) for each behaviour. The 
more barriers listed, the higher the score. A reliable index was created (α = 0.89). 
 
4.3.8 Habit 
 
Behavioural frequency is often used as a proxy for habit (e.g. Whitmarsh & O’Neill, 
2010), yet, the formation of “habit” has shown to be independent of the frequency with 
which a behaviour is performed (Verplanken, 2006). Thus, recognizing that “past 
behaviour” is not a good indicator of habit (Ajzen, 1991), this study followed the 
suggestions of Verplanken and Orbell (2003) to focus on the unconscious and automated 
nature of habits. On a 7-point scale (strongly disagree – strongly agree), respondents were 
asked;  “for each behaviour, please indicate the extent to which you agree that the 
behaviour has become automatic to you, that is, something you do on a routine basis, 
without consciously thinking about it” A reliable scale was obtained (α = 0.87). 
 
4.3.9 General Intention 
 
 
Given the relatively straightforward nature of broad intentions, following previous 
literature (e.g. Heath & Gifford, 2006; Hidalgo & Pisano, 2010; Spence et al., 2011), 
three general statements (7-point Likert scale) were used to measure a respondent’s 
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general intention to address climate change (e.g. “I intend to change my behaviour to 
help reduce climate change”).  A reliable scale was achieved (α = 0.85). 
 
4.4.0 Specific Mitigation Intentions 
 
 
Specific intentions were measured as follows; “considering the next four weeks, to 
what extent do you intend to adopt the following behaviours? In the next four weeks, 
I intend to (e.g. only run the dishwasher when there is a full load). Response format 
was a 7-point scale (very unlikely – very likely). Intentions were summed and 
averaged to form a reliable index describing mitigation intentions (α = 0.92).  
 
4.4.1 Specific Mitigation Behaviour 
 
 
Four weeks later, respondents were re-contacted and presented with the same behavioural 
items. On a 7-point scale, respondents were asked to report (to the best of their 
knowledge) how often they performed each of the 21 behaviours in the last four weeks 
(never – very frequently)22. A reliable mitigation behaviour index was formed (α = 0.91). 
 
4.4.2 Socio-Demographics 
 
  
A range of socio-demographic characteristics were measured as well, including; gender, 
age, education, political affiliation and level of income. 
 
 
                                               
 
22  Out of the 21 items, there were a few one-off efficiency behaviours for which it seemed somewhat 
unusual to perform them frequently in 4 weeks (e.g. purchasing a fuel-efficient car) – in this case, 
respondents were instructed to tick either “very frequently” (for yes) or “never” (for no). 
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5.0 Results 
 
5.1.  Overview of Statistical Analyses 
 
A structural equation modelling (SEM) approach (Ullman & Bentler, 2013) was adopted 
to evaluate the fit and hypothesised (mediated) path relationships of the domain-context-
behaviour (DCB) model. In essence, SEM can be seen as a combination and natural 
extension of both confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) and multiple regression. Yet, 
compared to standard regression or (manifest) path models, a structural equation 
modelling approach offers numerous benefits, including; more efficient (i.e. 
simultaneous) estimation of complex multivariate relationships, the ability to represent 
latent (i.e. unobserved) constructs as well as the ability to estimate and account for 
measurement error (Iacobucci, 2009). However, since it has been noted that the sampling 
distribution of “mediated” (i.e. indirect) effects may be slightly skewed or leptokurtic 
(rather than multivariate normal), the present study uses a bootstrapping method to 
resample the data (1000 times) when estimating indirect effects, as recommended by 
Preacher and Hayes (2008) and Hayes (2009)23. 
 
5.1.2  Assessment of Model Fit 
 
 
In line with the suggestions of Hu and Bentler (1999) and McDonald and Ho (2002), 
the following goodness of fit indices are reported24; χ2 (df), CFI (Comparative Fit 
Index) and the RMSEA (Root Mean Square Error Approximation). While the CFI 
compares the null model (i.e. no assumed correlations between the observed 
                                               
 
23 Although this is unlikely to be a concern for the current study, given its relatively large sample size.   
24 The Standardised Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR) is not used in the current study as it cannot 
reliably be computed (due to missing data).  
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variables) to the model of theoretical interest, the RMSEA is an absolute fit index 
that measures lack of fit per degree of freedom. For the CFI, a cut off value of 0.95 
indicates good fit and > 0.95 excellent fit whereas for the RMSEA, cut off values 
between 0.05 and 0.10 indicate reasonable fit and values < 0.05 excellent fit. In 
addition, because of the fact that for larger sample sizes, the Chi2 (χ2) test is nearly 
always rejected, as a rule of thumb, χ2 to degrees of freedom (df) ratios that range 
anywhere between 2 to 5 generally indicate good fit. 
 
5.1.3  Missing Data 
 
Missing data is a common problem in SEM and any model estimation should be 
accompanied by an account of how missing data was handled (McDonald & Ho, 2002; 
Schreiber et al., 2006). Unfortunately, a ubiquitous characteristic of longitudinal designs 
is the so-called drop-out rate (also known as “attrition”). In the present study, the attrition 
rate between stated intention (wave 1) and self-reported behaviour (wave 2) was about 
38%. Fortunately, attrition tends to only marginally affect the composition of the sample 
(Chang & Krosnick, 2009). Yet, in order to learn more about the nature of the missing 
data, Little’s Missing-Completely-at-Random (MCAR) test was implemented (Little, 
1988). The null hypothesis (that the data is missing completely at random) was rejected. 
In other words, either the data is Missing-at-Random (MAR) or Missing-Not-at-Random 
(MNAR). To further explore the data, several logistic regressions were run with 
‘missingness’ as the dependent variable. Missingness was not associated with socio-
demographic characteristics. In fact, only one significant predictor of missingness could 
be identified, namely; “general intention”. Those with higher intentions to help reduce 
climate change were somewhat less likely to report on their behaviour in wave 2 (perhaps 
because despite good intent, they didn’t actually change their behaviour). When data is 
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not MCAR or when the attrition rate is substantial, listwise deletion (i.e. only using 
observations for which full data is available) has shown to be a biased approach, inflating 
standard errors and greatly reducing power (Allison, 2003; Graham, 2009; Wothke, 
2000). In contrast, full information maximum likelihood (FIML) procedures use the full 
sample variance-covariance matrix (observed data) to fill in the unobserved (missing) 
data. FIML has consistently shown to be superior to traditional methods and is therefore 
regarded as an efficient and unbiased method for estimating structural equation models 
with missing data, especially when correlated variables that may determine missingness 
(e.g. general intention) are included in the model (e.g. Allison, 2003; Collins, Schafer, & 
Kam, 2001; Enders & Bandalos, 2001; Graham, 2009; McDonald & Ho, 2002; Schafer & 
Graham, 2002). This study therefore implemented the FIML procedure accordingly.   
 
5.2.  Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
An overview of the climate change mitigation scale items along with their mean scores 
and standard deviations is provided in Table 6.1. It becomes clear from the table that the 
public is willing to implement easy, low cost changes (e.g. maintaining correct car tire 
pressure, switching off electronics etc.) but this willingness steadily declines for more 
inconvenient, high-cost changes (e.g. flying less, purchasing a fuel-efficient car etc.). The 
full sample correlation matrix used for the analysis is provided in Table 6.2. With regard 
to convergent and discriminant validity of the measurement model, an item should 
generally correlate more strongly with all items of the same construct than with measures 
of other constructs (Campbell & Fiske, 1959). In other words, the “within” (intra-class) 
correlation coefficient given along the main diagonal (Cronbach’s α) should always 
exceed the “between” (inter)-correlations among the respective variables, which as Table 
6.2 shows, is clearly the case (note: the same result can be obtained from the CFA).   
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Table 6.1:  Climate Change Mitigation Scale Items Ranked By Mean Response Score. 
 
 
  
 
(N = 808) Mitigation Intention Scale                                                                                   
(1 = Very unlikely 7 = Very likely) 
Mean SD    
1.  Maintain correct tire pressure on my car 
2.  Only run the dishwasher when there’s a full load  
3.  Use a clothesline instead of a tumble dryer, when drying wet clothes 
4.  Alter my driving (i.e. avoiding sudden accelerations and stops) 
5.  Unplug (or shut down) electronics completely when not using them 
6.  Replace ordinary (non-saving) light bulbs with energy-saving (CFC) bulbs  
7.  Use energy-efficiency as a selection criterion when buying new appliances 
8.  Turn off my car when idle for longer than 30 seconds (except in traffic) 
9.  Turn down my heating/thermostat by 2 degrees  
10. Reduce my shower time to 5 minutes maximum 
11. Buy more locally grown and produced foods 
12. Reduce my driving by walking or biking more 
13. Use more public transportation (e.g. train, bus) instead of driving 
14. Reduce the number of miles that I fly 
15. Insulate my home or apartment 
16. Buy/consume less meat 
17. Buy carbon offsets when booking an airline ticket (whenever possible) 
18. Reduce my driving, by sharing car rides 
19. Switch from single glazed to double glazed windows 
20. Purchase home energy from a green source (e.g. wind or solar power) 
21. Purchase a more fuel-efficient car 
 5.96   
 5.83 
 5.49                                                                   
 5.41  
 5.39 
 5.32  
 5.18  
 5.13 
 4.96  
 4.82 
 4.59  
 4.33                         
 3.91 
 3.84                                     
 3.59 
 3.57 
 3.52 
 3.48 
 3.43                       
 2.83 
 2.55 
1.47 
1.68 
1.93                                                            
1.74 
1.76 
1.89                                   
1.84 
1.94 
1.95 
1.99 
1.81 
2.16                                   
2.26 
2.19                         
2.28 
2.03 
2.20 
2.18 
2.34                                                
2.02 
2.10 
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Table 6.2:  Intercorrelation Matrix and Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Note: Significant correlations (p < 0.05) are highlighted in bold. BIO = biospheric values, EGO = egoistic values, 
SOC = socio-altruistic values, RP = risk perception, CK = cause-knowledge, IK = impact-knowledge, RN = response-
knowledge, DN = descriptive norm, ATT = attitude, PBC = perceived behavioural control, SC = situational 
constraints, GI = general intention, MI = mitigation intention, HAB = habit, MB = mitigation behaviour. 
 
 
 
 
 
N = 808 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 M SD 
 1. BIO (0.93) 
              
6.22 1.79 
                  
 2. EGO   0.23 (0.79) 
             
4.55 1.45 
                  
 3. SOC 0.68 0.27 (0.87) 
            
6.76 1.56 
                  
 4. RP                       0.54 0.10 0.38 (0.96) 
           
4.83 1.36 
                  
 5. CK 0.11 -0.02 0.04 0.09 (0.90) 
          
6.24 1.92 
                  
 6. IK 0.27 -0.01 0.20 0.38 0.52 (0.88) 
         
7.19 2.52 
                  
 7. RN 0.22 0.02 0.17 0.36 0.55 0.61 (0.94) 
        
8.03 2.69 
                  
 8. DN 0.35 0.09 0.23 0.51 -0.01 0.16 0.18 (0.97) 
       
4.21 1.46 
                  
 9. ATT 0.49 0.05 0.37 0.57 0.07 0.25 0.26 0.49 (0.91) 
      
5.02 1.17 
                  
10. PBC 0.35 0.20 0.27 0.46 0.04 0.19 0.21 0.45 0.59 (0.94) 
     
4.68 1.22 
  
                 
11. SC -0.21 0.02 -0.18 -0.20 0.01 -0.10 -0.14 -0.24 -0.33 -0.31 (0.89) 
    
10.60 6.56 
                  
12. GI 0.49 0.13 0.33 0.67 0.04 0.28 0.35 0.61 0.63 0.58 -0.24 (0.85) 
   
4.63 1.48 
  
                 
13. MI 0.34 0.14 0.28 0.37 -0.06 0.12 0.17 0.39 0.66 0.61 -0.37 0.60 (0.92) 
  
4.43 1.37 
                  
14. HAB -0.19 0.21 -0.11 -0.16 -0.07 -0.13 -0.13 -0.13 -0.29 -0.11 0.27 -0.13 -0.20 (0.87) 
 
3.36 1.15 
                  
15. MB 0.31 0.12 0.24 0.29 0.01 0.09 0.11 0.33 0.53 0.38 -0.18 0.40 0.57 -0.21 (0.92) 3.89 1.35 
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5.3.  The Domain-Context-Behaviour Model (DCB) 
 
The structural model was estimated using STATA’s (StataCorp, 2013) SEM package. 
Although the initial model provided an adequate fit to the data; χ2 = 627.46; df = 214, p < 
0.001, CFI = 0.95, RMSEA = 0.06 (90% CI: 0.054-0.062), χ2 / df = 2.93, a few post-hoc 
adjustments were made to the initial model. Particularly, contrary to the competing value 
structure hypothesis, egoistic and altruistic values did not significantly add to the model 
above and beyond the effect of biospheric value orientations, as their path relationships 
were insignificant. Similarly, both cause and impact-knowledge did not add any variance 
in addition to response-knowledge, as their path relationships were equally insignificant. 
The notion that theoretical models should not be adjusted post-hoc is somewhat 
contrived, as any theory should be updated in light of contradicting empirical evidence. 
Indeed, a few modifications are generally deemed acceptable (McDonald & Ho, 2002). If 
fit for a theoretical model is completely rejected, than substantial post hoc adjustments of 
course no longer provide a confirmation of the original model but rather reflect a model 
that is mostly “data-driven” (Bullock, Harlow, & Mulaik, 2009). However, this is 
certainly not the case in the present study. 
Moreover, SEM can be used for both confirmatory as well as more exploratory 
purposes (Jöreskog, 1993). There are generally three main concerns when it comes to 
model modifications; (1) the extent to which modifications are stable / generalizable to 
other samples (i.e. changes that do not merely capitalize on sampling variability), (2) the 
number of sequential modifications made and (3) the interpretability of the adjustments 
(MacCallum, Roznowski, & Necowitz, 1992). With regard to the first point, given the 
relatively large and representative nature of this study it is unlikely that these 
modifications capitalize on particularities of the sample. Moreover, only a small number 
of modifications were made once without making any major conceptual changes to the 
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model. While the purpose of the current study is mostly confirmatory, there must be some 
room for exploration, as the context of climate change is unique and theoretical (model) 
development in this area has been lacking (Roser-Renouf & Nisbet, 2008; Whitmarsh, 
2009). Moreover, the purpose of the modifications here is not to drastically improve 
model fit but rather to avoid making the model unnecessarily complex (i.e. to arrive at the 
most parsimonious solution).   
Freeing the insignificant parameters results in a model with good fit, χ2 = 412.76; 
df = 150, p < 0.001, CFI = 0.98, RMSEA = 0.046 (90% CI: 0.041 – 0.052), χ2 / df = 2.75. 
All of the remaining hypothesised path relationships were supported (Table 6.3) and an 
overview of the final model is presented in Figure 6.3. Although biospheric values have a 
small direct effect on general intentions to help reduce climate change, most of the effect 
(approx. 85%) is mediated by the climate change context variables; risk perception, 
response-knowledge and descriptive social norms. Furthermore, while descriptive social 
norms, response-knowledge and risk perception are all significant predictors of general 
intentions to help reduce climate change, risk perception is clearly the strongest relative 
determinant. Together, values and climate change context variables explain (R2 = 66%) of 
the variance in general intentions.  
In turn, while general intentions have a significant direct impact on specific 
mitigation intentions, they also have a substantial indirect effect through the behaviour-
specific determinants; attitudes, perceived behavioural control and situational constraints. 
More specifically, about 1/3rd of the total effect of general intent on specific mitigation 
intentions is direct, while roughly 2/3rds of the effect is mediated by behaviour-specific 
variables. Thus, forming a broad intention to help reduce climate change results in 
stronger intentions to perform specific mitigation behaviours directly, as well as indirectly 
by creating more favourable attitudes toward mitigation behaviours, more perceived 
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control over taking specific actions and by reducing the amount of perceived situational 
constraints. General intentions and behaviour-specific variables explain (R2 = 57%) of the 
variation in specific mitigation intentions. Lastly, mitigation intentions and habits both 
significantly predicted mitigation behaviour. Yet, while the presence of habit has a clear 
negative influence on mitigation behaviour, a moderation (i.e. interaction effect) between 
intention and habit could not be substantiated. Mitigation intentions and habit jointly 
explain (R2 = 35%) of the variance in aggregate mitigation behaviour. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.3:  The Domain-Context-Behaviour (DCB) Model. Note: Visual depiction of 
results. All values are standardised beta coefficients and significant at p < 0.01. For ease of 
interpretation, only the structural model is displayed. Dotted lines represent indirect effects.  
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                                Table 6.3:  SEM Parameters Full DCB Model 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: BIO = Biospheric Values, RP = Risk Perception, RK = Response Knowledge, DN = 
Descriptive Norm, GI = General Intention, ATT= Attitude, PBC = Perceived Behavioural Control,     
SC = Situational Constraints, MI = Mitigation Intention, BEH = Behaviour, HAB = Habit.  
 
 
5.4.     Psychological Determinants of High vs. Low Cost Behavioural Changes  
 
 
As mentioned in section 3.1, the most crucial and practical dimension along which 
behavioural changes can be distinguished is the low-cost, low-impact, high-cost, high 
Path Relationships Full 
Model 
   β S.E.        p  
BIO -> GI via RP  0.30 0.02  < 0.001 
BIO -> GI via RN  0.02 0.01    < 0.01 
BIO -> GI via DN  0.10 0.01   <0.001 
BIO -> GI  0.07         0.02         <0.001 
RP -> GI  0.60 0.03   <0.001 
RK -> GI  0.08 0.01   <0.001 
DN -> GI  0.31 0.02   <0.001 
GI -> MI via ATT  0.28 0.03   <0.001 
GI -> MI via PBC  0.13 0.02   <0.001 
GI -> MI via SC -0.03 0.01   <0.001 
GI -> MI  0.16 0.03   <0.001 
ATT -> MI  0.44 0.04   <0.001 
PBC -> MI  0.24 0.03   <0.001 
SC -> MI -0.10 0.01   <0.001 
MI -> BEH  0.55 0.04   <0.001 
HAB -> BEH -0.13 0.04     <0.01 
MI*HAB -> BEH  0.05 0.03        n.s. 
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impact curve. While some scholars have predominantly scaled behaviours according to 
their difficulty level (e.g. Kaiser, 1998; Kaiser, Wölfing, & Führer, 1999), more recent 
research has highlighted that the perceived barriers to performing climate change 
mitigation behaviours are clearly multidimensional (e.g. Semenza et al., 2008; Tobler et 
al., 2012a). It is important to note that while researchers often have a priori beliefs about 
what behaviours should fall into these categories, it is (or ought to be) to some extent, an 
empirical question (i.e. what is perceived as costly or inconvenient by some might seem 
inexpensive and convenient to others, depending on one’s personal circumstances).  
To explore the dimensionality of the scale, a principal component analysis (PCA) 
with an oblique oblimin rotation was performed25. A two-component solution explained 
50% of the variance (Table A.1), which is fair given that past research has used three 
components to explain the same amount of variance (e.g. Tobler et al., 2012a). Although 
some of the individual loadings might appear relatively low (< 0.25), they provide a sharp 
contrast between the components. The possibility of a third components was also 
explored. The third component had an eigenvalue of 1.57, which according to the Kaiser 
criterion (> 1) could be considered, however, the third component added little explained 
variance and a three-factor solution had no clear interpretation - which is an important 
consideration (Fabrigar et al., 1999). The rotated 2-factor solution did have a clear 
interpretation (see appendix A). Particularly, the items that loaded on the first (low-cost, 
low impact) component correspond nearly exactly with the first 11 behaviours of the 
mitigation scale presented in Table 6.1 (i.e. behaviours people are most likely to 
perform). The latter 10 behaviours loaded on the second component (high-cost, high 
impact). This relationship is presented visually in Figure 6.4. Intentions to mitigate more 
                                               
 
25 An oblique rotation assumes that the components are correlated (as is common in social science). If the 
components are uncorrelated, then oblique will simply return an orthogonal rotation (Costello & Osborne, 
2005). 
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or less steadily decline when moving from relatively low-cost to more high-cost 
behavioural changes. While the upper quadrant indicates that the public is likely to make 
“low cost” changes (behaviours 1 to 11), this readiness levels off into “unlikely” for more 
“high-cost” changes (12 to 21). At the intersection the letter A is used to denote what is 
referred to here as “the point of ambivalence”. The PCA highlighted that items 12 and 18 
(driving less) load potentially well on both components. While it may be tempting to 
suggest that a “neutral” disposition warrants grouping in the “low-cost” category, the 
opposite is argued here.  
In fact, when looking at the most commonly reported barriers for the identified 
“high-cost, high-impact” changes (Table 6.4), items 12 and 18 (driving less) are 
associated with substantial barriers, most notably; “inconvenience”. Thus, while 
behaviours that border the neutral end of the scale might not be cost-prohibitive, people 
are unlikely to perform them because of the inconvenience factor associated with 
mobility-restrictions. Indeed, the finding that driving and flying less is perceived as 
highly inconvenient has been noted before (e.g. Tobler et al., 2012a; Whitmarsh et al., 
2011).  While the high/low cost categorization produced by the PCA closely matches the 
ranking of mitigation intentions, to check whether the grouping also made sense from a 
perceived barrier perspective, a t-test was performed. The test indicated that people 
indeed perceive, on average, significantly more barriers for high-impact than low-impact 
behaviours (M = 6.61, SE = 0.13) vs. (M = 3.97, SE = 0.12), t(807) = 26.24, p < 0.00126. 
Reliability scores for both the “low cost, low impact” scale (ɑ = 0.87) and the “high, cost, 
high impact” scale (ɑ = 0.90) were good. 
                                               
 
26 Although high and low-cost intentions significantly differ in terms of perceived constraints, the 
correlation between the two behavior classes is positive and significant (r = 0.65, p < 0.001).   
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Figure 6.4: Graphical Representation of Mitigation Intentions. Note: “A” 
indicates the point of “ambivalence”.  
 
Table 6.4:  Perceived Situational Constraints for High-Cost, High-Impact Changes 
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Climate Change Mitigation Behaviour Scale Items 
Low Cost - Low
Impact Changes
High Cost - High
Impact Changes
"Unlikely"
A
Perceived Situational Constraints for                                           
High-Cost / High Impact Changes 
 
Can’t                    
Afford It 
 
 
 
 
Don’t have      Decision is not      I don’t know                                                                      
the time           entirely up to me      how to 
 
Too                Other 
Inconvenient      Reason 
 
1. Reduce my driving by walking or 
biking more                                   
2. Use more public transport (e.g. train) 
instead of driving                         
3. Reduce the number of miles that I fly                                                                      
4. Insulate my home or apartment 
5. Buy/consume less meat 
6. Buy carbon offsets when booking an 
airline ticket (whenever possible) 
7. Reduce driving, by sharing car rides 
8. Switch from single glazed to double 
glazed windows 
9. Purchase home energy from a green 
source (e.g. wind or solar power) 
10. Purchase a more fuel-efficient car 
2.7% 
 
12.9% 
 
6.1%
26.7% 
2.4% 
41.0% 
 
2.0% 
28.9% 
 
41.0%                                                                
 
58.0% 
13.1%              8.3%               4.4% 
 
11.5%              6.3%               3.9% 
 
2.7%               20.0%            7.9% 
3.0%               30.7%              6.5% 
1.2%               30.0%              8.0% 
1.3%                9.3%              18.4% 
 
5.0%               15.0%              6.8% 
1.8%               26.9%              3.9% 
 
3.0%          21.1%      15.0%                                                                         
 
0.9%               11.8%              3.9%  
38.1%         33.4% 
 
44.4%         21.0% 
 
23.6%         39.7% 
6.3%           26.8% 
24.6%         33.8% 
7.4%           22.6% 
 
39.8%        31.4% 
5.30%         33.2% 
 
10.2%         9.8%                                
 
6.7%          18.7% 
"Likely" 
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The Domain-Context-Behaviour model was subsequently tested separately for 
each domain and results are displayed in Figures 6.5 and 6.6. The fit of both the high-
cost, high-impact; χ2 = 381.26; df = 150, p < 0.001, CFI = 0.98, RMSEA = 0.04 (90% CI: 
0.038 – 0.049), χ2 / df = 2.54 and low-cost, low-impact model was good; χ2 = 427.25; df = 
150, p < 0.001, CFI = 0.98, RMSEA = 0.048 (90% CI: 0.043 – 0.053), χ2 / df = 2.85. 
There were a number of notable differences between the two models. In particular, while 
general intentions to help reduce climate change are a significant direct and indirect 
predictor of low-cost mitigation intentions they are not a significant direct predictor of 
intentions to implement more high-cost changes.  
Furthermore, while situational constraints are a significant predictor of high-cost 
changes they are not a significant predictor of low-cost changes. In addition, while the 
presence of habit had a significant and negative impact on low-cost behaviours, habit did 
not have a significant influence on high-cost behaviours. The path relationships of the two 
models are provided in Tables 6.5 and 6.6. Overall, attitude-intention congruence is 
slightly stronger for low-cost than high-cost changes. In addition, the DCB model 
explained somewhat more variance in low-cost than in high-cost mitigation intentions   
(R2 = 53% vs. 44%). Lastly, although somewhat unexpected, the strength of the intention-
behaviour relationship is practically identical for both models (R2 = 36% vs. 35%).  
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Figure 6.5: Domain-Context-Behaviour Model Results for Low-Cost, Low Impact 
Behaviours. Note: All values are standardised beta coefficients and significant at p < 0.05.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.6: Domain-Context-Behaviour Model Results for High-Cost, High-Impact 
Behaviours. Note: All values are standardised beta coefficients and significant at p < 0.05.  
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Table 6.5:  Parameters Low-Cost Model                       Table 6.6: Parameters High-Cost Model 
 
 
5.5  Socio-Demographics & Non-Trivial Competing Model Structures 
 
 
It is important for any psychological theory to demonstrate its explanatory power above 
and beyond the effect of socio-demographic factors. To this extent, additional analyses 
indicated that as hypothesised, jointly, socio-demographic variables explain a small      
(R2 = 7%) amount of variance in general intentions and only a fraction of the variance in 
specific mitigation intentions (R2 = 2%). In fact, while females, liberals and higher 
educated individuals all tend to have significantly stronger intentions to help reduce 
Path Relationships 
Low-Cost Model 
   β S.E.   p  
BIO -> GI via RP  0.30 0.02    <0.001 
BIO -> GI via RN  0.02 0.01     < 0.01 
BIO -> GI via DN  0.10 0.01    <0.001 
BIO -> GI  0.07         0.02          <0.001 
RP -> GI  0.60 0.03  <0.001 
RK -> GI  0.08 0.01  <0.001 
DN -> GI  0.31 0.02  <0.001 
GI -> MI via ATT  0.26 0.03    <0.001 
GI -> MI via PBC  0.11 0.02    <0.001 
GI -> MI via SC -0.01 0.02        n.s. 
GI -> MI  0.08 0.03  <0.001 
ATT -> MI  0.53 0.04  <0.001 
PBC -> MI  0.21 0.04  <0.001 
SC -> MI -0.02 0.01   n.s. 
MI -> BEH  0.60 0.01  <0.001 
HAB -> BEH -0.08 0.04    <0.05 
Path Relationships 
High-Cost Model 
β S.E.   p  
BIO -> GI via RP 0.30 0.02    <0.001 
BIO -> GI via RN 0.02 0.01     < 0.01 
BIO -> GI via DN 0.10 0.01    <0.001 
BIO -> GI 0.07  0.02          <0.001 
RP -> GI 0.60 0.03  <0.001 
RK -> GI 0.08 0.01  <0.001 
DN -> GI 0.31 0.02  <0.001 
GI -> MI via ATT 0.21 0.02    <0.001 
GI -> MI via PBC 0.16 0.02    <0.001 
GI -> MI via SC                 0.02 0.01      <0.05 
GI -> MI 0.01 0.04    n.s. 
ATT -> MI 0.45 0.02  <0.001 
PBC -> MI 0.28 0.04  <0.001 
SC -> MI  -0.06 0.01    <0.05 
MI -> BEH 0.59 0.03  <0.001 
HAB -> BEH 0.07 0.04    n.s. 
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climate change, their effect on intention is fully mediated by domain and context-relevant 
variables (see Table A.2). The DCB model was also estimated net of the effect of socio-
demographic variables, as expected, differences in parameters were negligible. 
In addition to controlling for socio-demographic characteristics, it may be argued 
that other model-specifications fit the data equally well (MacCallum et al., 1993). For 
example, additional direct path relationships can be specified between the climate change 
context variables and specific mitigation intentions or between general intentions and 
mitigation behaviour. Yet, these direct paths are however not significant (i.e. the 
relationships are fully mediated by the intervening variables as specified by the DCB 
model) and adding such paths does not improve model fit. Thus, climate change context 
variables do not influence specific mitigation intentions directly (controlling for general 
intentions and behaviour-specific determinants) and general intentions do not influence 
behaviour directly (controlling for specific intentions and habit).  
In addition to testing the DCB model against alternative mediation hypotheses, the 
Theory of Planned Behaviour (Ajzen, 1991) can also easily be constructed from the 
current data (by removing habit, situational constraints and all other antecedent 
variables). Social descriptive norms can serve as a proxy for the TPB’s “subjective 
norm”. While social norms were operationalised at a general level (and hence not specific 
to any behaviour) this shouldn’t bear too much on the results given that subjective norms 
are usually the TPB’s weakest component (Armitage & Connor, 2001), especially when 
predicting pro-social behaviours (e.g. van der Linden, 2011). According to the TPB, 
attitude, perceived behavioural control and subjective norms would predict mitigation 
intentions, and in turn, intentions alone would predict mitigation behaviour. In terms of 
model fit, the TPB also provides an adequate fit to the data; χ2 = 36.26; df = 11, p < 
0.001, CFI = 0.99, RMSEA = 0.05 (90% CI: 0.035 – 0.073), χ2 / df = 3.30).  
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A comparative overview of model fit for the TPB vs. DCB is provided in Table 
6.7. While the TPB is more parsimonious, the objective of the DCB model is different, 
namely; to provide a comprehensive explanatory account of how psychological intentions 
to perform specific mitigation behaviours are ultimately formed. Such an explanation 
necessitates a more complex model that structurally organises the psychological 
antecedents of behaviour-specific determinants in a theoretically coherent manner. 
 
  Table 6.7:  Comparison of Model Fit: TPB vs. DCB. 
 
 
 
Model Fit: TPB vs 
DCB (N = 808) 
        
      
           χ2 
  
(df)            (p) 
 
      CFI 
 
    RMSEA                 χ2  / df 
   (90% CI) 
TPB     
     
Full Model         36.26
 
        
 11         p < 0.001
 
      0.99       0.053 3.30 
(0.035-0.073) 
     
High-Cost Behaviour 
Model 
        34.24 
        
 11         p < 0.001            0.99       0.052  3.11 
(0.033-0.073) 
     
Low-Cost Behaviour 
Model 
 
 
DCB   
                                                                           
        48.53 
        
 11         p < 0.001 
       
      0.99       0.069 4.41 
(0.050-0.089) 
 
 
Full Model         412.76
 
        
 150        p < 0.001
 
      0.98       0.046 2.75 
(0.040-0.051) 
 
High-Cost Behaviour 
Model 
        381.26
 
        
 150        p < 0.001
 
      0.98       0.044 2.54 
(0.038-0.049) 
 
Low-Cost Behaviour 
Model 
        409.18 
        
 150        p < 0.001            0.98       0.046  2.73 
(0.041-0.052) 
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6.0 Discussion 
 
 
6.1 The Domain-Context-Behaviour Model 
 
 
 
The purpose of the current study has been to move towards a more coherent psychology 
of climate change mitigation behaviour by introducing and validating the domain-context-
behaviour model (DCB). The DCB model is the first to advance a psychologically  
coherent explanation of how general environmental values (the domain), more distinct 
norms, beliefs, perceptions and feelings about climate change (the context) and situation-
specific determinants (the behaviour) are conceptually related to both each other as well 
as to voluntary mitigation intentions and behaviours.  
With a few exceptions, the present study was able to validate the overall 
conceptual structure of the model, as the DCB provided a good fit to the data and nearly 
all hypothesised path relationships were supported empirically. In particular, while 
biospheric value orientations significantly predicted all climate change context variables 
(i.e. risk perceptions, response-knowledge and social descriptive norms), they appear to 
be especially important in predicting risk perceptions of climate change, which is 
congruent with other recent research that has highlighted the role of biospheric values in 
environmental risk perceptions (e.g. de Groot, Steg, & Poortinga, 2013).  In turn, risk 
perceptions of climate change were identified as a crucial determinant of general 
intentions to help reduce climate change - which is also consistent with prior research 
(e.g. Hidalgo & Pisano, 2010; Spence et al., 2012). In addition, this study adds that 
descriptive social norms are also a significant determinant of general intentions to act, 
which is in line with the results of Kormos, Gifford, and Brown (2014), who recently 
demonstrated the usefulness of descriptive social norm messages in promoting low-
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carbon behaviours such as reducing personal car use. Last but certainly not least, the 
finding that broad environmental values and climate change cognitions, perceptions and 
norms do not affect specific mitigation intentions and behaviours directly also 
constructively builds on previous research in this area (e.g. Ajzen et al., 2011; Bamberg, 
2003; Poortinga et al., 2012; Whitmarsh & O’Neill, 2010 ). In particular, the present 
study further expands on this by introducing and validating the notion that general 
intentions to help reduce climate change function as a broad psychological “orienting” 
mechanism - activating specific mitigation intentions directly as well as indirectly by 
creating more favourable attitudes toward performing mitigation behaviours, by fostering 
a stronger sense of perceived control over performing the behaviour and by reducing the 
amount of perceived situational constraints. With regard to the latter, the present study 
recognizes a need to pay closer attention to the importance of situational barriers to 
change (Steg & Vlek, 2009) and shows, in line with other recent research (e.g. Klöckner 
& Blobaum, 2010; Tobler et al., 2012a) that a multidimensional “situational constraints” 
measure significantly improves behaviour-specific predictions.  
Finally, consistent with other integrated models of environmental behaviour (e.g. 
Bamberg & Schmidt, 2003; Klöckner & Blobaum, 2010, Klöckner, 2013) the present 
study finds that both (conscious) intentions and (unconscious) habitual processes 
significantly predict mitigation behaviour. Overall, the amount of variance that the final 
DCB model is able to explain in general intentions to help reduce climate change            
(R2 = 66%), specific mitigation intentions (R2 = 57%) and mitigation behaviour                  
(R2 = 35%) is very respectable, especially in comparison to previous studies and meta-
analyses, where more complex models of behaviour generally explain between 40% to 
50% of the variance in intention and 25% to 30% of the variance in behaviour (cf. 
Armitage & Conner, 2001; Bamberg & Möser, 2007; Klöckner, 2013; Sheeran, 2002).  
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It should be noted that some initial modifications were made to the conceptual 
model that warrants some further discussion here. In particular, in contrast to the 
competing value structure hypothesis (De Groot & Steg, 2008; Stern & Dietz, 1994), 
egoistic and altruistic value orientations did not significantly impact any of the climate 
change context variables above and beyond the effect of biospheric values. In terms of 
egoistic values, this is clearly due to the fact that they share a weak correlation with all of 
the climate change context variables. With regard to the role of altruistic values, they tend 
to be strongly and positively correlated with biospheric value orientations and it is likely 
that (at least in the environmental domain), unless they are in conflict, altruistic values 
add little extra variance (De Groot & Steg, 2007; Stern & Dietz, 1994). While the present 
study does not reject the idea of competing value structures, in the current sample and 
context, biospheric values alone appear to offer a sufficient explanation. 
Furthermore, the utility of both cause and impact-knowledge in predicting general 
intentions to help reduce climate change was statistically negligible above and beyond the 
effect of response knowledge. While these results may run contrary to the findings of 
some previous research (e.g. Bord et al., 2000; O’Connor et al., 1999), it is important to 
note that these studies did not control for the effect of different types knowledge on 
intention. For example, other studies have only found a weak effect (Whitmarsh, 2009; 
Whitmarsh & O’Neill, 2010) or no effect at all (e.g. Heath & Gifford, 2006), especially in 
comparison to response-knowledge (Truelove & Barnes, 2012). It is not suggested here 
that other types of knowledge are not important, as different types of knowledge tend to 
converge (Kaiser & Fuhrer, 2003). In fact, all three knowledge measures used in this 
study are significantly and positively correlated with each other. However, in terms 
intentions to address climate change, knowledge of response-strategies clearly seems to 
be most instrumental. Finally, while habit had a negative effect on mitigation behaviour, 
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an often suggested interaction-effect with intention (e.g. Triandis, 1977) could not be 
substantiated. This is not unusual however, as hypotheses concerning factors that 
moderate the intention-behaviour relationship have not proven to be consistent (Klöckner 
& Blobaum, 2010; Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010) and deserve further clarification.  
 
6.2 The Psychological Determinants of Low Impact vs. High-Impact Behavioural 
Changes 
 
Consistent with prior research (e.g. Diekmann & Preisendörfer, 2003; Gifford et al., 
2011; Tobler et al., 2012a; Whitmarsh, 2009), the present study confirms the notion that 
the public is significantly less willing to implement more high-cost, high-impact 
behaviour changes. To investigate potential differences in psychological determinants, the 
explanatory power of the DCB model was tested on both behavioural categories. 
Although model fit for each sub-dimension was good and both behaviour categories share 
important common psychological antecedents, some important differences still emerged.  
First, a generalised motivation to help reduce climate change does not seem to 
weigh in as strongly for high-cost behaviours, particularly because situational barriers 
tend to be more salient for high-impact changes. In turn, while situational constraints are 
of little concern for low-cost changes, low-cost behaviours tend to be subject to 
unsustainable habitual patterns. These results are relatively intuitive; situational 
constraints are less relevant for most low-cost, low-impact behaviours (e.g. reducing 
shower times etc.) but very relevant for more high-cost behaviours (e.g. purchasing a 
more fuel-efficient car). Similarly, most low-cost behaviours (e.g. leaving the lights on) 
are entrenched in habit while this is arguably less relevant for more high-cost behaviours 
(e.g. flying long distances). Moreover, the conceptual relationship between general intent, 
behaviour-specific variables and mitigation intentions was somewhat stronger for the 
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low-cost model than for the high-cost model. Accordingly, the low-cost DCB model 
accounted for more of the variance in intention (R2 = 53% vs. 44%). While overall, these 
findings are congruent with the hypothesis that psychological motivations tend to be 
somewhat more predictive of low-cost changes (Diekmann & Preisendörfer, 2003; 
Gatersleben et al., 2002; Steg & Vlek, 2009), an important aspect that previous studies 
have overlooked is the finding that the stability of the intention-behaviour relationship 
proved identical for both high-cost and low-cost actions - which is promising in the sense 
that high-impact mitigation intentions are equally (un)likely to translate into action as 
low-impact intentions. Moreover, both types of changes are significantly and positively 
correlated and appear to share a “common motivational roots”.  
 
6.3 The DCB, Other Behavioural Models and Future Research 
 
 
While this study found that females, higher educated and liberal individuals tend to have 
stronger mitigation intentions, congruent with other models of behaviour prediction, the 
DCB model assumed (and illustrated) that the effect of socio-demographic factors on 
intention and behaviour is fully mediated by psychological explanations. These findings 
are consistent with other recent work (e.g. Poortinga et al., 2012) as well as with more 
general surveys of the literature, which indicate that the influence of socio-demographic 
characteristics on pro-environmental behaviour is usually quite weak (Diamantopoulos et 
al., 2003). One potential explanation for this phenomenon is that psychological intentions 
to reduce climate change are voluntary in nature and thus psychologically “flexible” 
whereas actual consumption or energy use is more constrained by socio-economic factors 
(Abrahamse & Steg, 2011).  
In comparison to the DCB, the TPB provided an equally good fit to the data. Yet, 
it is important to highlight the distinct but complementary features of the DCB. For 
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example, one of the main strengths of the DCB model lies in its ability to provide a more 
comprehensive and evolutionary account of the formation of an individual’s 
psychological intention to “mitigate”. Moreover, the DCB model provides an overarching 
causal framework to help systematically organise predictors of climate change mitigation 
intentions and behaviours in a theoretically coherent and psychologically meaningful 
manner. The model is also more organic in the sense that it allows researchers and 
practitioners to choose at which point in the causal chain they wish to intervene.  
Overall, the current study offers many notable benefits and improvements over 
previous research. For example, the high reliability of the included constructs and 
relatively large and balanced nature of the sample provide more confidence in the fact 
that the DCB model is generalisable to other samples and populations as well. Moreover, 
the present study measured a wide range of self-reported behaviours in addition to stated 
intention, which is a substantial improvement over existing research (e.g. Brody et al., 
2012; O’Connor et al., 1999; Poortinga et al., 2012; Spence et al., 2011). Lastly, instead 
of assessing past behaviour and intention cross-sectionally, the longitudinal design of the 
study allows for stronger causality claims (Bullock et al., 1994).  
Yet, in spite of these benefits, the current study is certainly not without 
limitations. First, there was substantial attrition between the first and second wave of the 
survey (although subsequent missing data analyses provided little reason to suspect that 
any systematic bias resulted from this attrition). A second limitation is that the national 
quotas are ultimately based on a panel of respondents who volunteer to participate in 
online survey research and as such, the sampling procedure does not constitute a 
randomized probability sample. Having said this, national quota samples obtained from 
large online panels are often deemed sufficiently representative (Berrens et al., 2003).  
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A third obvious limitation of this study is the self-reported nature of the data. A 
common criticism is that people tend to somewhat overestimate and inaccurately recall 
their own pro-environmental intentions and behaviour (e.g. Chao & Lam, 2009; Gifford 
et al., 2011). While to some extent, this may be true, it has been noted that the effect of 
social desirability bias on self-reported environmental behaviour tends to be negligible 
(Milfont, 2009). Moreover, when aiming to discern broad relationships for a large number 
of behaviours, objective measurements are often not feasible (Tobler et al., 2012a) if not 
practically impossible (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010). Still, it could be the case that the very 
act of measuring “intent” might increase an individual’s probability to actually perform 
the target behaviour, which would inflate the observed intention-behaviour relationship 
(Morwitz & Fitzsimons, 2004).  
Another limitation is that the sole focus of this study was geared towards (direct) 
mitigation activities and hence the present study did not measure other important 
behaviours such as policy support (e.g. Leiserowitz, 2006; Tobler et al., 2012a) or 
adaptation behaviour (e.g. Zaalberg et al., 2009). In addition, the DCB model has only 
been tested and validated within the context of a specific Western culture (i.e. the UK). 
Future research could overcome some of these limitations and constructively build on the 
current study by examining the DCB model in other contexts and cultures as well as 
within the frame of an experimental approach.  
In addition, while the amount of variance that the DCB model is able to account 
for is relatively high, there are arguably other domain, context and behaviour-specific 
variables that may be added to improve the predictive validity of the model. For example, 
recent research has explored the role of pro-environmental identities and moral norms in 
mitigation behaviour (e.g. Poortinga et al., 2012; van den Werf, Steg, & Keizer, 2013; 
Whitmarsh & O’Neill, 2010). Lastly, the present study acknowledges that changes in 
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behavioural patterns are most effective in conjunction with larger socio-political shifts 
that facilitate and promote a low-carbon society. Thus, while it is pivotal to change 
existing public attitudes and perceptions, in order to enable widespread lifestyle changes, 
structural, contextual and institutional barriers to public engagement need to be alleviated 
as well (Lorenzoni et al., 2007; Stern, 2000).  
 
6.4    Implications for Public Communication & Behavioural Change 
 
 
In practical terms, the causal chain proposed by the model allows interventions to be 
designed at every stage of the process (domain, context, behaviour). Particularly, the 
DCB model suggests that in order to stimulate the development of a general intention to 
act, public communication campaigns should try to take an integrative approach and;            
(a) foster biospheric values, (b) increase risk perceptions of climate change, (c) enhance 
knowledge of individual response-strategies while (d) promoting and leveraging social 
norms to address climate change. This general intention is then likely to activate and 
motivate more specific (low and high-impact) mitigation intentions, especially when 
situational and contextual factors are conducive to implementing the intended change.  
While it is often argued that communication strategies have their limits, the 
present study does highlight that certain situational (e.g. time, ability, convenience) and 
contextual (e.g. habit) barriers are (at least partly) psychological in nature and thus, they 
may very well be influenced by persuasive communication messages that can produce 
changes in relevant knowledge, norms, values and attitudes. For example, the more 
motivated an individual is to take action (normatively, cognitively as well as 
emotionally), the lower the number of perceived situational constraints and the higher the 
sense of perceived control over performing the behaviour. In addition, while it is well-
known that unsustainable habits are resistant to change, people still need to be made 
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cognisant of their behaviour and alternative courses of action need to be mentally 
accessible. Similarly, in terms of possible domain-interventions, it is often argued that 
deep-seated fundamental values are relatively stable throughout a person’s life (Schwartz, 
1992). Yet, specific value-priorities are, to some extent, also situationally constructed 
(Gifford & Howes, 2009) and thus one potential strategy could be to increase the saliency 
of biospheric values in specific contexts without explicitly infringing on other important 
value structures such as egoistic motivations (De Groot & Steg, 2009) – a strategy which 
has the potential to make people more inclined to act on their values (Bolderdijk, Gorsira, 
Keizer, & Steg, 2013). Lastly, a much needed example of an integrative approach to 
public communication is the need to strike a careful balance between creating a sense of 
urgency and risk on one hand, and the importance of providing sufficient knowledge 
about how to effectively respond to the risk of climate change on the other, particularly 
via the adoption of specific mitigation and adaption behaviours (van der Linden, 2014).  
 
6.5 Conclusion 
 
This study introduced and validated a domain-context-behaviour (DCB) model.  
The major theoretical and practical contribution of the model lies in its ability to provide 
a comprehensive and psychologically coherent account of how broad environmental 
values and more specific norms, perceptions and beliefs about climate change ultimately 
influence climate change mitigation intentions and behaviours. In particular, the DCB 
model suggests that the common motivational roots that underlies a wide variety of 
“mitigation” behaviours is a general orienting intention to help reduce climate change. 
Overall, the DCB model can help inform and improve behavioural change interventions 
and as such, increase the relevance of environmental psychology in the mitigation debate. 
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7.1 Summary of Findings and Contribution of Thesis 
 
 
The central contribution of this thesis has been to advance a more comprehensive, 
theoretically informed and systematic social-psychological account of how people feel, 
think about and perceive the risk of climate change on one hand, and subsequently act on 
their perceptions, values, attitudes and intentions on the other.  
 
7.1.1 Theoretical Advances and Contribution to Literature 
 
A persistent theme throughout this thesis has been the notion that human behaviour in the 
context of climate change is complex and multi-determined and best understood by 
combining and integrating three key dimensions, namely; cognitive (e.g. knowledge), 
experiential (e.g. affect, personal experience) and socio-cultural (e.g. norms, values) 
factors. This theme is explicitly reflected in chapter 2, where I provide a survey of 
existing literature and conclude that popular approaches to public climate change 
communication and behavioural change have been relatively unidimensional, often 
appealing to only one aspect of human behaviour whilst neglecting other key factors.  
To this extent, a broad and practical typology is offered to describe the evolution 
of public climate change interventions, including the traditional “cognitive-analytical” 
type (which is largely focused on knowledge acquisition, education and information 
provision), the “affective-experiential” type (which predominantly relies on eliciting 
negative emotions through the use of fear and guilt appeals) and lastly, the “social-
normative” type (an approach which primarily focuses on creating and leveraging the 
persuasive appeal of social norms and negative/positive social identities).  
Highlighting that part of the limited success of past interventions is due to failing 
to recognize that human behaviour is multi-determined by cognitive, experiential and 
socio-cultural factors, a novel framework for communicating climate change is advanced. 
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The framework is novel for a number of reasons. First, because it strongly advocates an 
integrative approach to behavioural change, where public campaigns and appeals should 
be designed in such a manner that they effectively combine all three (cognitive, 
experiential and socio-cultural) dimensions. In addition, there is a large gap between 
practitioners who focus on designing behavioural change interventions and those scholars 
who are concerned with advancing a more diagnostic understanding of the determinant 
factors that explain and predict a given behaviour. To this extent, another major theme 
and contribution of this thesis is reflected in an effort to combine these two approaches. 
For example, the model suggests that climate change communication efforts should pay 
close attention to the psychological determinants of the mitigation behaviours that the 
campaign is trying to change.  
Chapter 3 specifically reviews the risk perception and risk communication 
literature and highlights that different paradigms and approaches currently exist to 
understanding public risk perception. Moreover, while there has been much debate about 
the relative explanatory power of one paradigm over another (e.g. Sjöberg, 2002), they 
have largely remained disintegrated and disconnected from each other (Wåhlberg, 2001). 
This is not to say that more recent attempts to combine theoretical approaches have not 
been made (e.g. see Leiserowitz, 2006; Jackson, Allum, & Gaskell, 2006; Pidgeon, 
Kasperson, & Slovic, 2003), yet this thesis makes a distinct contribution to the literature 
by specifically advancing a more comprehensive and integrated social-psychological 
model of risk perception, where cognitive, experiential, and socio-cultural factors are 
combined to explain and predict risk perceptions of climate change. Tested on a national 
sample of the UK population, the study reported in chapter 4 provides strong empirical 
evidence for both the validity of each of these dimensions on their own as well for the 
combined explanatory power of the model as a whole.  
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In particular, knowledge about the causes, impacts and solutions to climate 
change, negative affective evaluations, personal experience with extreme weather events, 
biospheric values, social norms (both descriptive and prescriptive) and key socio-
demographics (gender, political orientation and education) all explained and predicted 
holistic risk perceptions of climate change, jointly accounting for nearly 70% of the 
variance – which (to the best of my knowledge) is more than any published study to date 
has been able to explain. Thus, one major contribution of this thesis is its ability to 
provide a systematic, integrative and more comprehensive explanatory account of the 
major psychological dimensions that influence public risk perceptions of climate change. 
In doing so, the current thesis highlights that when it comes to explaining risk perceptions 
of climate change, experiential and socio-cultural factors weigh in substantially more than 
cognitive or socio-demographic factors. In fact, generalised (negative) affect is identified 
as the single most important determinant of risk perception.  
Another important contribution of this thesis revolves around exploring and 
empirically validating risk perception as a two-dimensional construct. Indeed, holistic risk 
perceptions can be conceptualised as having two underlying dimensions; societal and 
personal risk judgements – a conceptual distinction which has been proposed before (e.g.  
Tyler & Cook, 1984; Weinstein, 1989) but has not received much attention in the climate 
change context. Yet, the psychological level at which people construe representations of a 
risk is important to consider (Spence et al., 2012). For example, results from the national 
survey suggest that people are significantly more likely to see climate change as a societal 
rather than a personal risk, a finding which is very much consistent with similar studies 
conducted in both the UK and the US (e.g. Leiserowitz, 2006; Leiserowitz et al., 2013; 
Spence et al., 2012). Yet, while this is an important finding, the more interesting question 
is what determines societal and personal risk judgements. This thesis makes a novel 
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contribution by highlighting some fundamental differences between the psychological 
determinants of societal and personal risk perceptions. For example, broad knowledge 
about the causes, impacts and solutions to climate change predicted societal but not 
personal risk perceptions. In addition, personal experience with extreme weather was a 
significant predictor of personal but not societal risk perception. Similarly, while egoistic 
values were a significant predictor of personal risk, they did not predict societal risk 
perceptions. Common antecedents of both personal and societal risk perception included 
affect, biospheric values and social norms (as well as gender and political party).  
In addition to mapping and validating the key social-psychological dimensions 
that underlie risk perceptions of climate change, another major contribution of this thesis 
is a first attempt to explore the psychological relationship between personal experiences 
with extreme weather, negative affect and risk perceptions of climate change. In chapter 5 
I illustrate, using a theory-based approach, that the complex interrelationship between 
personal experiences with extreme weather events, the formation of negative affective 
evaluations and risk perceptions of climate change can be situated within the cognition-
emotion debate. Thus far, the literature has only conceptually indicated on a broad level 
that cognitive and affective judgements of climate change are intertwined (e.g. Marx et 
al., 2007; Sundblad et al., 2007), but no attempt has been made to explore how these 
constructs actually function in relation to each other in the context of climate change.  
In particular, three dominant social-psychological theories were compared. In the 
first model, affect is seen as an “information-processing” heuristic that guides and 
predicts risk perception (Slovic et al., 2007; Zajonc, 1980). In the second model, 
congruent with appraisal theory (Lazarus, 1984), affect is regarded as a post-cognitive 
concept, where instead, risk perception is conceptualised as a predictor of affect. In the 
third model, a dual-process perspective is advanced which integrates both theories and 
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suggests that experiential and cognitive processes operate in parallel (i.e. affect is thought 
to be both; predicted by – as well as influence risk perception at the same time).  
Drawing on the “risk-attribution hypothesis” presented in chapter 3, it is 
suggested that personal experience with extreme weather only leads to negative affective 
evaluations if people consciously attribute their experience to climate change. Using a 
structural equation modelling approach the hypothesised causal path relationships of all 
three models were compared. Results provide support for the aforementioned hypothesis 
in that the relationship between personal experience and affect is fully mediated by risk 
perception (i.e. cognitive / perceptual awareness of the risk). Yet, closer examination 
reveals that at the same time, once negative affective evaluations of climate change are 
formed, affect also functions as an important determinant of risk perception. In short, 
results from chapter 5 provide strong support for a theory of dual-processing, validating 
both theoretical perspectives and emphasizing the interplay between cognition and affect 
in shaping public responses to climate change (Marx et al., 2007) – which is considered a 
significant contribution to the risk perception literature (Finucane, 2012).  
Last but certainly not least, chapter 6 introduces a domain-context-behaviour 
(DCB) model. Until recently, much of the work on the social-psychological determinants 
of climate change mitigation behaviour has been mostly exploratory, unsystematic, 
intention-only and often non-representative (e.g. see Brody et al., 2012; Whitmarsh, 2009; 
Truelove, 2009; Tobler et al., 2012). In particular, the literature is characterized by 
substantial confusion over the role of environmental values and beliefs and perceptions 
about climate change in shaping specific mitigation intentions and behaviours. The DCB 
is a behavioural model that provides a novel and theoretically coherent explanatory 
account of how these variables are conceptually related to both each other as well as to a 
wide range of mitigation intentions and behaviours.  
                                                                     315 
 
 
Specifically, the DCB model suggests that general environmental value 
orientations (i.e. the domain) influence specific beliefs and perceptions about climate 
change (i.e. the context). Both values and climate change specific norms and cognitions 
subsequently influence a more broad and general intention to help reduce climate change. 
This general intention is free of specific time and context elements and works as a 
situation-invariant (psychological) orienting mechanism, activating and influencing 
specific intentions to perform mitigation behaviours directly as well as indirectly via more 
proximal behaviour-specific determinants. According to the DCB, mitigation intentions 
and habitual processes jointly predict mitigation behaviour. 
Following a few initial modifications, results from a structural equation modelling 
approach provide empirical support for the conceptual structure of the DCB model. In 
particular, biospheric value orientations (the domain) were found to influence general 
intentions directly as well as indirectly via risk perceptions, response-knowledge and 
social descriptive norms (the context). These results are in line with the idea that general 
value orientations shape human perception, influence the cognitive accessibility of 
relevant knowledge and determine the way that people attend to and select information 
(Stern & Dietz, 1994; De Groot & Thøgersen, 2013). Jointly the domain and context 
variables explain 66% of the variance in general intentions. General intent in turn 
predicted specific mitigation intentions directly as well as indirectly via the behaviour-
specific determinants (attitudes, perceived control and situational constraints). General 
intention and behaviour-specific variables together accounted for 57% of the variance in 
specific mitigation intentions. Specific intentions and habit jointly predicted mitigation 
behaviour, accounting for 35% of the variance. Overall, the explanatory power of the 
DCB model is very respectable, especially in comparison to prior research and existing 
models (e.g. Bamberg & Möser, 2007; Klöckner, 2013; Whitmarsh & O’Neill, 2010). 
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Another major contribution of this thesis follows from analyzing differences in 
determinants between low-cost, low-impact and high-cost, high-impact behavioural 
changes, as much of the literature has predominantly been concerned with the former 
(Gifford et al., 2011). Overall, consistent with other recent work (e.g. Whitmarsh et al., 
2011), results of the national survey highlight that compared to low-cost actions, the UK 
public is still significantly less engaged with and less willing to adopt more high-cost 
changes (e.g. purchase green energy) and a multitude of barriers are perceived to doing 
so. Furthermore, while common psychological antecedents could be identified that 
underlie engagement in both types of behaviours, a general motivation to act appeared 
less influential in predicting high-cost behaviours, a finding which is also congruent with 
prior research (e.g. Diekmann & Preisendörfer, 2003; Steg & Vlek, 2009).  
Although the DCB model provided a good fit for both behavioural categories, 
some notable differences emerged. While situational constraints were predictive of high-
cost intentions they were not predictive of low-cost intentions. Similarly, while habitual 
processes were predictive of low-cost intentions, habit was not a significant predictor of 
high-cost intentions. Overall, two important and promising findings are that low and high 
cost behavioural changes are significantly and positively correlated (r = 0.65), which 
could provide some (albeit indirect) support for the existence of potential spill-over 
effects (Thøgersen, 1999; Whitmarsh & O’Neill, 2010). In addition, another important 
finding is that the stability of the intention-behaviour relationship is approximately equal 
for both high and low impact changes. This is promising in the sense that intentions to 
perform high-cost changes are not necessarily less likely to materialise into action. 
 Lastly, compared to existing behavioural models such as the Theory of Planned 
Behaviour (Ajzen, 1991), the DCB model performs (at least) equally well (if not better) 
but also provides a more comprehensive and systematic explanatory account of a wide 
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range of important climate change mitigation behaviours. It does so specifically by 
illustrating, in a theoretically coherent manner, how relatively distant domain and context 
variables ultimately influence more proximal determinants of behaviour. 
 
7.1.2 Methodological Contributions  
 
 
This thesis also makes a number of important methodological contributions. First, the 
mitigation behaviour scale was specifically designed to be relevant to the context of 
climate change, comprising a wide range of impactful curtailment and efficiency 
behaviours. Secondly, a large number of highly reliable psychological constructs were 
measured so that their relative influence could be assessed simultaneously in a systematic 
manner. For example, instead of using “quick and dirty” measures of self-reported 
knowledge, an objective measure was implemented that differentiates between three 
important forms of knowledge (i.e. knowledge about the causes, impacts and solutions to 
climate change). Doing so is important because results are likely to be conflated when 
only subjective or partial knowledge levels are controlled for (Kaiser & Fuhrer, 2003; 
Roser-Renouf & Nisbet, 2008). In addition, past research has often used very different 
and inconsistent measures of risk perception (Leiserowitz, 2007), including single-item 
questions (e.g. Whitmarsh & O’Neill, 2010). Congruent with the approach of Leiserowitz 
et al. (2013) and Spence et al. (2012), this thesis used a total of 8 items to measure 
temporal, spatial, cognitive and emotional dimensions of perceived risk - allowing for a 
more comprehensive assessment.  
With regard to predicting mitigation behaviour, next to a measure of perceived 
control, contextual factors were taken more effectively into account by using a 
multidimensional measure of perceived barriers / situational constraints, which builds 
constructively on previous research (e.g. see Klöckner & Blobaum, 2010; Steg & Vlek, 
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2009; Tobler et al., 2012). Furthermore, while past research (e.g. Poortinga et al., 2011; 
Smith & Leiserowitz, 2012) has often relied on single-item measures of “holistic affect”, 
this thesis used several indicators to represent global affective evaluations without 
conflating the measure with a moral judgement (good/bad). The present research also 
adds to the literature by taking the influence of normative factors on perceptions and 
behaviour more widely into account through a social norms approach (Tobler et al., 
2012). Similarly, in terms of habit, although still self-reported, the current research goes 
beyond simple measures of past behavioural frequency, as habit has shown to be 
independent of the frequency with which a behaviour is performed (Verplanken, 2006).  
In addition, two other significant methodological contributions are made. First, the 
current research not only measured self-reported behaviour in addition to intention but 
also as part of a longitudinal design, allowing for greater confidence in causal claims 
(Bullock et al., 1994). Thus, in contrast to correlating belief-measures with past behaviour 
at the same point in time (e.g. Semenza et al., 2008; Whitmarsh, 2009), this thesis 
investigated how predictive values, intentions and perceptions of climate change are in 
Time 1 of self-reported behaviour in Time 2. Last but certainly not least, this thesis also 
provides behavioural researchers with some successful examples of how more complex 
(non-recursive) structural equation methods can be employed to better understand 
intricate systems of behavioural relationships. 
 
7.2 Implications for Risk Communication, Behavioural Change and Public 
Policy 
 
 
Overall, results of this thesis have clear practical implications. To begin with, the 
complex and multidimensional nature of risk perception suggests that public 
communicators should take an integrative approach; interventions should not only 
cognitively inform people about the causes, consequences and solutions to climate change 
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but they should also aim to foster strong biospheric values, affectively and experientially 
engage people and inform people that climate change is a societal risk that important 
referent others are worrying about as well.  
To this extent, some practical suggestions are offered. First, differences in 
determinants between societal and personal risk perceptions are in line with results of 
other recent research which has suggested hat the level at which people mentally construe 
representations of a risk are important to consider (Spence et al., 2012; Trope & 
Liberman, 2010). For example, results from chapter 4 suggest that people are 
significantly more likely to see climate change as a societal rather than a personal risk. 
Thus, in order to better leverage the effect of knowledge about the causes, impacts and 
solutions to climate change, this information should be communicated in such a way that 
it is made more locally relevant and relates to people’s daily experience (e.g. see also 
Doyle, 2011; Lorenzoni et al., 2007; O’Neill & Nicholson-Cole, 2009). Indeed, the 
“psychological distance” of climate change needs to be reduced temporally, spatially, 
emotionally as well as socially (Spence et al., 2012). To illustrate, people should have 
information on both; how their local UK region(s) and communities are likely going to be 
affected by climate change as well as information on effective response strategies.  
However, at the same, factors that are more proximal to people’s day to day life 
(such as personal experiences with extreme weather) need to be clearly linked to the 
broader societal issue of climate change (i.e. they need to be made globally relevant). To 
be precise, results from this thesis strongly suggest that in order for people to form 
negative affective evaluations of climate change, a conscious and perceptual bridge needs 
to be build that links how people’s experiences with extreme weather are conceptually 
related to the impacts of climate change (e.g. see also Weber, 2010). While of course no 
single weather event can be causally attributed to climate change, there is increasing 
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support for the usefulness of extreme weather as a persuasive communication device  
(e.g. Capstick & Pidgeon, 2014; Myers et al., 2012a; Spence et al., 2011), particularly 
because daily weather is less abstract and something people can easily relate to (Smith & 
Joffe, 2012). A potentially useful strategy is therefore to focus on the increasing 
frequency with which extreme weather events are occurring (Coumou & Rahmsorf, 2012) 
– so long as extremely cold weather events are framed as being compatible with the 
impacts of global warming (Capstick & Pidgeon, 2014).  
Overall, results suggest that in forming risk judgements of climate change, socio- 
cultural and experiential factors weigh in substantially more than cognitive or socio-
demographic factors. As mentioned, personal experience is important in stimulating more 
affective engagement with climate change. In fact, as this research and that of others’ 
(e.g. Leiserowitz, 2006; Smith & Leiserowitz, 2012) has shown, negative (holistic) affect 
is the strongest single determinant of risk perception. As part of this frame, this thesis 
does however not necessarily advocate a “fear-based’ approach – which, as discussed in 
chapter 2 has shown to be subject to many caveats and pitfalls (O’Neill & Nicholson-
Cole, 2009). Fear-based approaches generally result in maladaptive responses because 
they short-circuit cognitive-control mechanisms in the brain. Primarily because more 
neural pathways run from the amygdala (i.e. the emotional centre of the brain’s limbic 
system) to the brain’s prefrontal structures than the other way around (LeDoux, 1996). 
Thus, it is easy to be overwhelmed by fear but relatively difficult to control it.  
One finding worth mentioning is that recent research has similarly discussed a 
useful distinction between “worry” and “fear”. Compared to fear, worry is an active (but 
less intense) emotional state that often triggers and motivates increased cognitive, 
analytical and central processing of risk information (Smith & Leiserowitz, 2014). While 
taking note of the “finite pool of worry” hypothesis (Weber, 2010), framing climate 
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change as a risk about which to “worry” rather than as a risk to  “fear” is likely to foster 
more constructive public engagement with the issue (Smith & Leiserowitz, 2014).  
Lastly, the triangular relationship proposed in this thesis between cognitive, 
experiential and socio-cultural factors is entirely in line with the notion that information 
should be placed and framed in such a way that is does not trigger or aggravate existing 
socio-political, cultural or ideological differences, which are particularly pronounced in 
Anglo-Saxon countries (Painter & Ashe, 2012) such as the UK and the United States (e.g. 
Gromet, Kunreuther, & Larrick, 2013; Hart & Nisbet, 2012; McCright & Dunlap, 2011; 
Poortinga et al., 2011). One useful strategy to consider in this regard is the notion of 
“value-congruent” information processing (Bolderdijk et al., 2013; Corner et al., 2014; 
Steg et al., 2014), where the saliency of biopsheric value orientations can be leveraged in 
specific situations without conflicting or threatening the validity of other important values 
that people may espouse (De Groot & Steg, 2009). To this extent, audience segmentation 
techniques and tailored message strategies have proven useful in testing specific frames 
(e.g. public health) that appeal to different audiences (e.g. Myers et al., 2012b).  
 As illustrated by the second part of this thesis, risk perceptions also plays an 
important (indirect) role in driving mitigation intentions and behaviours. While a major 
finding of this thesis is that relevant domain (i.e. broad biospheric values) and specific 
climate change context variables (i.e. risk perception, response-knowledge and 
descriptive social norms) do not influence specific mitigation behaviours directly, they do 
influence a general intention to act. This general intention is an important motivating 
force in activating and predicting specific mitigation intentions, which in turn, in 
conjunction with habits predict specific mitigation behaviours. Thus, while risk 
perceptions, values, knowledge and norms clearly have a role to play in behavioural 
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change campaigns, an important conclusion of this thesis is the message that specific 
mitigation behaviours are driven by behaviour-specific determinants.  
To this extent, as discussed in detail in chapters 1 and 2, an important objective of 
this thesis was to stimulate the relationship between “theories of change” and “models of 
behaviour”. Public interventions often fail to take into the account the determinants of 
specific behaviours. While experiences with extreme weather and beliefs and perceptions 
about climate change may influence a general intention to reduce energy consumption 
(e.g. Spence et al., 2011; Spence et al., 2012), whether or not someone will form a 
specific intention (e.g. turn down the thermostat) and act on that intention, is very much 
dependent on situational factors and that person’s specific attitude towards the behaviour. 
While it is promising that general intentions to act influence specific intentions indirectly 
by creating more favourable attitudes toward performing specific behaviours, by creating 
more perceived control and less perceived situational constraints, it is still important for 
public interventions to focus on these behaviour-specific aspects. In fact, this conclusion 
has received increased attention and indirect support from other scholars as well (e.g. 
Ajzen et al., 2011; Hansla et al., 2008; Whitmarsh & O’Neill, 2010).  
Indeed, while it is often noted that many structural barriers to behavioural change 
exist (e.g. Lorenzoni et al., 2007; Steg & Vlek, 2009), this thesis highlights the need to 
focus on alleviating specific situational barriers to engagement with more high-cost, high-
impact behaviours. For example, while people often report that reducing meat 
consumption or changing transport and mobility behaviours is very inconvenient, it is 
important to realise that at least some of these perceived situational constraints (e.g. time, 
inconvenience) are psychological in nature and thus influenced by relevant attitudes, 
norms and value priorities. This implies that the perception of such constraints can be 
changed if public interventions incorporate messages that are targeted at alleviating 
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specific barriers – a strategy that is likely to increase the probability that people will 
implement the requested changes. 
  This thesis also reaffirms the finding that many low-cost, low-impact behaviours 
(e.g. leaving the lights on) are entrenched in unstainable habitual routines. When targeting 
specific behaviours, public campaigns should try to make people cognisant of their habits 
and provide information to make sure that alternative behavioural choices are mentally 
accessible to people. Ideally this should be done in an integrative manner as well. For 
example, if such information is preceded by “social proof “that referent others are 
changing their behaviour as well whilst endorsing biospheric values, people are more 
likely to be persuaded by the information provided. Indeed, such relatively simple 
techniques have recently demonstrated to be effective for low-cost behaviours such as 
bottled water consumption (e.g. Bolderdijk et al., 2013; van der Linden, 2013).  
 
7.3 Limitations of Thesis and Future Research  
 
While this thesis constructively advanced the literature and made a number of significant 
and original contributions, a number of limitations apply. First, one obvious limitation is 
the self-reported nature of the data. It is possible that respondents overstated their self-
reported intentions and mitigation behaviours or that the very act of measuring intention 
increased the probability of a respondent actually performing the behaviour (Gifford et 
al., 2011; Morwitz & Fitzsimons, 2004). In either case, this could potentially inflate the 
observed correlations between the psychological constructs of interest. Having mentioned 
this, the effect of social desirability bias in environmental surveys has shown to be 
relatively limited (Milfont, 2009). Moreover, one major objective of this thesis has been 
to investigate the psychological antecedents of a wide range of mitigation behaviours, 
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which limits the feasibility of other techniques (e.g. observation). Yet, future research 
could focus on obtaining more objective measurements (e.g. energy meter readings).  
Second, while the hypothesised structure of the DCB model fit the data well and a 
stronger case for causality was made by separating the measurement of psychological 
dispositions (e.g. intention) and self-reported behaviour (Podsakoff et al., 2003), a fruitful 
avenue for future research would be to explore the validity of the model in other contexts 
and cultures and to test the causal mechanisms proposed by the model in an experimental 
(field) setting. Similarly, the study reported in chapter 4 could be criticised for not using 
“clean” measures of cognition and affect and for only providing preliminary (tentative) 
causal evidence for a model of dual-processing. Experimental studies could induce and 
measure affective states physiologically and assess to what extent personal experiences 
influence risk perception and intention. For example, Zaalberg and Midden (2013) have 
recently done so using virtual reality simulations of flooding events.  
A third drawback is the fact that the national quota sample used in this thesis was 
obtained from a large online panel and is therefore not a probability sample. While online 
quota samples are generally regarded as less representative than probability samples, due 
to the increasing variability of membership in online panels and near universal internet 
access, differences between online and more traditional techniques are sharply declining 
(e.g. Berrens et al., 2003). Another short-coming of this thesis relates to missing data, 
both item non-response (e.g. due to sensitive demographic questions) and panel attrition. 
Although this could reasonably be controlled for by (a) identifying the likely mechanisms 
that determine the pattern of missingness and (b) by using the latest techniques for 
estimating missing data (i.e. full information maximum likelihood procedures), the reader 
should take this into account when interpreting the results of this thesis.  
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In addition, while many social-psychological constructs and behaviours were 
surveyed, the list is by no means exhaustive. For example, even although a substantial 
amount of variance could be explained using the constructs reported in this thesis, social-
psychological aspects of risk perception that could be added to the model in future 
research include; trust in scientists and experts, perceived benefits, mass media influence 
and climate change scepticism (e.g. Malka et al., 2009; Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2003; 
Poortinga et al., 2011; Slovic, 2006; Smith & Leiserowitz, 2012) as well as the influence 
of positive emotions such as “hope”. In terms of behaviour, future research could explore 
the usefulness of other potentially important factors such as pro-environmental identities 
and moral norms (e.g. Poortinga et al., 2012; van der Werf et al., 2013; Whitmarsh & 
O’Neill, 2010). Closely related, another limitation of this study is its central focus on 
mitigation behaviour. For example, future studies may want to include other important 
actions such as adaptation behaviour and support for climate change policies.  
Lastly, criticisms towards “incremental behavioural change” approaches are noted 
and the limitations of modelling “social, contextual and situational” factors are duly 
acknowledged here (e.g. Doyle, 2011; Shove, 2010; Uzzell, 2010). In addition to 
changing norms, beliefs and perceptions (or so-called “bottom-up” approaches), 
transitioning to a low-carbon society will ultimately require widespread changes in social 
practice, redefined meanings of human-environment interactions and large-scale policy 
(or “top-down”) support to help alleviate structural and monetary barriers to change 
(Lorenzoni et al., 2007). Still, a bottom-up approach will continue to play an important 
role in any multi-level effort as, at the very least, it can help increase support for and 
acceptability of such policies (Steg & Vlek, 2009).  
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7.4 Conclusion 
 
 
This thesis has illustrated that while public risk perceptions of climate change are 
complex and multidimensional, they are primarily influenced by three key psychological 
dimensions, namely; cognitive, experiential, and socio-cultural factors. In addition, an 
important distinction between societal and personal risk judgements is validated 
empirically. At present, climate change is still regarded as a “societal” risk in the mind of 
the public more so than a “personal” risk. To this extent, the relationship between 
personal experience with extreme weather events, negative affective evaluations and risk 
perceptions of climate change was evaluated. While personal experiences with extreme 
weather influence negative affective judgements of climate change only via conscious 
risk appraisals, affect and risk perception strongly and reciprocally influence each other.  
Overall, behavioural engagement (especially with more high-cost changes) is still 
relatively low among the UK public and perceived barriers are plentiful and 
multidimensional. Yet, while important differences in determinants exist between low and 
high-cost behavioural changes, evidence is provided for a common motivational roots 
driving mitigation intentions and behaviours. In fact, the domain-context-behaviour 
(DCB) model advanced in this thesis highlights that environmental values and climate 
change risk perceptions, norms and knowledge influence specific mitigation intentions 
and behaviours indirectly via a general orienting intention to help reduce climate change. 
Taken together, these findings strongly encourage public climate change campaigns to 
take an integrative approach in considering cognitive, experiential and socio-cultural 
factors and suggest that such campaigns should pay more attention to situational and 
behaviour-specific barriers and determinants in communicating and eliciting change. 
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Appendix A:  Supplement 1 to Chapter 6 
 
 
 
Table A.1:  Factor Loadings from Principal Component Analysis (PCA) 
 
 
 
 
Note: Rotated (oblique oblimin) two-factor solution. LL = low-cost, low-impact, HH = high-cost, 
high-impact. 
 
 
 
 
 
Climate Change Mitigation Behavior Scale (1-7)                                                                                                     
Rotated Factor Solution 
                
Mean 
                     
  LL                         
              
 HH
1.  Maintain correct tire pressure on my car  
2.  Only run the dishwasher when there’s a full load  
3.  Use a clothesline instead of a tumble dryer, when drying wet clothes 
4.  Alter my driving (i.e. avoiding sudden accelerations and stops) 
5.  Unplug (or shut down) electronics completely when not using them 
6.  Replace ordinary (non-saving) light bulbs with energy-saving (CFC) bulbs  
7.  Use energy-efficiency as a selection criterion when buying new appliances 
8.  Turn off my car when idle for longer than 30 seconds (except in traffic) 
9.  Turn down my heating/thermostat by 2 degrees  
10. Reduce my shower time to 5 minutes maximum 
11. Buy more locally grown and produced foods 
12. Reduce my driving by walking or biking more 
13. Use more public transportation (e.g. train, bus) instead of driving 
14. Reduce the number of miles that I fly 
15. Insulate my home or apartment 
16. Buy/consume less meat 
17. Buy carbon offsets when booking an airline ticket (whenever possible) 
18. Reduce my driving, by sharing car rides 
19. Switching from single glazed to double glazed windows 
20. Purchase home energy from a green source (e.g. wind or solar power) 
21. Purchase a more fuel-efficient car 
 5.96   
 5.83 
 5.49                                                                   
 5.41  
 5.39 
 5.32  
 5.18  
 5.13 
 4.96  
 4.82 
 4.59  
 4.33                         
 3.91 
 3.84                                     
 3.59 
 3.57 
 3.52 
 3.48 
 3.43                       
 2.83 
 2.55 
 0.36 
 0.24 
 0.29 
 0.36 
 0.30 
 0.22 
 0.23 
 0.36 
 0.30 
 0.26 
 0.21 
 0.18 
 0.12 
-0.01
-0.02 
 0.12 
-0.01 
 0.20 
-0.06
 0.01 
 0.04 
-0.09 
 0.09 
-0.01                                                       
-0.03 
-0.05 
 0.07                                   
 0.11 
-0.03 
 0.02 
 0.05 
 0.09 
 0.10                                  
 0.23 
0.38                               
 0.37 
 0.21 
 0.38 
 0.22 
 0.41                                                
 0.36 
 0.33 
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     Table A.2:  Effect of Socio-Demographics on General Intentions 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Hierarchical multiple regression with general intentions to help reduce climate change as 
the dependent variable. Values are standardised beta coefficients. Standard errors are provided  
in parentheses, *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05.  
 
General Intention       Socio-
Demographics 
  Context     
 Variables 
      
       (β) 
  
      (β) 
   
   
Gender 
(female) 
      0.14*** 
       (0.12) 
     0.04 
      (0.07) 
   
Age      -0.04 
       (0.05) 
    -0.06 
      (0.03) 
   
Education 
(higher) 
      0.09* 
       (0.13)  
     0.01 
      (0.07) 
   
Income       -0.01         
       (0.17) 
    -0.02 
      (0.10) 
   
Political Party 
(liberal) 
      0.20*** 
         (0.14) 
     0.03 
      (0.08) 
 
Biospheric Values 
 
 
Risk Perception 
 
Response-
Knowledge 
 
Descriptive Social 
Norm 
         - 
 
         
         -  
          
         - 
 
 
         - 
     0.06* 
     (0.02) 
      
     0.54*** 
     (0.04) 
 
     0.08*** 
     (0.01) 
 
     0.30*** 
     (0.03) 
   
N        588       588 
adj. R2 
∆ adj.  
       0.07       0.67 
      0.61 
Fchange        9.43     301.02 
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Appendix B: Supplement 2 to Chapter 6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure B.1:  Theory of Planned Behaviour (Ajzen, 1991). Note: Schematic overview of main 
components. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure B.2:  Value-Belief-Norm Theory (Stern et al., 1999, Stern, 2000). Note: Schematic 
overview of main components. 
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Figure B.3:  Theory of Interpersonal Behaviour (Triandis, 1977). Note: Schematic overview of 
main components.  
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Appendix C:  Sample Characteristics 
 
 
Table C.1:  Sample Characteristics  
Sample Characteristics      N = 808 
Gender  
  
Male 49.88% 
Female 50.12% 
  
Age  
  
18-24 12.75% 
25-34 21.16% 
35-44 22.77% 
45-54 21.91% 
55-65 21.41% 
 
Region 
 
  
East Anglia 7.30% 
East Midlands 6.44% 
West Midlands 
London 
North East 
North West 
Scotland 
South East 
South West 
Wales 
Yorkshire & Humberside 
Northern Ireland 
 
Education 
 
No Qualification                                                               
8.66% 
14.60% 
4.83% 
11.26% 
8.29% 
14.60% 
8.04% 
4.70% 
8.17% 
3.09% 
 
 
 
3.66% 
GCSE / O-Level / BTEC NVQ Level 2                                       
A-Level / International Baccalaureate 
      23.48%
19.19% 
Higher Education / National Certification 15.91% 
Bachelor’s degree or equivalent 
Master’s degree or equivalent 
Doctoral Degree 
I prefer not to answer 
22.35% 
11.49% 
1.64% 
2.27% 
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Table C.1 continued 
 
 
Political Party 
  
Conservative Party 19.57% 
Labour Party 26.77% 
Liberal Democrats 
UK Independence Party 
Green Party 
None of the above / other 
I prefer not to answer 
6.06% 
4.04% 
3.41% 
22.98% 
17.17% 
 
 
Income 
 
Up to £9,999                                                    
10,000 to 19,999 
20,000 to 29,999 
30,000 to 39,999 
40,000 to 49,999 
50,000 to 59,999 
60,000 and above 
I prefer not to answer 
 
 
 
         
14.52% 
24.24% 
19.70% 
13.76% 
6.82% 
3.79% 
4.55% 
12.63% 
 
 
Religiosity 
 
Christianity 
Islam 
Judaism 
Hinduism 
Buddhism 
Sikhism 
Other 
None (No Religion) 
I prefer not to answer 
 
 
 
 
      48.11% 
        2.40% 
        0.88% 
        1.26%  
        1.14%    
        0.38% 
        2.40% 
      38.13% 
        5.30% 
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Appendix D:  National Survey Questions and Items 
 
 
Screen shots of the online survey items and questions are provided below. Please note 
that due to question / item randomisation the survey displayed below is not necessarily 
the order in which participants viewed the survey questions (with the exception of certain 
blocks such as the introduction, demographic quotas and the end screen). Similarly, items 
were grouped together here in relevant blocks for display convenience. 
 
1. Introduction 
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2. Socio-Demographics Screener for Quota Sampling 
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3. Broad Value Orientations 
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4. Past Behaviour 
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5. Habit Strength 
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6. Climate Change Definition 
 
 
 
 
 
7. Generalised Affect 
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8. Risk Perception 
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9. Personal Experience with Extreme Weather 
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10. Descriptive Social Norm 
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11.   Prescriptive Social Norm 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12.   Impact-Knowledge Scale 
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13.   Cause-Knowledge Scale 
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14.   Response-Knowledge Scale 
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15.   Attitude Towards Performing Mitigation Behaviours 
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16.   Perceived Control Over Performing Mitigation Behaviours 
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17.   Situational Constraints / Barriers 
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18.   General Intention 
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19.  Mitigation Intention 
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20.  End Screen Message 
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21.   Introduction Follow Up Survey (Wave 2) 
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22.   Self-Reported Behaviour 
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Appendix E:  Focus Group Study Form / Human Subjects Approval 
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